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This research focuses on judicial decision-making in the federal courts to 
determine whether unwarranted disparities persist, and also to gauge the change, if any, 
that occurs over time.  Three sentencing outcomes were analyzed: the in/out incarceration 
decision, the length of term of incarceration decision, and the judicial downward 
departure decision.  Eleven consecutive fiscal years of data from all 94 federal district 
courts were used to assess the effects of a defendant’s gender, race and ethnicity, mode of 
conviction, offense type, district court location, and year of sentencing on the sentencing 
outcome.  The results of the study were presented along two dimensions, namely as 
overall aggregate findings concerning the effects of these factors, and secondly, as 
findings concerning the effects of these factors on each individual fiscal year to measure 
the changes in the influence of these factors over time.   
The aggregate findings show that female defendants are treated more leniently 
while black and Hispanic defendants were hampered in all three sentencing outcomes—
Hispanics more so for the incarceration decision, and blacks more so for the length-of-
term and the judicial downward departure decision.  The mode of conviction was found 
to be highly significant, penalizing those defendants who were convicted at trial.  The 
influence of the offense type categories, the fiscal year of sentencing, and many of the 
district court variables were also significant.  The findings from the temporal analysis 
indicate that gender became less significant over time in the incarceration decision as the 
probability of going to prison increased for all defendants.  The probability of Black and 
Hispanic defendants being incarcerated and of their length-of-term changed over time, 
but their likelihoods for receiving downward departures did not.  The only change noted 
for the mode of conviction was for judicial downward departures, but the change was an 
even greater decrease in the likelihood of receiving this type of departure.  Additional 
findings suggest that defendants sentenced for immigration offenses are treated 
differently at sentencing, and that differences in these three sentencing outcomes vary by 
district court and by the fiscal year in which the sentencing occurred. 
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CHAPTER I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1984, the United States Congress enacted the Comprehensive Crime Control 
Act.  The Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) was included in this important federal 
legislation.  The passage of the SRA eliminated indeterminate sentencing in the federal 
criminal justice system and created a determinate sentencing system based on Sentencing 
Guidelines formulated and promulgated by a new federal entity called the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission.  The presumptive Federal Sentencing Guidelines took effect in 
November 1987, and the United States Supreme Court upheld their constitutionality in an 
important ruling in 1989 (see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), 109 S. Ct. 
647 (1989)).  The principal purpose for the passage of these legislative reforms contained 
in the SRA was to reduce unwarranted disparity in sentencing outcomes in the federal 
court system due to the effects of extralegal factors such as race, ethnicity, gender, age, 
and socioeconomic status.  In particular, these reforms were aimed at increasing the 
consistency between sentences for offenders convicted of similar crimes by narrowing 
the scope of judicial discretion and by increasing the certainty and, in some cases, the 
severity of punishment for convicted offenders (Tonry, 1996). 
 Since the establishment of the Guidelines, a number of research studies have 
analyzed sentencing outcomes for offenders convicted in the federal criminal justice 
system.  Even the U.S. Sentencing Commission has collected and analyzed sentencing 
data in order to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the Sentencing Guidelines.  
Many of these studies have attempted to measure the reduction, if any, in sentencing 
disparity by gender or across racial and ethnic categories.  Despite this growing body of 
research, there remains a lack of consensus regarding the integrity of sentencing under a 
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presumptive guidelines regime across different judicial districts from a longitudinal 
perspective.  A presumptive sentence attaches a penalty to a conviction that must be 
adhered to by the sentencing court unless extraordinary mitigating or aggravating 
circumstances relating to the case demand either an increased or a decreased penalty 
(Tonry, 1992; 1993).  Additionally, there has been too little focus on unraveling the 
discretion of federal judges apart from the conduct of other courtroom actors and separate 
from the influence of the presumptive sentence prescribed by the Sentencing Guidelines 
themselves.  To build a cohesive theory of sentencing under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, a longitudinal study which takes these variables into account is needed. 
 This dissertation will review the results and conclusions of previous research 
studies and present new research hypotheses to examine the balance between judicial 
discretion and residual disparity due to extralegal variables such as race, ethnicity, and 
gender constructed within a longitudinal framework.  The empirical analysis will use 
similar variables and methods as previous studies that have examined the effects of 
extralegal variables on sentencing outcomes in the federal courts.  However, it will also 
build upon the foundational findings from research studies of state sentencing guidelines 
systems.  Specifically, it will use sentencing data on convicted federal offenders during 
the period of fiscal years 1993 through 2003.  The year of sentencing will be the principal 
component of longitudinal measurement and judicial districts will be used to determine 
geographic differences.   In addition, it will analyze sentencing data from the spectrum of 
convicted crimes in the federal system by a grouping process which will place each type 
of crime into categories to examine differences in sentencing outcomes between white, 
black, and Hispanic male and female offenders.  It is hypothesized that male and female 
3
offenders of different races and ethnicities will receive disparate treatment between 
judicial districts and over time as measured by the in/out incarceration decision and the 
length of term decision, but that these disparities in sentencing outcomes should lessen as 
the Guidelines become more accepted and adhered to by the federal judiciary.  It is also 
hypothesized that the racial, ethnic, and gender disparities that occur as a result of 
downward departures granted by federal judges will decrease between judicial districts 
and over time as sentencing under the Guidelines becomes more normative and 
standardized. 
 This dissertation contains eight chapters.  The first chapter introduces the topic of 
the undertaken research.  The second chapter reviews the history of the emergence of 
presumptive sentencing guidelines and the historical context underlying the transition to a 
determinate sentencing system.  It discusses the roles of federal judges and the efforts of 
sentencing reform to reduce the discretion exercised by them.  It explains the process of 
applying the Guidelines at sentencing.  It also reviews the criticisms of the Sentencing 
Guidelines and important legal cases that have contributed to their development, 
culminating with a discussion of their current status.  The third chapter summarizes the 
research that has examined racial, ethnic, and gender disparity in sentencing outcomes 
under sentencing guidelines in the federal system and various state systems.  The fourth 
chapter discusses the theoretical underpinnings of criminal justice sanctions and 
courtroom behaviors, with a particular focus on judicial behavior and the sentencing 
decision.  It then presents the hypotheses to be tested in the current study.  The fifth 
chapter presents the methodological framework for measurement and analysis and 
discusses the data and variables utilized to perform the longitudinal analysis.  The sixth 
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chapter presents the descriptive statistics of the variables and the results of the bivariate 
correlation analysis between the variables.  The seventh chapter summarizes the results of 
the multivariate empirical analysis by describing the significant effects of the 
independent variables on the three judicial outcome decisions, namely the incarceration 
decision, the length-of-term decision, and the judicial downward departure decision.  
These findings are presented along two dimensions in order to present, first, an overall 
view of sentencing and then, second, a year-by-year analysis to measure change over 
time.  Finally, chapter eight contains the conclusions which were formulated from the 
research findings, outlines the research caveats, and addresses certain policy implications 
that may be inferred from the findings of the study. 
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CHAPTER II.  SENTENCING COURTS AND SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
History of U.S. Sentencing Commission and Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
 Justice is commonly portrayed as a blindfolded woman who holds a balancing 
scale in one hand and wields a sword in the other hand in order to represent the 
measurement of justice and the exaction of revenge upon the guilty.  The blindfold 
represents equality, meaning that justice judges facts not persons.  Hence, the intangible 
ideal of balanced justice is brought to life through palpable form and features.  With 
justice personified, the belief that justice can be accomplished and its significance for a 
democratic society becomes solidified. 
 The ideal of equal justice and equality under the law are embedded in the 
amendments accompanying the Constitution of the United States and are ingrained in the 
citizenry as inherent rights necessary to sustain a free society.  Notwithstanding, the law 
has treated people differently.  In response to the detrimental treatment of those people, 
the criminal justice system has been scrutinized and studied by practitioners and non-
practitioners alike.  The consequences of this concerted effort played a prominent role in 
influencing the development of a determinate federal criminal justice system that 
promised to treat all individuals alike.  The end result was embodied in a solution to 
ensure that every convicted offender is treated alike in order to make sure that no one is 
treated differently.  
 In trying to accomplish the ideal of equal justice, many scholars and practitioners 
have proposed ideas to overcome discrimination at various locations in the criminal 
justice system.  Judge Marvin E. Frankel (1972), a distinguished judge serving on the 
federal bench in the Southern District of New York, is credited with taking the theoretical 
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discussions surrounding sentencing guidelines and building a concrete formula for their 
implementation in the federal criminal justice system.  His book gave form and feature to 
an idea of sentencing, helping it to gain momentum and force and political proponents 
until the idea was given life in the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) of 1984.  Congress’s 
historic passage of the Sentencing Reform Act aimed to correct and remedy unwarranted 
sentencing disparities (Hall, 1999). 
 The push for sentencing reform has ebbed and flowed throughout the last century.  
However, the latter end of the twentieth century appeared to herald the end of the era of 
indeterminate sentencing in the federal criminal justice system, in favor of sanctioning all 
people alike based on their crimes and disregarding their individual circumstances.  The 
concept of sentencing reform was originally conceived by and credited to liberal political 
reformers during the 1970s as an anti-imprisonment and antidiscrimination measure.  
Liberal politicians felt that Sentencing Guidelines would ameliorate the problems 
concerning discrimination and the ideal of equal treatment under the law; a result arising 
out of the exercise of such wide discretion by federal judges, whose power to determine a 
sentence under the indeterminate federal statutes appeared almost limitless.  Sentencing 
reform eventually evolved and was brought about as part of a more conservative law-and-
order crime control measure during the early 1980s, although it was still widely 
supported on both sides of the political aisle.  Conservatives supported the reforms 
because of perceived leniency in sentencing offenders convicted of egregious crimes 
(Anderson et al, 1999). 
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act was enacted in 1984 and contained major 
federal criminal law reforms.  Among the reforms was the Sentencing Reform Act of 
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1984 (SRA), which established the U.S. Sentencing Commission as an independent 
commission within the judicial branch of the federal government (Hauser, 1993).  The 
result was a transfer of sentencing authority from individual federal judges to an 
administrative Sentencing Commission.  The U.S Sentencing Commission (hereinafter 
Commission) employs personnel who are equipped with specialized technical 
competence in the area of sentencing to formulate Guidelines and policy directives using 
comprehensive procedural approaches and who are supposed to be insulated from short-
term political pressure (Tonry, 1993; Payne, 1997).  However, some critics have 
suggested that, as a bureaucracy, it has in some cases proven to be even less responsive to 
judicial concerns about fair and just punishment than the elected politicians in Congress 
(Stith and Koh, 1993; Tonry 1992; 1996). 
The Commission was formed to draft Guidelines that would narrow the disparity 
in sentences imposed by federal courts upon similarly situated defendants for comparable 
criminal conduct.  This original group of nationally-recognized sentencing practitioners 
and experts designed the Guidelines to incorporate a wide variety of legally relevant 
factors that were considered important under prior federal sentencing practice (Kautt and 
Spohn, 2002).  The Commission’s ruling body has seven voting members and two ex-
officio members.  Three of these Commissioners must be sitting federal judges, and no 
more than four may be members of the same political party (Ogletree, 1988).  The three 
federal judges are chosen from a group of six recommended by the Judicial Conference 
of the United States (Sisk et al., 1998). 
The seven Commissioners are appointed by the President and confirmed by the 
U.S. Senate.  They each serve six-year staggered terms.  Over the years, these politically-
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appointed Commissioners have consisted of lawyers from private firms, attorneys from 
the federal government, federal judges, an economist, a sociologist, a member of the U.S. 
Parole Commission, and a few professors of law.  One Commissioner, Stephen G. 
Breyer, has gone on to become a U.S. Supreme Court Justice.  The Commission’s 
chairperson has always been a federal judge.  This makes the Commission unique 
because it consists of members from the judicial branch of government, but is empowered 
to perform functions of the legislative branch of government.  For the Guidelines and 
their amendments to become law, the U.S. Congress must not enact a law to the contrary 
before the congressional term expires each year on May 1.  By not acting before the 
deadline, the proposed Guidelines become law. 
 The Commission was mandated by the U.S. Congress to develop and promulgate 
Guidelines characterized by honesty, uniformity, and proportionality (Mustard, 2001).  
This statutory mission was interpreted by the Commission to further the basic purposes of 
criminal punishment through deterrence, incapacitation, and just deserts.  Rehabilitation 
was also included as a lesser, but still important, under-girding to the formulation of the 
Guidelines (USSC Guidelines Manual, 2001).  Thus, the Commission was established 
and recognized as an official government agency with the responsibility for developing 
the Guidelines.  
The final draft of the Sentencing Guidelines was written at a late date in some 
haste to meet the “unreasonable submission deadline” set by the U.S. Congress (Ogletree, 
1988, p. 1,947).  The principal intent of the original Commissioners in drafting the 
Guidelines was to achieve uniformity among similar criminal conduct and proportionality 
between different types of offenses (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1991).  For the most 
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part, the penalty ranges of the Guidelines were estimated using typical, or average, 
sentence lengths for each offense category based on a study of past sentencing practices.  
This was viewed as a way to bridge historical and future sentencing practices in a manner 
that would invite voluntary participation from the federal judiciary (Harcourt, 2003).  The 
penalty ranges were also influenced by Congressional pressure applied through the 
concurrent passage of mandatory minimum and career criminal statutes, resulting in a 
“problematic merging” of mandatory penalties with the Guidelines (Kautt, 2002, p. 638).  
Consequently, the Commission established ranges that were significantly more severe 
than past practice for certain crimes such as drug trafficking, white collar crime, robbery, 
murder, aggravated assault, immigration offenses, and rape (U.S. Sentencing 
Commission, 2004). 
The Guidelines were to be completed and implemented by the federal criminal 
justice system on November 1, 1987 (see Tonry, 1996 for a complete history).  The focus 
on the individual offender and an individually-tailored sentence was shifted to a new 
system that focused on the criminal offense and arranged for numerical equality in 
sentence length for defendants convicted of similar crimes.  The Guidelines explicitly 
prohibit consideration of factors “not ordinarily relevant” (U.S.S.C. Guidelines Manual, 
2001, p. 384).  Through policy statements and amendments, this broad prohibition has 
come to include youthful age, education and vocational skills, mental and emotional 
conditions, physique, drug and alcohol dependence, employment record, family ties and 
responsibilities, community ties, race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, socioeconomic 
status, military, civic, charitable, or other public service, lack of guidance as a youth, and 
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similar circumstances indicating a disadvantaged upbringing (Harcourt, 2003; Mustard, 
2001). 
Regardless of these monumental efforts to achieve the ideal of equal justice, 
disparity has not altogether been eradicated.  Equal treatment of all persons convicted of 
the same crimes has not resolved the differences created by the unique and varied 
circumstances of individual offenders.  Instead, “identical treatment regardless of 
individual differences has eviscerated our more refined notions of individual justice, and 
the belief that “justice is blind” has yielded to the reality that, in fact, blind justice is 
injustice” (Ogletree, 1988, p. 1,960).  Justice requires both uniformity, where similar 
offenders who commit similar offenses are sentenced similarly, and fairness, where the 
sentencing judge considers all knowable exigencies of a particular situation so that a just 
sentence is imposed (Levine, 2002; Bush, 1990). 
Federal Judges and Discretion 
Spurred by concerns to defend their sentencing decisions in the public spotlight, 
several individual judges spoke out in public forums to share their personal opinions 
about sentencing reform.  While compelling, the remarks of these individual judges was 
not equal to the potential weight of the body of the entire bench membership.  Their 
participation was construed as a way to avoid a legislative solution that would in effect 
dictate their work, magnifying and micromanaging a process which, historically, was 
viewed as their unique litigious domain. 
As a result, the federal judiciary, as a unified body, had little influence on the 
development of sentencing reform legislation.  Instead, for the most part, federal judges 
always stayed on the periphery of the sentencing reform debate, almost as if by ignoring 
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the problem, it would fade away into obsolescence.  The organized federal judiciary’s 
governing body, the Judicial Conference of the United States, took little, if any, initiative 
to explore changes in sentencing procedure with interested congressional staff members 
or people in the academic world.  In short, “the federal judiciary’s failure to forestall the 
Senate’s passage of the bill authorizing the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act and its 
inability even to convince the Senate to assign judges the predominant role in developing 
Sentencing Guidelines were, in retrospect, defaults of decisive significance” (Stith and 
Koh, 1993, p. 230).   
In retrospect, it is difficult to think of any action substantial enough to thwart or 
even delay sentencing reform any longer.  Sentencing reform was imminent.  Perhaps the 
Judicial Conference would have been successful if they had lobbied for Guidelines that 
were advisory rather than presumptive.  In this manner, they would have worked in 
cooperation with Congress to devise the Guidelines rather than have a rigid system of 
rules thrust upon them. 
One of the principal purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) was to limit 
judicial discretion.  Discretion, in this context, refers to “the means by which actors in the 
criminal justice system substitute their own judgment, interests, or objectives for formally 
specified statutory punishments in order to influence criminal justice outcomes” (Kessler 
and Piehl, 1998, p. 256).  Up until this time, an indeterminate system had bestowed wide 
latitude upon federal judges in determining appropriate sentencing options.  They 
exercised an enormous and virtually unreviewable amount of discretion when 
determining a suitable sentence.  Prior to the adoption of the SRA, federal judges’ 
discretion seemed almost infinite, as long as the sentence imposed did not exceed broad 
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statutory limits (Ogletree, 1988).  While viewed as positive and necessary by the 
judiciary, this latitude was not seen in the same positive light by the other members of the 
courtroom workgroup.  Thus, the ability of the Sentencing Guidelines to limit judicial 
discretion was hailed by conservatives and liberals alike.  Sentencing Guidelines would 
supposedly sentence offenders convicted of like crimes alike.  No offender would ‘get off 
easy,’ nor would he receive a harsher sanction than was called for by the criminal 
offense. 
 For this reason, when the U.S. Sentencing Commission was established, many 
judges serving on the federal bench were visibly shaken and upset.  Some were outraged.  
They knew that the Sentencing Guidelines would limit their discretion and many felt as if 
their hands were being tied.  More than a few judges expressed concerns that they would 
be unable to perform their judicial functions so as to satisfy the demands of justice 
required for each individual and unique case.  Unfortunately, the independence and 
autonomy many federal judges held as a virtue of their position also contributed to their 
loss of power to exercise broad discretion over the sentencing decision.  According to 
Stith and Koh (1993), disgruntled federal judges have no one to blame but themselves for 
two important reasons.  First, they failed to address sufficiently the issue of disparity in 
sentencing as a unified judicial conference when it surfaced as a significant political issue 
in the 1970s.  Second, they failed to unite their voices of dissent in such a way as to 
anticipate or to persuade Congress of the potential detrimental consequences of the 
Sentencing Reform Act before it was passed. 
In any case, many judges refused to adhere to the Sentencing Guidelines.  During 
1988, federal district judges were compelled to address the issue of whether the 
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Sentencing Guidelines were constitutional in nearly 300 separate case decisions.  In 
almost two-thirds of the rulings, federal judges invalidated the Guidelines on various 
constitutional grounds as challenged by the defense counsel (Sisk et al., 1998).  As one 
district judge commented at the time, federal criminal sentencing had quickly dissolved 
into chaos (see United States v. Ortega Lopez 684 F. Supp. 1506, 1520, & n.12 (C.D. cal. 
1988)(en banc)).  The sentencing crisis was resolved on January 18, 1989, when the 
constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines was upheld in an 8 to 1 decision of the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), 109 S. Ct. 647 
(1989).   
The Mistretta decision is historic in its importance because it clearly marked the 
end of the era of the indeterminate sentencing system in the federal criminal justice 
system.  In subsequent years, the Truth in Sentencing Act was passed limiting sentence 
reduction for good behavior to fifteen percent, discretionary parole was abolished, and 
mandatory minimums were put into place for certain crimes, particularly those involving 
drugs.  Federal judges have come to accept the Sentencing Guidelines, and some have 
even pointed to the benefits of standardizing the sentencing process.  For those judges 
appointed to the federal bench after the Mistretta decision, sentencing by the 
Commission’s Guidelines is all they know.  The other federal judges with longer tenure 
similarly follow suit, possibly deferring to the principle of faithful adherence to a higher 
court’s precedents in combination with the desire to make sound decisions that produce 
congruence in typical cases involving settled issues of law (Klein and Hume, 2003). 
 There are currently 94 district courts, each state having at least one district and as 
many as four districts.  Likewise, the Unites States and its territories are divided into 12 
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regional circuits, each including three or more states (with the exception of the District of 
Columbia circuit) (Kautt, 2002).  The number of judges varies by district.  The amount 
and type of workload carried by each judge varies as well.  There is no formalized system 
of guidance or oversight of a federal judge’s independent caseload among the district or 
circuit courts, although statistics on the work load of district courts are included in the 
Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (Smith and 
Dickey, 1999; Sisk et al., 1998). 
Federal judicial nominations have received widespread notoriety in the media 
over the past few years.  Earning a seat on the federal bench requires both patience and 
thick skin to get past the contentious political maneuvering of both major political parties.  
Once the president submits a nominee’s name to the judiciary committee of the U.S. 
Congress, the potential judicial candidate must be approved by a majority vote (Johnson 
and Songer, 2002).  Appointments are for life, or until judges decide to retire or 
relinquish their post for a job in the private sector.  Thus, federal judges are supposedly 
free from the political pressures of local and national politics (Tonry, 1993).  They do not 
need to worry about being re-elected.  They are insulated from local community or 
constituent expectations.  They are also removed from the impact of local concerns such 
as racial and ethnic immigration.  Their only concern should be whether their judicial 
decisions will be upheld on appeal to the higher circuit courts (Pribil, 1992; Reitz, 1998).  
At the same time, however, federal judges are not immune from potential political 
influence if they are seeking career advancement within the federal judiciary, such as the 
opportunity to be nominated and appointed to the appellate courts or even the U.S. 
Supreme Court (Sisk et al., 1998). 
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Application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
 Sentencing under the Federal Guidelines is dependent upon two factors—offense 
seriousness and criminal history.  All legal variables should be contained within these 
two factors.  Whether the offender is committing his first crime or his tenth crime, this is 
calculated into the criminal history score.  The criminal history score is determined by the 
number of prior convictions, the length of the sentences that were imposed for each, and 
how recently the offender was last convicted or incarcerated for any prior offenses.   
 The criminal history score is determined in large part by the length of prior 
sentences rather than on an evaluation of the nature and seriousness of prior criminal 
conduct.  The Commission itself has acknowledged that the criminal history score is 
unlikely to take into account and might not reveal all the variations in the severity of 
criminal history that may occur (Hauser, 1993).  For this reason, once calculated, the 
criminal history score is not final.  The Commission has provided judges with some 
discretion to depart from the designated criminal history score when reliable information 
regarding the criminal history background of the defendant indicates that the score fails 
to reflect adequately the seriousness of the offender’s past conduct or the likelihood that 
the offender will commit crimes in the future (Freedman, 2001). 
Whether the offense was bank robbery or distribution of illegal drugs and all of 
the legally relevant conduct that occurred as part of the offense is calculated into the 
offense level or seriousness score.  The offense level begins with a base offense level 
(BOL) assigned to each crime category, and is then modified by specific mitigating or 
aggravating offense characteristics (SOCs) that could raise or lower the offense level 
along its range.  The offense level is further refined under the general adjustment 
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provisions such as whether the offender obstructed justice or has accepted sufficient 
responsibility for the criminal conduct.  Additionally, the Guidelines take aggravating 
circumstances into account such as offenders whose criminal histories consist of two or 
more felonies, offenders receiving substantial portions of their income from criminal 
activity, those leading a conspiracy of three or more, and those who commit an offense 
while under state or federal criminal jurisdiction for a previous offense (Karle and Sager, 
1991). 
Meanwhile, all extra-legal variables should be excluded unless under extremely 
extraordinary circumstances.  In other words, age, race, ethnicity, gender, education, 
socioeconomic status, mental and physical health, parenthood, and other status 
characteristics are prohibited from being factored into the sentencing decision (Bush, 
1990).  Nor do the Guidelines allow for consideration of important offender 
characteristics such as prior drug history and the extent of the individual offender’s 
blameworthiness for the specific crime for which he is being sentenced.  Instead, the 
Commission concluded that only the defendant’s criminal history, his dependence upon 
criminal activity for a livelihood, and his acceptance of responsibility for his wrongdoing 
were relevant sentencing factors.  These factors place all the focus on the harm caused by 
the offender’s criminal act and little, if any, emphasis on circumstances that might serve 
to mitigate the punishment (Ogletree, 1988). 
Once the final offense level and criminal history score are calculated, the court 
refers to the sentencing table for the prescribed sentencing range.  The Guidelines include 
a sentencing table with 43 offense levels on a vertical axis and 6 criminal history 
categories on a horizontal axis.  Each cell in the 43 rows by 6 columns table contains a 
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range of months of imprisonment in which the judge must sentence the offender, unless 
circumstances warrant the granting of a departure.  Each individual range overlaps with 
ranges in the preceding and succeeding levels (Houser, 1993).   
The sentencing table is further divided into four zones that point out where 
available probation and intermediate sanctions are deemed appropriate sentencing 
alternatives.  Zone A is located at the top of the grid and prescribes all possible 
sentencing ranges between zero and six months.  That is, Zone A is the only part of the 
grid where only probation, without any kind of confinement, is an available sentencing 
option (see Guidelines Manual §5E1.1(a)(1)).  In Zone B of the sentencing table, judges 
have the option to sentence convicted offenders to a combination of probation with 
confinement conditions to include either imprisonment or intermediate sanctions (see 
Guidelines Manual §5B1.1(2)).  In Zone C of the sentencing table, “split” sentences of 
imprisonment and intermediate sanctions are available sentencing options for the judge, 
but confinement conditions in conjunction with probation is no longer included as a 
sentencing option (see Guidelines Manual §5C1.1(c)(3),(d)(2)).  Finally, in Zone D of the 
sentencing table, incarceration is the only sentencing option available to judges. 
The inclusion or exclusion of certain offense characteristics can produce drastic 
differences in sentencing outcomes.  One example of the tremendous variation resulting 
from the application of enhancements is demonstrated by convictions for offenses 
involving firearms.  Offenders whose crimes involved the use of firearms are subject to 
increased penalties under federal statute 18 U.S.C. §924(c).  Along with mandatory 
minimum laws for drug offenses and other serious federal crimes, Congress has enacted 
and amended federal laws for offenses involving firearms.  Indeed, their frequent use of 
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crime control measures such as mandatory minimum penalties shows an obstinate 
preference for obligatory statutes over the Commission’s Guideline enhancements 
(Hofer, 2000).   
 In response, the Commission has created several idiosyncratic rules for offenders 
convicted of the firearms statute.  As with similar mandatory minimum statutes for drug 
offenses, the Commission attempted to accommodate the statutory penalties by matching 
them up with Guideline penalties.  However, this merely resulted in two overlapping and, 
in some respects, inconsistent sets of rules delineating sentencing for firearms offenses.  
Moreover, the Commission has found that firearm enhancements are not applied in all the 
cases where they appear legally warranted.  This application difference varies across 
district jurisdictions.  The significance of this disparity cannot be understated because if 
the enhancements are not evenly applied, incapacitation is not accomplished and the 
deterrent effect of the Guidelines is undermined.  Inconsistent application weakens the 
Guidelines’ ability to achieve proportionate sentencing and avoid unwarranted disparities 
among similarly situated offenders (Hofer, 2000). 
 Under the Guidelines, weapon involvement in the offense is included as a Special 
Offense Characteristic (SOC), and is frequently decided by the judge at a sentencing 
hearing.  The standard of evidence at these hearings is by preponderance of evidence.  
The Guidelines neither require that a weapon be charged in the indictment, nor that the 
defendant be convicted specifically of weapon use.  They only distinguish between 
certain behaviors such as possessing, displaying, brandishing, threatening, and 
discharging a weapon.  Because of the relevant conduct provision, the weapon SOC in 
the Guidelines can be applied even if a defendant is acquitted of a section 924(c) count in 
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a multi-count indictment.  Any weapon that is present at a location where the offense 
conduct occurred triggers the SOC application.  The burden is on the defendant to 
disprove that the gun was related to the crime (Hofer, 2000). 
 Whether or not a judge decides to apply the SOC, or whether the prosecutor 
charges the defendant with that statute or dismisses gun counts can result in two 
offenders who have engaged in similar conduct receiving vastly different sentences.  
Discretion exercised by these court actors is what makes the difference.  The Guidelines 
cannot change this.  Instead, the consequences of sentencing reforms such as the firearms 
statute with its increasingly draconian penalties becomes just another weapon in the 
arsenal of the prosecutor to negotiate a plea agreement.  The consequence of these rigid 
statutes is that fairness becomes more dependent on the discretion of court actors and less 
on strict application of rule of law (Hofer, 2000). 
 Failure to apply sentencing enhancements for special offense characteristics such 
as the weapons SOC is known as “circumvention.”  It is important, however, to 
distinguish between circumvention prompted by the desire to evade the Guidelines and 
that prompted by a desire to avoid mandatory minimums.  It cannot be automatically 
assumed that sentences resulting from Guideline evasion are necessarily “wrong.”  
Sometimes they are.  But sometimes Guideline circumvention produces arguably just 
results.  The principal problem with Guideline circumvention is that it occurs in a context 
that forecloses oversight and obscures accountability. The persistence of circumvention 
in a significant minority of the guilty-plea cases presents a risk to the overall success of 
the Federal Guidelines effort (Nagel & Schulhofer, 1992). 
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This example of applying the weapons enhancement is just one way of 
demonstrating the fact that the Guidelines need more flexibility.  Yet, an effort to achieve 
greater flexibility must at the same time remain attuned to the need of preserving a 
system of structured discretion that avoids opening the sentencing process to widespread 
and problematic disparities like those that prompted the Sentencing Reform Act in the 
first place.  What is at stake is the subtle balance between flexibility and structure, a 
balance that may need further refinement in order to reach its goals.  This balance is 
complicated further by the constant requirement to adjust and fine tune the system based 
on the unforeseeable needs of the future (Wilkins and Steer, 1993).  
Criticisms of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have been criticized for a number of reasons. 
Most of the criticisms point to the rigid inflexibility and complexity of the Guidelines. 
Tonry (1996) presents a thorough and critical review of the criticisms of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines.  It is important to mention a few of them here.  First, the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines have come to be perceived as “mandatory” rather than 
presumptive.  Since their enactment, the Commission has sent a mixed message to federal 
judges by first telling them to consider the recommended range calculated by the 
Guidelines, but then sending new directives that require the judges to impose the 
Guideline’s sentence unless a particular circumstance that the Commission has failed to 
adequately consider is uncovered (Stith and Koh, 1993).  Thus, while the products of the 
Sentencing Commission’s labors have been given the modest name “Guidelines,” they 
have had the full force and effect of laws, prescribing the sentences criminal defendants 
are to receive.  The discretion of federal judges to depart outside of the presumptive 
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punishment ranges has been extremely limited and discouraged by the Commission.  In 
fact, critics assert that calling them “Guidelines” is somewhat of a misnomer (Cabranes, 
1994; Doerner, 1989; Gomez, 1995). 
A federal district court is directed to impose a sentence within the applicable 
prescribed Guideline range, if it finds the case to be a “typical” one (Koon v. United 
States, 518 U.S. 81, 85, 1996; Mistretta v. United States 488 U.S. 361, 413, 1989).  The 
Supreme Court, in Koon v. United States, ruled that appellate courts should use an abuse 
of discretion standard in reviewing the district courts’ application of the Guidelines to the 
facts of the offense conduct at sentencing.  Their decision also reasserted a district court’s 
prerogative to determine whether a particular factor or circumstance takes the case 
outside the heartland and warrants a departure.  Defining what involves a “typical” or 
heartland case has proven to be as difficult as defining what constitutes an 
“extraordinary” circumstance.  Any departures must be justified enough to convince 
appellate courts that the Commission did not already adequately consider the defendant’s 
personal circumstances.  A judge who disregards them or departs from them can expect 
his decision to be reversed upon appeal (Klein and Hume, 2003; Stith and Cabranes, 
1998). 
Second, the Guidelines have been criticized for being unnecessarily complex 
(Ruback, 1998; see Kramer, 1998 for a rejoinder).  The complexity of the Guidelines is 
born of an exhaustive attempt to create a system that would most fairly punish convicted 
offenders in the same way for similar crimes (Hall, 1999).  The sentencing grid is 
composed of 43 separate offense levels and six different criminal history categories, and 
this complexity may actually increase the risk of miscalculation and unreliability in 
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sentencing like offenders alike.  The Guidelines are difficult to understand, impossible to 
apply even-handedly, and frequently difficult to predict.  Annual amendments by the 
Commission have resulted in over five hundred changes in sentencing law during the first 
five years following the implementation of the Sentencing Guidelines (Wilson, 1995). 
 The Federal Guidelines are anything but simple.  There are a myriad number of 
adjustments that can be applied to raise or lower the final offense level.  A principal 
example of additional adjustments is the application of the Safety Valve.  This adjustment 
is frequently used for first-time offenders who are subject to mandatory minimum 
penalties.  It is intended to offset mandatory sentences in certain circumstances by 
mitigating the sentence.  However, proving all the requirements to apply the Safety Valve 
mechanism has been shown to be extremely difficult, contributing to its apparent 
arbitrary application (Pribil, 1992; Maxfield and Kramer, 1998) 
One Senior Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has 
criticized the Guidelines for their “excessive complexity” (Newman, 2000, p. 56).  As an 
example, he cites the loss tables for theft crimes where the formulation resulting from the 
Commission’s extraordinary detail “carries a sound general principle to an absurd 
extreme” (p. 56).  In other words, the theory of graduated punishments building upon the 
amount of loss appears to be a sound idea, but when put into practice, amounts to the 
displacement of sound judgment owing to the estimates of amounts of calculable loss, 
which are frequently imprecise.   
Monetary loss is highly contingent on both the discretion of investigating agents 
and the discretion of prosecutors, all of whom must take into consideration the financial 
and temporal constraints of building a successful case.  This judge contends that the 
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Commission’s detailed loss tables are exactly backwards in that they start with the 
amount of loss, which largely determines the sentence, and then provides slight 
adjustments for various factors, such as role in the offense.  He suggests that the current 
Commission move away from the overly excessive and detailed complexity devised by 
the original Commissioners (Newman, 2000). 
The Guidelines require that sentencing in criminal cases for numerous offenses 
depends primarily on the calculation of certain quantitative amounts of loss related to the 
crime.  This requirement has in turn created a need for statistical inferences about 
quantity.  In drug cases, the quantity of drugs and their corresponding weight is relevant 
in determining the Base Offense Level (BOL).  In fraud cases, the amount of money lost 
is relevant in determining the principle Special Offense Characteristic (SOC).  In 
########### and software copyright cases, the quantity of materials and their 
corresponding market value is relevant.  Because of the emphasis placed on quantity in 
determining the proper sentence on the Guideline’s grid, proper methodology in the 
practice of statistical sampling and inference approaches to estimate the appropriate 
quantities is necessary.  Since quantitative amounts are used as the basis for sentencing, 
improper sampling and statistical inference can undermine the interests of justice 
(Izenman, 2000). 
Criminal practice in federal courts requires a sophisticated understanding of the 
Guideline application rules.  The Sentencing Commission maintains a telephone hotline 
for probation officers to call with questions when calculating the recommended 
Guidelines sentence for the Pre-sentence Investigation Report (PSR).  In addition, judges 
must consult both the relevant statute and the Guidelines when determining a defendant’s 
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sentence.  Ultimately, the statutory maximum or minimum trumps the Guidelines if they 
are inconsistent, but usually they are not (Hofer, 2000).   
The Commission has consistently attempted to fit the Guideline ranges within 
both the maximum and minimum statutory penalties.  When the applicable Guidelines 
range is within the statutory penalty range, the Guidelines range is determinative, and any 
sentence chosen by the judge from within this range is permissible.  Otherwise, rules 
have been formulated for handling exceptional cases.  When the statutory minimum 
exceeds the Guidelines range, the judge is directed to use the statutory minimum as the 
sentence.  When the statutory maximum is less than the Guidelines range, the judge is 
direct to us the statutory maximum as the sentence.   
 To complicate matters further, a new Sentencing Guidelines Manual is published 
by the Sentencing Commission each year that incorporates the revisions and amendments 
adopted by Congress.  The Commission is constantly monitoring court decisions.  
Because of constantly evolving case law, the Commission claims that the amendment 
process is valuable because “Congress foresaw the necessity for periodic amendment of 
the Guidelines, envisioning a dynamic, progressive sentencing policy centered around 
Guideline application experience” (Wilkins and Steer, 1993).  The Commission was 
empowered by the Sentencing Reform Act with the initial and primary task of addressing 
intercircuit conflicts in Guideline interpretation.  Hence, the system is set up so that the 
Commission is always playing catch up.  This has further complicated the issue of 
Guidelines application because the question arises of whether to apply the current 
Guidelines manual at the time of sentencing, or whether to apply a previous Guidelines 
manual that was in effect at the time the offense was committed.   
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The Commission has attempted to elucidate the manual application question by 
requiring the sentencing judges to apply the Guidelines manual in effect at the time of 
sentencing.  Yet, every circuit has rejected sentences produced by this rule where an 
applicable Guideline was revised to the offender’s detriment between the time the offense 
was committed and the time of sentencing (Ferranti, 2003).  This ubiquitous rejection is 
based on the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution, which stipulates that no law shall 
be upheld which acts retrospectively to disadvantage an offender. 
 However, by applying the Guidelines manual in effect at the time of the criminal 
conduct, the problem is still not completely resolved.  For example, if a defendant 
committed the offense for the first time one year and then committed the same offense a 
second time the following year, the question then arises as whether to apply the 
Guidelines manual in effect at the beginning of the criminal conduct or at the end of the 
criminal conduct?  The circuits have not dealt equally with this question. 
 A third criticism of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines asserts that, rather than 
reserving the most stringent penalties for the most egregious crimes, the entire spectrum 
of sentences imposed are harsher than they were under an indeterminate system.  The 
passage of draconian mandatory minimum sentences by the U.S. Congress contributed to 
this increase because mandatory penalties will always “trump” a Guideline (Hofer, 2000, 
p. 52).  In response, the Commission raised the entire penalty grid to match the 
mandatory minimum penalties and avoid sentencing cliffs, thus increasing the overall 
sentence lengths for all convicted offenders (Wicharaya, 1995; Tonry, 1996). 
 Fourth, the discretion once exercised predominantly by judges is transferred in 
large part to the prosecution.  Whereas the actions of the bench are maintained in the 
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courts’ records, the actions of the prosecution are frequently done behind closed doors 
and are not subject to public scrutiny.  The role played by the prosecution has become 
larger and more important in determining the final outcome of the convicted defendant.  
This shift has likewise affected the role played by the defense counsel (Hall, 1999; 
Weinstein, 1999).  For example, departures that reward the defendant for his cooperation, 
known as “substantial assistance” departures, may only be awarded upon motion of the 
prosecution (Steffensmeier and DeMuth, 2000; Maxfield and Kramer, 1998).  Otherwise, 
the bench cannot make an independent determination of assistance to the Government to 
depart outside of the Guidelines. 
 According to Stith and Cabranes (1998, p. 78), the Guidelines attempt to repress 
the exercise of informed discretion by judges so that now the judge “merely functions as 
an automaton by mechanically applying the stark formulae set by a distant Sentencing 
Commission.”  Under the Guidelines regime, the sentencing discretion of the federal 
district courts has been so severely constrained that the inescapable conclusion is that the 
Guidelines, rather than the judges, now dictate the sentence imposed (Ferranti, 2003). 
 Reduction of unwarranted disparities in sentencing outcomes was one of the 
primary goals of the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA).  The SRA mandated that the 
Guidelines be entirely neutral to extra-legal factors.  This included the defendant’s 
socioeconomic status.  It has long been recognized that indigent defendants who are 
represented by public defenders and court-appointed attorneys do not receive sentencing 
outcomes as favorable as defendants who are not in such penurious circumstances 
(LaCasse and Payne, 1999; Gould, 1973).  The Guidelines were supposed to ameliorate 
this problem.  Instead of correcting this state of affairs, however, the situation has been 
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exacerbated by making a defendant’s sentence even more dependent on the quality and 
nature of a defendant’s representation (Hall, 1999).   
A defendant’s sentence is now determined, in large part, by the prosecutor’s 
decisions and the public defender’s adeptness in manipulating the Guidelines, as 
compared to the previous system in which the judge was almost solely responsible for the 
sentence.  The Guidelines have entrenched existing disparities based on quality of 
representation even deeper into the sentencing process.  The problem surfaces because a 
number of the offense characteristics turn on specific factual bases or assessments by the 
judge or the probation officer.  A defendant who is not adequately equipped to present 
mitigating evidence or rebut the prosecutor’s evidence can find his sentence quickly 
enhanced by factors related to the criminal conduct.  The public defender is charged with 
ensuring that factual determinations are accurate and that any enhancements made under 
the Guidelines are legitimate.  According to Hall: 
“Whereas disparities in the previous system of indeterminate sentencing 
inevitably lurked in the background, the current system of guidelines sentencing 
differs in two significant ways: any discretion that the judge might have exercised 
to check prosecutorial abuse is now legally foreclosed, and many defendants who 
might have chosen to plead not guilty and mount a defense under the previous 
indeterminate sentencing system are now likely to channel their legal resources 
toward mitigating the potential harshness of their punishment (1999: 1,334).” 
 
The transformation to a determinate sentencing system was a result of the 
emphasis on aggregation, probabilities, and risk calculation.  It was a reflection of 
criminal law during the twentieth century, which gradually evolved through the 
development and refinement of actuarial models.  However, actuarial models in criminal 
law are comprised of basic probability assessments and straightforward statistical models.  
They are not highly sophisticated and, frequently, are overshadowed by political choices.  
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The statistical methods employed in these actuarial models narrowed in on certain key 
predictors of crime—specifically, on the prior criminal history of the offender.  Thus, the 
penalty ranges of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are designed to converge along two 
dimensions: offense seriousness and criminal history. 
Criminal history is a powerful predictor of future criminal behavior; however, to 
rely solely on this predictor, to the exclusion of all other relevant variables, makes little 
sense.  There is documented evidence on the correlations between criminality and home 
conditions, physical traits, genetic make-up, social interactions, and neighborhood 
environment.  Sentencing Guidelines exclude all these factors in favor of relying solely 
on current offense characteristics and prior criminal history.  This staunch exclusion then 
begs the question, “how is it, after all, that purported correlations between prior 
incarceration and future criminality have led us to profile prior criminal history for 
purposes of sentencing and law enforcement, rather than to conclude that there is a 
problem with prisons, punishment, or the lack of reentry programs?” (Harcourt, 2003, p. 
164). 
Fifth, the Sentencing Guidelines have been criticized because of their unique 
application approach.  When an offender is convicted, all “relevant conduct” that 
occurred during the commission of the crime is taken into account, not just the behavior 
to which the offender pled guilty or was found guilty of, at trial (Tonry 1996, p. 78; 
1993b).  All conduct related to the offense can be used to determine the seriousness level 
for the sentencing grid.  By allowing judges to weigh all “relevant conduct” relating to 
the current offense conduct, the Commission was attempting to offset prosecutorial 
discretion.  Under the doctrine of “relevant conduct,” judges are required to consider all 
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knowable facts, when present, regardless of whether they are charged and whether the 
parties have made stipulations to the contrary.  
 Uncharged, but relevant, conduct was upheld by the courts throughout the 1990s.  
For example, in U.S. v. Quintero, 937 F. 2nd 95 (2nd Circuit 1991), the court noted that 
“for all the criticism the Guidelines have attracted, one of their virtues is the illumination 
of practices and policies that were applicable in the pre-guidelines era, but that received 
less attention when sentences were only a generalized aggregation of various factors, 
many of which were frequently unarticulated.”  Recently, however, the fairness of this 
approach was called into question by the third circuit court of appeals in the case of 
Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000). 
Apprendi v. New Jersey 
One of the most controversial aspects of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines was 
its emphasis on consideration of all “relevant conduct” (including acquitted and 
uncharged conduct) when determining the appropriate sentencing range for an offense.  
The relevant conduct provision of the Guidelines requires a sentencing court to consider 
“all acts and omissions…that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme 
or plan as the offense of conviction” (U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §1B1.3(a), 
2000, p.18).  In other words, conduct for which the defendant has been acquitted, conduct 
for which the defendant can still be tried and sentenced in a separate criminal proceeding, 
and uncharged conduct all fall within the scope of what constitutes “relevant conduct.”  
Moreover, these facts must only be proven to the judge by a preponderance of the 
evidence during sentencing rather than beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. 
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The idea of judicial fact finding at the sentencing stage of a trial had been 
supported by Supreme Court decisions up until this time.  In June 2000, the Supreme 
Court departed from this trend and placed a limit on the relevant conduct provision when 
it ruled in Apprendi v. New Jersey that “any fact (other than prior conviction) that 
increases the maximum sentence for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted 
to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt” (530 U.S. at 497 n.21).  This principle 
has become known as the “Apprendi rule” and functions as a check on legislative 
discretion to define elements and sentencing factors. 
The defendant, Charles Apprendi, was a man who fired several bullets at the 
home of an African-American family who had recently moved into his previously all-
white neighborhood.  Apprendi acknowledged to the police that racial bias motivated his 
conduct, and he asserted that he intended his attacks to send a message to the minority 
family.  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Apprendi pled guilty to two counts of second-
degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose and one count of third-degree 
unlawful possession of an antipersonnel bomb.  Under the conditions of this plea 
agreement, Apprendi could expect to receive a maximum sentence of twenty years.  
Following the evidentiary hearing, however, the trial judge found by a preponderance of 
the evidence that Apprendi’s actions were undertaken “with a purpose to intimidate,” as 
outlined by the hate crime statute of the state of New Jersey.  At sentencing, the judge 
applied the sentence enhancement, thus increasing the aggregate maximum sentence 
length Apprendi would serve to thirty years.   
Apprendi appealed the enhanced sentence based on the premise that his motive 
for the shooting as a racially-motivated hate crime had not been proven to a jury beyond a 
31
reasonable doubt and thus violated his due process constitutional rights.  In reversing the 
decision of the trial court, the Supreme Court concluded that the New Jersey hate crime 
statute was unconstitutional because it permitted a judge to impose a penalty based upon 
a finding of fact by a preponderance of the evidence, when in fact it should have been 
based on a finding of fact beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury.  The New Jersey law was 
struck down by the Court because it violated a criminal defendant’s Fourteenth 
Amendment right to due process and Sixth Amendment rights of notice and trial by jury.   
The Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi was decided by a 5-4 margin.  The 
four dissenting opinions contended that, despite their references to common law tradition, 
the Court has long recognized that not every fact bearing on a defendant’s punishment 
need be charged in an indictment or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  They 
also provided the first warning of its consequences on the determinate sentencing 
practices adopted by the criminal justice systems in many states and the federal 
government.  In previous decisions, the Supreme Court had supported the determination 
of legislatures in defining the elements of a criminal offense.  In fact, Justices Breyer and 
Rehnquist argued in their dissent that “procedural compromises” are vital to the 
functionality of the courts in the criminal justice system, and contended that there are far 
too many factors relevant to sentencing to permit, as a practical matter, submission of all 
or even most of them to a jury. 
The “Apprendi rule” requires that the particular elements of the alleged crime that 
will impact the amount of penalty at sentencing be included in the indictment and tried to 
the jury.  Interestingly, the Court explicitly stated that the Federal Guidelines were not at 
issue under the Apprendi ruling and declined to outline how the rule would affect the 
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procedures required when determining how to apply Guidelines sentencing factors. 
Apprendi v. New Jersey was a state case; therefore its impact on Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines must be inferred.  One such inference would be that the Apprendi rule would 
require jury determination of all facts that raise the applicable Guidelines range.  Another 
inference could be that any facts that would affect or determine the penalty range under 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines would also fall under the determination of a jury.   
There are two key points upon which rests predicting the amount of impact the 
Apprendi rule would have on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  First, the Court will 
have to decide whether the Guidelines sentencing factors and statutory sentencing factors 
are ultimately distinguishable.  Some would argue they are not.  Second, the Court will 
have to distinguish judicial fact-finding at sentencing with judicial discretion when 
imposing a sentence.  Both involve a judge’s exercise of authority, but only the latter 
affords a judge the flexibility to select a just punishment.  Judicial fact-finding is directed 
by the Guidelines, with a prescribed impact on a defendant’s sentencing range for each 
fact found.  Thus, it should deserve the full protection of the Constitution. 
Any increase in the applicable Guideline range constitutes an increase in the 
maximum penalty an offender can receive under the Sentencing Guidelines.  The relevant 
conduct provision permits an increase in the available maximum penalty based on facts 
not tried to a jury and not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  It therefore clearly 
conflicts with the principle announced in Apprendi.  Sentencing courts are still free to 
consider conduct not determined by a jury when imposing judgment so long as they stay 
within the prescribed statutory range (Russell, 2001). 
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Within two years of the Apprendi decision, over 3,500 federal and state decisions 
have cited Apprendi, and the Supreme Court has vacated and remanded more than fifty 
cases based on the Apprendi rule.  The effects of the Apprendi rule will have a particular 
impact on narcotics cases, where the quantity of the drug is directly correlated to the 
penalty range of the Sentencing Guidelines.  Thus, the government must charge drug 
quantity and prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, or the defendant must allocute to 
quantity at a guilty plea hearing before sentencing (Levine, 2002). 
 The Apprendi decision has caused a stir within both legal academic circles and 
criminal justice practitioner circles.  In addition to numerous articles, there have also 
been two major symposia devoted to examining the impact of the Apprendi rule (see 
Symposium: Reflections on the Consequences of Apprendi v. New Jersey 37 Criminal 
Law Bulletin 552, 2001; Apprendi Symposium 38 American Criminal Law Review 241, 
2001).  The Supreme Court itself has attempted to clarify its ruling, but in doing so, they 
have taken a “zig-zag” approach (Berman, 2002, p. 75).  For example, in Harris v. United 
States (122 S. Ct. 2406, 2002), the Court restricted the reach of Apprendi by holding that 
facts which increase applicable mandatory minimum penalties can still be treated as 
sentencing factors and do not require jury findings beyond a reasonable doubt.  In other 
words, the Harris majority declined to extend the same constitutional protections to facts 
that increase the statutory minimum sentence as the Apprendi Court extended to facts that 
increase the statutory maximum sentence.  But, on the same day, in Ring v. Arizona (122 
S. Ct. 2428, 2002), the reach of Apprendi was expanded when the Court held that facts 
which establish eligibility for the death penalty must be treated as elements of the 
criminal conduct and thus require submission to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  Thus, 
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rather than clarify the Apprendi rule, subsequent decisions that reference it appear to 
merely raise a whole host of new issues. 
 Speculation on the impact of Apprendi on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines has 
varied on a scale from little impact to sounding the death knell signaling the end of the 
era of Guidelines sentencing (Levine, 2002).  Within the two extremes of Apprendi 
having no impact on the Guidelines and Apprendi wholly invalidating the Guidelines, 
many possibilities exist.  In applying the Apprendi rule to the Sentencing Guidelines, the 
jury and not the judge must now find facts that would increase the penalty range of 
sentence length in which the judge must sentence the defendant.  Thus, whenever a 
sentencing factor exposes a defendant to a heightened punishment range, this factor 
triggers a defendant’s constitutional rights to due process, notice, and trial by jury.  The 
burden is on the government to include all aggravating sentencing factors in the charges 
at trial and prove them to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The Current Status of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
 In the years following the Apprendi decision, the Commission had the opportunity 
to reframe the Guidelines in order to secure them against further legal assaults 
surrounding the application of relevant conduct rules.  Instead, the Commission 
downplayed the importance of the Apprendi rule and chose to maintain the status quo, 
squandering their opportunity to clarify appropriate application procedures.  The window 
of opportunity closed at the beginning of 2005. 
In two separate but related cases (United States v. Booker and United States v. 
Fanfan), on January 12, 2005, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines must be considered “advisory” in order to comply with the 
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Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.  These two cases involved men convicted on 
federal drug charges in Wisconsin and Maine, respectively.  In both cases, the federal 
district court judges imposed greater sentences under the Guidelines based on the 
determination of a fact at sentencing that was not found by the jury or admitted by the 
defendant. 
From this point forward, federal judges are no longer compelled to follow the 
Guidelines.  In both cases, the Supreme Court found that presumptive Guidelines which 
require judges to make findings of fact in addition to the facts found by the jury or 
admitted by the defendant are unconstitutional.  The relevant conduct portion of the 
Guidelines prescribed that these factual findings be used as part of the basis for the 
sentence imposed, and this aspect makes them unconstitutional.  Moreover, both the 
defendant and the government will be able to appeal a sentence handed down by a federal 
district court, but the standard of review will be the reasonableness of the sentence rather 
than whether the sentence comports with the Guidelines. 
 In announcing its rulings, the Supreme Court determined that the remedy to bring 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in line with the Constitution is to excise two sections 
of the statutes that comprise the Guidelines scheme; namely 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (the 
provision that makes the Guidelines mandatory), and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (the provision 
that provides the standards for appellate review of a sentence, and includes that the 
sentence must represent a correct application of the Guidelines).  In effect, the Court’s 
holdings mean that judges must consider the Guidelines (among other factors) in 
formulating a sentence, but they are no longer bound to abide by their direction.  The 
Court did not adopt the proposed remedy whereby sentencing enhancements would be 
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included in the indictment and decided by a jury pursuant to a proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard.  However, it is implied in the ruling that this is the direction toward 
which the Court is pointing.  The ultimate effect of these decisions on federal sentencing 
will only become clear after the courts have utilized the new rules for some time. 
 The decisions that have negated the presumptive nature of the Sentencing 
Guidelines appear to signal the beginning of a slight shift away from the crime control 
model for the federal criminal justice system, the philosophy that drove the passage of the 
Sentencing Reform Act.  A vast amount of rigorous and highly scientific research 
conducted during the last two decades has proven that rehabilitation programs can be 
effective when offenders are matched with appropriate programs.  The idea of “locking 
them up and throwing away the key” has only resulted in a record number of individuals 
under the jurisdiction of the criminal justice system.  Recognition among the judicial and 
legislative branches of government that this trend is resulting in diminishing returns as 
more and more offenders with less serious criminal histories are being incarcerated for 
longer periods of time is definitely overdue. 
 At the same time, it is highly likely that the U.S. Congress will adjust the federal 
criminal code statutes to bring them into conformity with the constitutionality 
requirements set out by the Supreme Court rulings in the cases of United States v. Booker 
and United States v. Fanfan. Once these changes are addressed, it would then allow the 
Sentencing Guidelines to return to their presumptive status.  If the Sentencing Guidelines 
become presumptive again, it is imperative that the decision to do so rests solidly on a 
foundation of a thorough knowledge of the effects of Sentencing Guidelines on 
sentencing outcomes in the federal system.  The current study of sentencing outcomes 
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under the Sentencing Guidelines from fiscal years 1993 through 2003 will provide 
lawmakers with the resources they need to make an informed decision regarding the 
usefulness of presumptive Guidelines based on findings using scientific standards of 
significance and rigorous research methods.  In this manner, the ability of Sentencing 
Guidelines to reduce unwarranted disparity in sentencing outcomes across judicial 
districts and over time due to extralegal factors such as race, ethnicity, and gender will be 
known and measurable rather than being based on assumptions derived from samples 
limited in both size and scope. 
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CHAPTER III.  PRIOR SENTENCING RESEARCH 
Literature Review of Sentencing Guidelines Studies 
 The literature has accumulated at a somewhat sluggish pace concerning the actual 
performance of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, in part owing to the difficulty in 
examining differences in sentencing outcomes before and after their implementation.  
Some have attempted to measure the differences (Anderson et. al., 1999; Griffin and 
Wooldredge, 2006; McDonald and Carlson, 1993; LaCasse and Payne, 1999).   Also, the 
cumbersome size of the Commission’s databases may detract from scientific inquiry, 
which is often dictated by fiscal, temporal, and other manageability constraints.  A good 
portion of the research conducted thus far has been done by individuals with first-hand 
Commission experience or with personal knowledge of the Commission and accessibility 
to its personnel. 
 Studies of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have used numerous research 
designs and methodologies to analyze the data gathered each year by the Commission.  
One of the main purposes of the Guidelines was to make the effects of extra-legal 
variables negligible.  Therefore, the primary purpose underlying the research has been to 
measure the amount of disparity attributable to extralegal characteristics.  This has been 
done by analyzing the in/out decision, the length of term decision, the decision to depart 
outside of the Guidelines, or a combination of these three sanctioning decisions.  While 
no one has tried to assert that the Sentencing Guidelines have been able to erase the 
effects of extralegal variables, the debate has ensued about the extent to which they have 
managed to exclude them (Albonetti, 1991).  Overall, findings from these studies show 
that sentencing disparity among judges has declined since the implementation of 
39
Sentencing Guidelines.  However, it has not disappeared altogether (Anderson et al., 
1999). 
 Approximately one-half of the states have transformed their criminal justice 
systems from indeterminate systems into some form of presumptive or determinate 
sentencing system.  The sentencing guidelines developed at the state level vary in 
philosophy, purpose, and scope.  A great deal of research on sentencing outcomes has 
been conducted at the state level to determine the success of state sentencing guidelines.  
As a result, literature has accrued that discusses what sentencing guidelines can do, what 
a commission should do, the effects of guidelines on courts and different types of 
defendants, and the advantages and disadvantages of changing to a guidelines system.   
The majority of research has been conducted using sentencing data from three 
states—Minnesota, Washington, and Pennsylvania.  In 1978, Minnesota was the first 
state to establish a Guidelines Commission.  The state subsequently adopted sentencing 
guidelines on May 1, 1980.  Under the Minnesota guidelines system, the predominant 
factor influencing the appropriate sanction involves the severity of the current offense 
and, to a lesser extent, the person’s criminal history (Moore and Miethe, 1986; Koons-
Witt, 2002).  Much of the research surrounding the Minnesota sentencing guidelines has 
focused on the impact on jail incarceration rates (D’Allessio and Stolzenberg, 1995; 
Moody and Marvell, 1996; Stolzenberg and D’Allessio, 1996; Land and McCleary, 
1996), the abolishment of parole (Marvell and Moody, 1996), and the impact of 
incarceration rates on certain crimes such as homicide (Marvell and Moody, 1998). 
The state of Washington’s Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 created a determinate 
system with presumptive guidelines for the sentencing of adult felons.  The legislature’s 
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reasoning for punishment under the guidelines and their requirement that sentences be 
based principally on the offense seriousness level and the offender’s criminal history 
score was similar to the system established in Minnesota.  In the state of Washington, all 
superior courts are required by law to submit copies of all sentencing documents for 
felony convictions to the Washington State Sentencing Guidelines Commission who 
collects, monitors, and analyzes the data for research purposes.  This data is considered to 
be among the most complete and reliable among the states with sentencing guidelines 
systems.  Research has been conducted with this state’s data to determine the influence of 
legal and extralegal characteristics such as race and ethnicity and gender characteristics 
on departure decisions (Engen et al., 2003), as well as for predicting sentencing decisions 
and outcomes (Engen and Gainey, 2000). 
In 1982, the state of Pennsylvania enacted a sentencing guidelines system.  
Similar to other states, these guidelines are also based on categories of offense severity 
and prior criminal record.  However, Pennsylvania’s system is much less restricted in that 
it still permits significant judicial discretion.  Thus, there is considerable variation in 
sentences imposed across the 67 counties and 60 judicial districts in the state.  Much of 
the research surrounding the Pennsylvania state sentencing guidelines has focused on the 
incarceration decision (Kramer and Steffensmeier, 1993; Steffensmeier et al., 1993; 
1995; 1998), the context of the court communities on sentencing outcomes (Ulmer and 
Kramer, 1996; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004; Ulmer and Kramer, 1998), the social context of 
punishment decisions (Britt, 2000), and departures and the influence of extralegal 
characteristics (Johnson, 2003; 2005; Kramer and Ulmer, 2002). 
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The fact that researchers who utilize state sentencing data are asking the same 
questions as researchers who study the federal system’s sentencing data is no 
coincidence.  The same questions apply to both federal and state criminal justice systems.  
They both want to achieve the same end through their reforms—the reduction of 
unwarranted sentencing disparity.  Therefore, it is important to include a review of state-
level sentencing data in order to glean important methodological considerations and 
compare previous findings to paint a complete picture of the research surrounding 
sentencing guidelines.  It is not necessary to reinvent the wheel with federal level data 
simply because, up until now, it has only been done with state level data.  Before doing 
so, however, the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s own recent evaluation will be reviewed 
for comparison purposes. 
The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s 15-Year Review 
 In November 2004, the U.S. Sentencing Commission released a report to the 
public as part of its congressionally mandated 15-year review of federal sentencing 
practice.  This report was a follow-up to the first report submitted to Congress in 1991, 
evaluating and summarizing the first four years of federal sentencing under the new 
determinate system.  As stated in the subtitle of the 2004 report, the Commission 
attempted to assess the extent to which the federal criminal justice system is achieving 
the goals of reform that were outlined in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.  These 
goals were: to reduce disparity, to assure certainty and severity of punishment, and to 
increase the rationality and transparency of punishment.  The Commission’s 2004 report 
was based on a review of sentencing practices for six offense types—drug trafficking, 
economic crimes, immigration crimes, offenses involving firearms trafficking and 
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possession, violent crimes, and sexual offenses.  These offense type categories have 
comprised the majority of the caseload in federal criminal courts. 
The Commission’s report also summarized findings from a survey of federal 
judges.  Approximately one-half of federal district court judges and about one-third of 
circuit court judges filled out and returned the questionnaire.  While the Commission 
claims to be committed to an open dialogue with the federal judiciary, the survey 
response rate appears to be somewhat discouraging.  Demonstrating how the survey 
results are congruent with the general opinion of the entire judicial conference when such 
a large proportion of judges failed to respond to the Commission’s request to participate 
in the survey may prove to be problematic. 
 Both the incarceration rate and the average prison sentence length increased 
across all six offense types evaluated in the Commission’s 15-year report.  Following the 
passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, the Guidelines drug quantity tables were 
adjusted to match the severity of the penalty to the quantity of the drug, resulting in a 
dramatic increase in the time served by convicted drug offenders in the federal criminal 
justice system.  This trend is visible for all types of drugs, although the proportions are 
substantially higher for crack cocaine and then followed by powder cocaine, ######, and 
other scheduled narcotics.  The penalties associated with methamphetamine have also 
been raised in the last few years to be on par with that of ######. 
 Economic offenses constitute the second largest group of federal crimes being 
sentenced in the federal criminal court system.  The offenses in this category, commonly 
called “white collar” crimes, include offenses such as fraud, larceny, embezzlement, and 
tax evasion, and have historically received less severe sentences.  Under the Guidelines, 
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this trend has shifted away from sentences of probation toward more intermediate 
sentences that often include some type of confinement.  Similar to the drug quantity 
tables, loss tables in the Guidelines connect the monetary amount of loss to determine the 
severity of the corresponding penalty. 
 The number of offenders being sentenced for immigration offenses has surged 
since the mid 1990s. The two most common types of immigration crimes are alien 
smuggling and illegal entry.  After Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, revisions to the Guidelines placed most 
defendants convicted of immigration offenses deeper into the zones of the sentencing 
table where alternative sentences are no longer available.  As a result, the use of 
incarceration has increased substantially for immigration offenses. 
 Offenses which involved the possession, use, and trafficking of firearms in 
conjunction with a drug trafficking or other violent crime have also been given 
mandatory minimum penalties.  Corresponding amendments to the Guidelines have 
resulted in a 100 percent increase of prison term lengths compared to average prison 
sentences for firearms offenses before the enactment of the Guidelines.  The 
Commission’s own policy changes have been the most significant factor driving the 
increases in firearms offense penalties to double their pre-Guidelines figures. 
 Violent crimes such as murder, manslaughter, assault, kidnapping, robbery, and 
arson constitute a very small proportion of federal offenses.  The most common offense 
in this category is bank robbery.  While average prison sentences have not increased for 
these types of crimes under the Guidelines like the other crime categories, the elimination 
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of parole has increased the overall time served for violent crime to substantially higher 
levels. 
 The last crime type evaluated by the Commission in its 15-year review was sex 
offenses, which include offenses such as criminal sexual abuse, exploitation, and 
promotion of illegal sex acts.  Similar to violent crimes, these offenses constitute a very 
small proportion of cases in the federal criminal justice system.  Congress has passed a 
large amount of legislation regarding these types of crimes, and the Commission has 
responded with amendments and increased penalties for defendants convicted of sex 
offenses.  These changes have resulted in longer sentences for these types of crimes, 
particularly offenses involving minors. 
 According to the Commission’s report, racial disparity in average sentence length 
continues to persist because of mandatory minimum penalties associated with convictions 
for drug offenses.  The importance of drug quantity has taken precedence over all other 
offense characteristics in determining the final offense level.  Besides the amount of 
drugs confiscated by law enforcement authorities and submitted for evidence, the 
aggregate drug amount involved in the drug trafficking and/or distribution organization 
over a long period of time is fairly uncertain.  In these circumstances, drug quantity is 
frequently estimated from accounts by less-than-reliable sources.  The offense conduct 
narratives contained in the Pre-sentence Investigation Report often rely on potentially 
untrustworthy factors such as confidential informants and the testimony of co-
conspirators who have traded testimony for promises of lenient treatment.  Nearly one-
third (31%) of the district judges who participated in the Commission’s survey pointed to 
sentencing for drug offenses as the foremost or second greatest challenge in achieving the 
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purposes of a fair and just sentence.  The majority of judges felt that sentence lengths for 
drug offenses were excessively harsh in proportion to the seriousness of the crime. 
 The Commission’s report finds that some disparity still exists under the 
Guidelines.  Disparity persists both between individual judges and between districts.  
Departures outside of the Guidelines are the primary mechanism for residual disparity.  
The Commission’s evaluation found racial, ethnic, and gender disparity in average 
sentence length, likelihood of imprisonment, caseload, within range sentencing, and 
intermediate sentencing options.  Thus, while the Commission claims to have met the 
goals of increased rationality and transparency in sentencing and increased certainty and 
severity in punishment, goals of reducing unwarranted disparity and achieving a high 
level of uniformity in sentencing have only been partially achieved. 
 Interestingly, the Commission’s report notes that the number of cases on the 
federal criminal court docket has grown every year since the enactment of the Guidelines 
while the national crime rate has simultaneously decreased.  The Commission’s report 
states that, “the federal criminal justice system simply is handling an increasing 
proportion of a decreasing number of criminals in the United States and imposing 
increasingly severe penalties upon them” (p. 76).  This trend to incarcerate more low-
level offenders for longer periods of time has resulted in more individuals under the 
jurisdiction of the criminal justice system than in any previous era, or compared to the 
proportion of any other nation in the world.  Certainly, other changes such as the passage 
of truth-in-sentencing laws and mandatory minimum penalties have also contributed to 
this increase.  The Sentencing Guidelines are just one more reform of the crime control 
movement that has played a role in this incarceration trend. 
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The Commission’s report concludes that the Sentencing Guidelines are capable of 
controlling and changing sentencing practices.  Guidelines are also preferable to codified 
statutes since they take into account many factors and offense characteristics not 
identified in the formal legal code.  Finally, the Commission asserts that Guidelines are 
much better suited to sentencing than mandatory minimum penalties passed by Congress 
because they allow for more precisely targeted policymaking. 
Research on Sentencing Guidelines and Disparities in Sentencing Outcomes 
For more than 40 years now, research has attempted to determine the exact effects 
of race and ethnicity on sentencing, even whether an effect exists (Chiricos and 
Crawford, 1995; Spohn, 2000; Zatz, 1987; 2000).  Racial disparity in sentences for drug 
offenders has increased dramatically since the Federal Guidelines were promulgated.  
Racial minorities have been disproportionately affected, and research has uncovered 
significant variation in federal sentencing outcomes for drug offenses that legally relevant 
factors do not explain (Albonetti, 1997; Schulhofer, 1992; Steffensmeier and DeMuth, 
2000). 
Debate over racial and ethnic bias has continued, even as sentencing structures 
have changed from indeterminate to determinate systems.  Notwithstanding these 
reforms, opportunities for more subtle forms of discrimination still exist and continue to 
influence sentencing outcomes (Everett and Nienstedt, 1999).  Even formal Sentencing 
Guidelines such as those promulgated in the federal system still leave ample room for 
individualized sentencing and persistent disparity (Zatz, 1984; Miethe & Moore, 1985; 
Paternoster & Bynum, 1982). 
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Today, there is a large amount of literature surrounding racial bias in sentencing.  
At the same time, much variation exists in the quality of the research designs.  It deems 
merit, therefore, to examine the methodologies used to support research findings in this 
area.  Some have argued that the high incarceration rate of blacks is due to discrimination 
in the criminal justice system.  Others have suggested that blacks are more frequently 
involved in serious and violent offenses. Overall, initial studies in this area lacked quality 
research designs in three important areas, namely selection of single points of study 
within the criminal justice system, the number of jurisdictions in the studies, and the level 
of aggregation of those jurisdictions used to study racial disparities (Crutchfield, Bridges, 
& Pritchford, 1994).  Nor can one overlook the fact that there is a great deal of variation 
throughout the United States in racial patterns of imprisonment, and that these variations 
probably account for much of the diversity of results that have been reported. 
Of course, every step in the criminal justice process, from the enactment of 
specific criminal statutes to the arrest decision or prosecutorial charging practices to the 
charging of relevant conduct should be explored as influential in federal sentencing 
outcomes (McDonald and Carlson, 1993).  The problem of “cumulative disadvantage” is 
still considered relevant (Zatz, 1987).  A partial explanation of the increased racial 
disparity can be traced back to the reemergence of mandatory minimums (Nagel & 
Schulhofer, 1992; Schulhofer, 1992; Tonry, 1993; USSC, 1991; 2004).  Federal penalties 
for drug offenses demand the same mandatory sentence for one gram of crack cocaine as 
for those involving one hundred grams of powder cocaine.  This difference, whether it 
was done purposefully or unintentionally, resulted in the vilification and targeting of the 
black population—particularly young black men (Tonry, 1995; Bush-Baskette, 2000). 
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Differences stemming from cultural backgrounds and language barriers have 
negatively influenced the dispositional outcomes of Hispanic and Native American 
defendants relative to white defendants convicted of similar crimes (Zatz, 1984; 1985; 
1987; 2000; Bynum, 1984).  Hispanics frequently receive harsher sanctions for certain 
crimes such as those involving drugs owing to similar stereotypical attributes (Zatz, 
1984; LaFree, 1985).  Also, black defendants are repeatedly perceived as more 
dangerous, less amenable to treatment, and less committed to the values held by 
conventional society (Zatz, 1985; Kramer and Steffensmeier, 1993; Steffensmeier et al., 
1998; Bridges and Steen, 1998).   
Recent research findings have demonstrated that the role played by racial and 
ethnic factors in sentencing outcomes is very likely part of a larger interaction effect.  In 
other words, racial and ethnic effects may be conditional on other defendant 
characteristics such as gender, age, criminal history, or offense type (e.g. drug offenses) 
(Spohn and Holleran, 2000; Steffensmeier and DeMuth, 2000; 2001; Steffensmeier et al., 
1998).  This interaction effect appears to contribute the most stringent effects on 
sentences of convicted young minority males.  Moreover, these interaction effects do not 
apply uniquely to violent or “street” crimes.  In her examination of white collar case 
dispositions, Albonetti (1998) found that it was important to measure both direct and 
indirect effects of such variables as guilty pleas, race, gender, and other offender and 
offense characteristics in determining their combined effects on judicial discretion at 
sentencing. 
Studies of sentencing guidelines have regularly focused on two discretionary 
decisions faced by the courts at sentencing to shed light on unwarranted disparity due to 
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extralegal factors.  The first sentencing decision is whether or not to incarcerate the 
convicted offender.  This decision is commonly called the “in/out” decision.  The second 
sentencing decision regards determining the length of the prison term for those offenders 
who receive a sentence of incarceration.  This decision is referred to as the “length-of-
term” decision.  In order to characterize the disparity that can arise from the influence of 
extralegal factors on these two decision points, a comprehensive review of sentencing 
outcome studies in several states as well as the federal system was undertaken.  A 
detailed summary of this research literature follows. 
Studies of State Sentencing Guidelines 
 One of the earliest studies of racial disparity under sentencing guidelines was 
performed by Kramer and Steffensmeier (1993), who examined Pennsylvania guidelines 
sentencing data and found that race had a small effect on judicial decision-making on the 
in/out decision, but a negligible effect on the length-of-term decision.  In later studies, 
Steffensmeier and colleagues (1998) discovered that interactive models, which 
considered the joint effects of race, gender, and age on sentencing outcomes, were far 
more useful than additive models when measuring their influence on the final sentencing 
outcome (see also the additive model tested by Spohn and Holleran, 2000).  Together, 
these studies demonstrate that factors such as gender, race and ethnicity, and age can 
affect sentencing outcomes both independently and in combination with one another 
(Steffensmeier et al., 1995; Johnson, 2003). 
Ulmer and Kramer (1996) examined differences in sentencing outcomes in three 
Pennsylvania counties to measure the effects of extralegal characteristics such as race and 
gender.  They constructed a theory built upon the work of Albonetti (1991), who 
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observed that judges are often forced to make predictions about offenders’ future 
behavior based upon information that is often shallow and inadequate. Their results 
suggested that judges rely on extralegal factors to buttress the legal factors and thereby 
reduce the uncertainty of the decision-making process.  More recently, Steffensmeier and 
DeMuth (2001) analyzed sentencing outcomes for black, white, and Hispanic defendants 
in Pennsylvania and found that white defendants were more likely to receive lenient 
treatment and Hispanic defendants were more likely to receive the most severe penalties.  
These results were constant for both the in/out decision and the length-of-term decision.  
Whether the crime of conviction was drug-related or not did not affect the significance of 
the racial and ethnic disparities. 
 Engen and Gainey (2000) used felony sentencing data from Washington State to 
present an alternative model which specifies the effects of offense severity and criminal 
history better than past research.  They found that when they controlled for the 
presumptive sentence, the effects of extralegal factors such as race and gender were 
considerably reduced.  Ulmer (2000) cautions, however, that the model depends on the 
type of data and demonstrated that what was appropriate for studying sentencing 
outcomes in Washington State was not the best option for studying Pennsylvania 
sentencing outcomes.  This exchange points out the importance of controlling for the 
presumptive sentence so that the influence of other factors that condition the sentencing 
outcome can be measured with greater accuracy. 
 Racial typification of violent crime has been found to be a significant predictor of 
support for more punitive punishments such as the call for more arrests, more funding for 
police and other security measures, and expanded use of longer terms of incarceration 
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and other punitive social control mechanisms (Chiricos et al., 2004).  The effects of racial 
disparity on severity of punishment have been shown to vary at the individual court level 
(Britt, 2000).  In addition, other factors such as court size, local jail capacity, court 
caseload pressure, and percent minority in the surrounding community can interact with 
race and ethnicity to affect the likelihood of incarceration (Ulmer and Johnson, 2004).  
According to Ulmer and Johnson (2004, p. 169), “viewing courts as distinctive 
communities, and viewing focal concerns of sentencing as embedded within and shaped 
by court communities, could also connect theories of criminal punishment to broader 
sociological concerns in stratification and organizational sociology.” 
Indeed, demographic and social factors such as racial composition of the 
population, crime rates, and citizen ideology have been correlated with a much greater 
influence on the increase in state incarceration rates than formal criminal justice policies 
such as determinate sentencing, mandatory minimum sentences, and truth-in-sentencing 
laws (Sorensen and Stemen, 2002).  The number and complexity of possible factors 
affecting crime rates make it extremely difficult to isolate a single law and test its 
effectiveness, especially if its contribution to crime reduction is relatively small (Hofer, 
2000).  The relationship between broader societal factors such as racial heterogeneity in 
the population, age structure of the population, levels of urbanization, industrialization 
and economic development, and poverty and unemployment rates should also be 
considered relevant (Sorensen and Stemen, 2002). 
 Research on presumptive sentencing guidelines has demonstrated a correlation 
with prison population growth primarily when such guidelines are sensitive to prison 
capacity or whenever the corresponding legislature was charged with the obligation to 
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consider prison capacity when establishing presumptive sentencing ranges (Marvell, 
1995).  Controlling prison growth has thus become a secondary function of some state’s 
sentencing guidelines systems.  At the same time, studies of numerous states’ guidelines 
systems have failed to find any association with lower overall state crime rates (Lee, 
2001). 
 Together, these studies provide a persuasive argument for the influence of 
extralegal characteristics on both the decision to incarcerate and the length-of-term 
decision.  The magnitude of the evidence suggests sentencing outcomes in state courts 
continue to result in unwarranted disparity even after the introduction of sentencing 
guidelines.  These disparities are associated with extralegal characteristics of the 
defendant such as race and ethnicity as well as court and community characteristics. 
Studies of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
 Significant racial and ethnic differences on the decision to incarcerate and the 
length-of-term decision have likewise been found using federal sentencing data.  
Steffensmeier and DeMuth (2000) uncovered significant differences in outcomes using 
sentencing data from the U.S. federal courts from 1993 to 1996.  Unfortunately, they 
limited their analysis to male defendants and U.S. citizens.  The sentencing outcomes for 
both blacks and Hispanics were significantly harsher than white defendants. 
 In addition to racial and ethnic disparity, other demographic traits and personal 
circumstances have been shown to exercise a negative influence on case outcomes for 
some offenders.  These include gender, socioeconomic status, family status, education 
levels, income levels, and citizenship (Kempf-Leonard and Sample, 2001; Mustard, 2001; 
Smith and Damphousse, 1998; Albonetti, 1997).  The conclusions reached by these 
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studies suggest that the original objectives of uniformity, consistency, and equity have 
not been fully accomplished by the promulgation of presumptive Sentencing Guidelines 
in the federal system. 
 The sentencing outcomes of defendants convicted of drug offenses have received 
the largest amount of attention in research studies (Hebert, 1997; Bush-Baskette, 2000; 
Semisch, 2000; Kautt and Spohn, 2002).  The Guidelines prescribe vastly different 
sentences depending on the type and amount of drug used in the offense conduct.  
However, even after controlling for factors such as type and amount of drug, minority 
offenders received harsher sanctions than white offenders for similar drug offenses 
(Hebert, 1997).  Minorities were more likely to be both imprisoned and received longer 
prison sentences than white defendants for similar drug crimes.  A large portion of the 
discrepancy was due to white defendants whose final offense level was lowered because 
of their acceptance of responsibility.  Results such as these suggest that federal judges 
sentence minority offenders, at least in part, on historically constructed and actively 
maintained stereotypes regarding race or ethnicity and drug use. 
 Nevertheless, across offense types, blacks and males have been found to be less 
likely to receive no prison terms when that option was available, and less likely to receive 
downward departures (Mustard, 2001).  In particular, sentencing outcomes involving the 
use of mandatory minimum sentences are significantly conditioned by racial factors 
(Kautt and Spohn, 2002). Overall, a defendant’s race has demonstrated strong influence 
over the sentencing outcome whether they qualified for and received a mandatory 
minimum sentence, or they qualified for but did not receive a mandatory minimum 
sentence, or they did not fall within the statutory purview of a mandatory minimum 
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sentence.  While influential for black and Hispanic defendants, these findings have not 
been shown to extend to Asian defendants for either the in/out decision or the length-of-
term decision (Chanhatasilpa, 2000).  Thus, the Sentencing Guidelines have been 
successful in inhibiting racial discrimination against Asian defendants.  
 In summary, similar to the findings at the state court level, studies of the 
Sentencing Guidelines in the federal system have found significant differences for black 
and Hispanic minority offenders for both the in/out decision and the length-of-term 
decision.  These studies have also attempted to measure the influence of additional 
offender characteristics when available.  However, no study has examined sentencing 
outcomes over time, and the data on court characteristics are limited to location in terms 
of district and circuit court boundaries.  In combination with extralegal factors, 
geographic location can create differences between courts in numerous ways, including 
dismissal rates, sentencing outcomes, mode of disposition, likelihood of incarceration, 
and length of sentence (Kautt, 2002; Johnson and Songer, 2002).   
Gender Disparity and Sentencing Guidelines 
Studies of sentencing outcomes in both state and federal criminal justice systems 
have uncovered gender disparities.  Significant differences in sentencing outcomes 
between male and female defendants convicted of similar crimes have been noted (Daly, 
1994; Albonetti, 1998; Daly and Tonry, 1997; Hanbury, 2000; Jeffries et al., 2003; 
Koons-Witt, 2002; Semisch, 2000; Mustard, 2001; Nagel and Johnson, 1994; 
Steffensmeier et al., 1993; 1998).  Steffensmeier and colleagues (1993) collected studies 
during the previous three decades to compile a comprehensive summary on the gender 
differences in imprisonment decisions and sentence length as well as enumerate the 
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shortcomings of certain studies, such as inadequate controls for offense seriousness and 
prior record. 
Gender influences sentencing practices, both by itself and in combination with 
other factors such as race, marital and employment status, pregnancy and motherhood, 
and offense type (Koons-Witt, 2002).  Studies on sentencing guidelines have shown that 
gender is influential in sentencing offenders to prison (Griswold, 1987; Steffensmeier et 
al., 1993; Ulmer and Kramer, 1996), in determining reasons for departures from the 
recommended sentence (Kramer and Ulmer, 1996; Steffensmeier et al., 1993), and in 
deciding sentence length (Albonetti, 1997). 
Nor is the phenomenon of gender disparity unique to the United States.  Jeffries 
and colleagues (2003) found that women were treated more leniently than men over a 
seven-year period in New Zealand.  This finding applied to both the in/out decision and 
the length of term decision.  Results such as these can be attributed to one of two reasons.  
First, women often tend to play minor roles in crime and to have less serious criminal 
histories (Daly, 1994: Chesney-Lind, 1997; 1989).  Second, decisions that result in 
gender disparities early in the decision making process will likewise contribute to gender 
disparities at the end of the judicial decision making process (Daly and Chesney-Lind, 
1988).  For example, pre-trial release decisions have been shown to affect differences in 
sentencing outcomes (DeMuth, 2003). 
The fundamental question about what constitutes justice for women is at the core 
of the debate over equal versus different treatment of women in the legal system.  In the 
area of sentencing reform, however, the equal treatment of women has translated into an 
increased reliance on incarceration as a sanction.  Sentencing guidelines were designed to 
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exclude the influence of gender, and thus resulted in the diminished relevance of factors 
that were considered to be of significant consequence previous to the change in 
sentencing laws.  Critics of sentencing reforms argue that women have been 
disproportionately affected by the use of guidelines (Chesney-Lind and Pollock, 1995; 
Nagel and Johnson, 1994; Raeder, 1993). 
The chivalry and paternalism perspectives assume that women in general are 
protected by the criminal justice system and are sentenced more leniently when compared 
with men (Daly and Bordt, 1995; Raeder, 1993; Mustard, 2001).  Women who fulfill 
traditional gender expectations by acting in a feminine, docile, and subordinate manner 
tend to experience lenient treatment compared with women who do not fulfill these 
traditional roles.  The presence of children and marital status contributes to the disparity.  
For example, Daly (1987; 1989; 1994) finds that ‘familied’ defendants are treated more 
leniently than their non-familied counterparts.   
Criminological theory has struggled to explain criminal offending behaviors of 
women.  Mainstream theory has run up against two obstacles—the generalizability 
problem and the gender ration problem—in trying to address the motivations and reasons 
for criminal behavior in women.  Sanctioning theory has run into similar problems in 
trying to deter and prevent future criminal offending among women.  The differing life 
circumstances of male and female offenders frequently results in different sanctions, even 
within a guidelines system. 
The question of addressing unwarranted disparity in sentencing reform has 
consistently been viewed through the perspective of the male offender.  By framing men 
in the context of the usual or “normal” offender, women are then viewed as exceptions.  
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Feminist scholars have challenged this conceptualization.  Daly (1994) has outlined three 
different options on which to base sentencing reform.  First, treat men more like women.  
Second, treat women more like men. Third, split the difference.  However, proposed 
sentencing policies that relied on a female standard were viewed as too lenient.  The 
unintended and undesirable effect of this transition using a male standard was an increase 
in the likelihood of incarceration for women, including nonviolent offenders.  This 
phenomenon was particularly striking among black minority women convicted of drug 
offenses involving crack cocaine (Bush-Baskette, 2000)   
 A number of studies have been conducted to measure the reduction in gender 
disparity after the implementation of sentencing guidelines (Albonetti, 1997; Griswold, 
1987; Knapp, 1984; Kramer and Ulmer, 1996; Moore and Miethe, 1986; Steffensmeier et 
al., 1993; Steffensmeier et al., 1998).  It was assumed that a shift from a rehabilitative 
indeterminate sentencing system focused on the individual offender to a system 
emphasizing the type and seriousness of the offense would result in equal treatment.  Yet, 
research showed that courts adjust over time to compensate for reforms and protect their 
sense of justice (Koons-Witt, 2002). 
Previous studies have uncovered statistically significant differences between the 
sentences imposed on men and women defendants using the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines (Nagel and Johnson, 1994; Newton, Glazer, and Blackwell, 1995; Mustard, 
2001).  These differences might best be explained by distinguishing “gender-related” 
sentencing disparity from “gender-based” sentencing disparity (Kesler, 2003, p. 192).  
Women offenders commit primarily non-violent offenses, go to trial less frequently than 
men offenders, and are more likely to be assigned to the lowest criminal history category 
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than men.  Thus, “gender-related” factors such as role in the offense and criminal history 
may help explain, and possibly justify, sentencing disparities that appear to be based on 
gender. 
 Nagel and Johnson (1994, p. 182) remind their readers that the purpose of 
sentencing reforms during the 1980s was “designed to substantially reduce judicial 
sentencing discretion, to reduce unwarranted sentencing disparities, and to reduce race, 
gender, and class discrimination.”  While there was an especially forceful push at the 
federal level to shift the focus from offender characteristics to offense characteristics and 
the offender’s criminal history, the favorable treatment of female offenders has not been 
eliminated.  Nevertheless, they propose that this apparent gender disparity is not a bad or 
unjust phenomenon.  The desire to avoid disparities between the genders through 
“facially neutral Guidelines must not eclipse the principles of desert and crime control 
that animate sentencing policy, or the fact that lenient treatment of women in the criminal 
justice system may have macro-level social costs which must be weighed against any 
micro-level benefits to individual offenders” (p. 221). 
Gender has been shown to have a small but significant effect on the likelihood of 
imprisonment that favored female offenders in state level studies (Steffensmeier et al., 
1993; Koons-Witt, 2002).  This is a common consequence of the judge’s sentencing 
decisions being based on concerns of blameworthiness and practicality.  Overall, gender 
effects have persisted, in large part, because of the departure mechanisms that are built 
into sentencing guidelines, allowing judges to exercise discretion in deciding the 
appropriate sentence.  Such discretion allows sentencing courts to adapt or circumvent 
sentencing reforms to continue to assert their notions of fairness (Kramer and Ulmer, 
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2002).  Among female offenders in particular, the presence of dependent children 
significantly reduced their likelihood of going to prison (Koons-Witt, 2002).  These 
findings point to the fact that courts are not ready to ignore gender altogether and that 
women’s special circumstances are indeed recognized and considered at sentencing. 
Under the federal Sentencing Guidelines, black females convicted of offenses 
involving crack cocaine have not been so fortunate.  Drug crimes involving crack cocaine 
fall under the most stringent mandatory minimum penalties contained within the 
Sentencing Guidelines.  Since black females are more likely to be convicted of offenses 
involving crack cocaine than other drug types, they are also more likely to receive 
mandatory minimum sentences more often than offenders in other racial, ethnic, and 
gender demographic groups.  Thus, black women convicted of drug offenses involving 
crack cocaine have been negatively affected in both the in/out decision and the length-of-
term decision, resulting in an unprecedented increase in the proportion of black females 
in the federal prison population (Bush-Baskette, 2000). 
Overall, the defendant’s gender has been shown to exert a significant influence on 
the sentencing outcome in both state and federal studies.  This is true for both the in/out 
incarceration decision and the length-of-term decision.  Whether this gender-related 
disparity is judged to be warranted or unwarranted still has not been decided. 
Judicial Departures and the Sentencing Guidelines 
Under the prior indeterminate sentencing system, judges exercised a wide degree 
of discretion to sentence offenders.  Different judges sentenced offenders differently 
based on their own conceptions of sanctioning theory.  Consequently, it was not 
uncommon for personal biases and prejudices to enter into the sentencing decision (Karle 
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and Sager, 1991).  In response to the call for reforms, a determinate sentencing system 
was established.  The new system was constructed around Sentencing Guidelines to 
replace a century-old system of indeterminate sentencing in federal criminal cases.   
The U.S. Sentencing Commission was charged with the creation of a system of 
criminal justice that would balance the desirability of a high degree of uniformity against 
the necessity for the exercise of discretion (Hauser, 1993).  The Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines restrict, but do not entirely eliminate, judicial discretion.  Once the final 
offense level and criminal history score are calculated, the sentencing court still retains 
the discretion to depart above or below the specified Guideline range based upon a 
defendant’s manifest extraordinary circumstances.  When a court decides to sentence a 
defendant outside of the prescribed penalty ranges, this is known as a departure.  
Inevitably, the departure decision has evoked the largest amount of controversy because 
it involves unchecked discretion and connotes inadequacies in the Guidelines and 
disparate treatment of offenders convicted of similar crimes. 
 Departures exist, in part, because the real-life application of the Guidelines has 
proven more difficult than the theoretical reasoning that drove their enactment.  They 
occur when the court determines that the need for individualized treatment outweighs the 
need for equal treatment so as to warrant a departure outside the prescribed Guideline 
punishment ranges (Pribil, 1992).  On one hand, the Guidelines exclude factors such as 
race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, socioeconomic status, age, educational level, 
vocational skills, physical condition, previous employment, and family ties as not to be 
considered manifest extraordinary circumstances under which a departure may be 
granted.  On the other hand, a rigid, mechanized application which straitjackets a 
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sentencing court should be avoided.  The question of whether judges possess sufficient 
discretion to address atypical cases and offset any imbalances, and the related question of 
whether Congress and the Commission have permitted virtually no judicial discretion 
remain unanswered. 
 As Ogletree (1988, p. 1,958) points out, “consistency produced by ignoring 
individual differences is a false consistency.”  Likewise, uniformity in sentencing relies, 
in large measure, upon the equally uniform charging efforts of the U.S. Attorneys.  
Adding to this complexity is the fact that not all similarly convicted offenders are truly 
similarly situated in terms of their diverse offender and complex human circumstances.  
The same sentence may have an inconsistent impact on two different offenders due to 
their differing life situations.  A fifteen-year sentence would affect a 19-year-old young 
man differently than a 24-year-old single mother of three small children or a 63-year-old 
man.  Critics of the Guidelines contend that this inequality in outcomes would be unjust 
(Tonry, 1996).  To this end, fixed rules coupled with narrowly-guided, non-binding 
policy statements are, on occasion, insufficient and inappropriate (Bush, 1990). 
 A departure connotes judicial noncompliance with the Sentencing Guidelines, and 
this routinely invokes appellate jurisdiction by both the government and the defendant.  
The purpose of the appellate review mechanism is to ensure there is no abuse of 
discretion by the sentencing court (See Koon v. United States, 1996, 518 U.S. 81).  At the 
same time, the fact that the Guidelines leave room for differing interpretations by the 
appellate courts, leads to the possibility of the reemergence of the very disparity that 
Congress originally sought to remove from the sentencing process (Ellingstad, 1992).   
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The Guidelines may be thought of as a framework within which a judge should 
typically impose a sentence.  A court first determines whether an aggravating or 
mitigating factor is present and must then determine whether the Guidelines already 
account for that factor.  If the Guidelines account for the factor adequately, the court may 
not depart from the Guidelines.  If the Guidelines do not account for the factor, or “do not 
do so adequately,” the court must then determine if the existence of the factor merits a 
sentence outside the recommended Guideline range (Pribil, 1992).  This then begs the 
question, what is “adequate?” 
Deciding whether departures are a signal that the sentencing Guidelines are 
functioning properly depends on the position from where one starts.  It is not as simplistic 
as just taking a stand on one side or the other.  In short, is a departure “good” or “bad?”  
It is better to begin with the fact that departures occur.  Unique circumstances will arise 
that are not covered within the scope of even the most complex of guidelines systems.  It 
is just plain fact that unforeseeable or infrequent circumstances will arise in future cases 
that are not anticipated or accounted for in the current Guidelines.   Kramer and Ulmer 
(2002, p. 901) framed the situation succinctly when they stated that the sentencing 
process as “a complex, localized, interpretive process, and formally rational sentencing 
policies like guidelines cannot cover all possible situations.”  The Commission also 
realized this possibility and envisioned the departure mechanism as a way to receive 
important feedback from the courts regarding the Guideline’s operation (USSC, 2003). 
Sometimes departures are used to further the goals of equitable justice when the 
Guidelines fall short.  At other times, they may be used to generate more unwarranted 
disparity based on discriminatory or prejudicial views.  The real issue, then, appears to be 
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in determining whether the departure mechanism supports the aim of the Guidelines in 
reducing disparity more often than hindering the aims of the determinate Guidelines 
sentencing system. Furthermore, the reasons for some departures as warranted or 
unwarranted are still not resolved.  For example, departing outside of the recommended 
sentencing ranges for women based on their gender or parental status is viewed by some 
as evidence of residual disparity, while other researchers view these issues as justifiable 
reasons for departures. 
 If departures are viewed solely in the context of being an asset or a liability to this 
type of sentencing system, their inevitable occurrence will serve to reinforce or justify the 
existing belief.  If departures are seen as drawbacks, then any departures will 
automatically be judged as going against the purpose and intent of the Guidelines.  The 
more departures occur, the greater the disparity resulting from deviation from the 
Guidelines.  If departures are seen as a way to make the Guidelines more equitable, then 
the results of such departures will reinforce that viewpoint.  The more departures occur, 
the belief that justice is being accomplished will correspondingly increase.  Departures 
are good if one is willing to make allowances.  If these allowances are categorized as 
disparate treatment because they deviate from the Guidelines, they will be viewed in a 
negative light no matter the extenuating circumstances. 
 Perhaps, the place to begin is in the definition of disparity itself.  There are two 
kinds of disparity: warranted and unwarranted.  Warranted disparity is the variation in 
sentence outcomes due to legally relevant factors, such as criminal history, crime type, 
and crime severity.  Unwarranted disparity is the variation in sentencing outcomes that 
can be reasonably identified as resulting exclusively from other extra-legal factors such 
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as race, gender, or socioeconomic status after all legally relevant sentencing factors are 
taken into account (Stolzenberg and D’Alessio, 1994; Bushway and Piehl, 2001). 
 When the Guidelines were first promulgated, the Sentencing Commission failed 
to clarify the circumstances under which warranted departures are justified, thus 
engendering intercircuit conflict.  One instance of such intercircuit conflicts occurred 
regarding downward departures based on extraordinary family circumstances.  In the 
early 1990s, there was widespread, and sometimes vehement, disagreement among the 
circuit courts surrounding the circumstances for this departure reason.  The conflict 
arising from this particular sentencing issue demonstrated that the Commission and by 
extension, the Guidelines, apparently failed to provide adequately comprehensive 
instructions to the courts (Wayne, 1993). 
Simply put, departures are permitted, but not expected, to happen in the normal 
course of sentencing.  In subsequent rulings, the U.S. Supreme Court placed a great deal 
of trust and responsibility on the Sentencing Commission as a continuing, independent 
body to provide guidance to the courts.  The expectation was that the Sentencing 
Commission would take seriously its monitoring function, to amend and review the 
Guidelines on a regular basis.  Although it operates under the judicial branch, it is not a 
court nor does it exercise judicial power (Jackson, 1990).  Tangentially, this then begs the 
question, who would have the ultimate power to overrule, the Commission or the 
Supreme Court?  
Because of the lack of clear guidance from the Commission in the beginning of 
the Guidelines era, the federal courts have interpreted the Commission’s policy on 
departures on a case by case basis.  In the ensuing years, they have ruled that certain 
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circumstances are improper justifications for a departure, including defendant’s inability 
to speak English, alien defendant, first-time offender status, consideration of political 
circumstances, and defendant’s affluence.  Conditions which the courts have found to be 
non-extraordinary and therefore, not meriting a downward departure include pregnancy, 
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), poor health, drug dependence, 
alcoholism, and participation in a post-arrest drug rehabilitation program. Examples of 
non-extraordinary family circumstances found not warranting a departure include the 
defendant’s status as a single parent, efforts to keep the family together, status as a parent 
of several children, two minor children being separated and placed with strangers, status 
as parent of a handicapped child, spouse was imprisoned, unpleasant childhood and 
family life, and wife’s affair with the victim.  In 1992, the Commission amended its 
formal departure policy to limit departures based on lack of youthful guidance and 
circumstances surrounding a disadvantaged upbringing (Pribil, 1992). 
 The courts have ruled departures to be justifiable under certain atypical 
circumstances.  Extraordinary circumstances have been found where: the stability of a 
close-knit family depended upon the defendant’s presence, a child’s exceptionally 
promising future was threatened, the family ties were unusually supportive and shielded 
the young defendant from gang-related influences, the defendant had extraordinary 
parental responsibilities, there was a lack of youthful guidance, and the community would 
be deprived of an exemplary citizen.  Additional reasons used as grounds for departure 
include: conduct of the victim, lesser harms, coercion and duress, diminished capacity, 
voluntary disclosure of the offense, certain limited cases of co-defendant disparity, and 
impressive rehabilitation (Pribil, 1992). 
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Notwithstanding this area of case law, many judges consider themselves bound by 
the Commission’s advice contained in their policy statements that certain offender 
characteristics are “not ordinarily relevant” to sentencing.  In his review of sentencing 
decisions, Gomez (1995) found that a series of family factors which, in isolation, would 
not remove a case from the heartland would, when clustered together, invite increased 
consideration for departures.  Likewise, Farabee (1998, p. 602) found that “multiple 
circumstances of the defendant’s life were aggregated and offered as a combined reason 
for downward departure.”  Thus, the confounding boundary appears to lie in deciding 
how many cases are atypical and justify a departure.  There is a complete absence of 
Commission guidance over expected quantity of occurrences for unusual or atypical 
cases.  Is ten percent too large?  Five percent?  One percent?  (Kramer and Ulmer, 1996). 
 Whenever a judge chooses to exercise discretion and depart outside of the 
boundaries of the Guidelines, reasons explaining the departure are entered into the case 
documents.  Departures may be either “guided” or “unguided.” Guided departures in the 
Guidelines assign a specific number of levels to be added or subtracted from the final 
sentencing range.  Unguided departures are not accompanied by any Commission 
direction and are left entirely to the discretion of the judge (Hauser, 1993, p. 373).   
 Therefore, disparity may continue under a Guidelines system in three important 
ways.  First, through the use of overly broad categories which result in similar sentences 
for unlike offenders.  Second, through plea practices which involve bargaining for the 
exclusion of facts or charges that significantly alter the sentencing decision.  Third, and 
of importance to the present study, through excessive or inappropriate departures from 
the Guideline’s heartland.  The Commission has described the offense categories in the 
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Guidelines as “carving out a ‘heartland,’ a set of typical cases embodying the conduct 
that each Guideline describes” (USSC, 1992, p. 45).  A departure should place the 
defendant within the appropriate heartland, not above or below, because doing otherwise 
creates unwarranted disparity. 
 The continued practice of unwarranted departures is one of the reasons that 
disparities persist within a Guidelines system.  In short, departures are the mechanism for 
circumvention of the sentencing ranges prescribed by the Guidelines and the “primary” 
source of unwarranted differences (Mustard, 2001, p. 285).  Both warranted and 
unwarranted departures depend upon the same discretion exercised by federal judges.  
Thus, by allowing warranted departures, the possibility of unwarranted departures is 
almost inevitable.  Warranted departures should be viewed by the Commission as 
signaling inadequacies in the Guidelines that need to be addressed and remedied.  The 
Commission should have a mechanism in place to monitor instances of unwarranted 
departures.  The Commission could then be empowered to alert the judges about 
unwarranted departures and hold them accountable for their decisions. 
Much research has demonstrated that unwarranted departures are used in ways 
that can disadvantage minority defendants (Albonetti, 1997, 1998; Kramer and 
Steffensmeier, 1993; Kramer and Ulmer, 1996; Steffensmeier et al., 1993; Steffensmeier 
and DeMuth, 2000; Ulmer, 1997).  Departures reward those who plead guilty rather than 
exercise their right to a trial, and they disadvantage male defendants (Steffensmeier et al., 
1998; Everett and Nienstedt, 1999; Kempf-Leonard and Sample, 2001; Kramer and 
Ulmer, 1996; Engen, Gainey et al., 2003).  Departures involve consideration of extralegal 
factors (Pribil, 1992).  They shift the focus from a just deserts framework to consideration 
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of concerns such as blameworthiness, dangerousness, risk of future offending, and 
rehabilitative potential (Kramer and Ulmer, 2002). 
At the same time, departures will never be entirely eliminated from the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines.  Nor should departure decisions be viewed generally as acts of 
“judicial defiance.”  Departures are a way of measuring whether the judges feel that the 
Guidelines do not sufficiently consider factors that are integral to just and fair sentencing 
decisions (Karle and Sager, 1991).  Congress did not intend for the Guidelines to be so 
mechanized that they excluded all consideration for individual case factors.  Instead, they 
intended to ensure that the Guidelines provided enough flexibility to allow adequate 
consideration of circumstances that may call for a sentencing departure (Pribil, 1992). 
A sentencing system tailored to fit every conceivable unique offense characteristic 
of each case would quickly become unworkable and seriously compromise the certainty 
of punishment and its deterrent effect.  When a court finds an atypical case, one to which 
a particular Guideline linguistically applies but where conduct significantly differs from 
the norm, the court may consider whether a departure is warranted (Hauser, 1993). This 
is simply because it is impossible to foresee every circumstance and anticipate every 
relevant case and offender characteristic (Hofer and Allenbaugh, 2003).  Ultimately, the 
human factor cannot be removed from the sentencing decision, and therefore it will 
always influence the sentencing decision to some degree. 
The widely criticized jurisprudence of departures has suffered from a failure to 
recognize the philosophy underlying the Guideline rules.  The departure mechanism 
allows judges to help identify the Guideline’s philosophy by departing whenever the 
Guideline’s own purposes would be defeated with the imposition of a prescribed sentence 
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range.  Departures are inevitable and necessary to offset the disparity that the Guidelines 
would create (Ogletree, 1988).  Departures are appropriate under certain circumstances, 
and when utilized in pursuit of the Guideline’s own purposes will reduce, not increase, 
true sentencing disparity (Yakren, 2003).  
 The number of departures is of lesser importance than the conditions under which 
a departure is appropriate.  The first step in the departure decision should be to decide 
whether the characteristics of the case and the offender fall outside the scope of the 
heartland of the applicable Guideline.  The best description of what constitutes a 
Guideline’s heartland is the type of cases to which it should apply in order to achieve the 
overall stated penal purpose.  According to Hofer and Allenbaugh (2003, p. 48), “there is 
no justice in applying the Guidelines blindly in cases where the presumptive sentence is 
unfair and ineffective.  Treating two offenders the same because the rules say so, even 
though they differ markedly in their culpability, in the harm caused by their crime, or in 
their risk of recidivism, is to elevate the rules above reason.” 
There are two kinds of departures: those granted by judges at their own discretion, 
and those granted by judges based upon motions filed by the prosecution for “substantial 
assistance” to the government (USSC Guidelines Manual §5K1.1, 2000, p.372).  The 
Guidelines provide the Government with the power, but not the duty, to file a motion for 
departure to the court based upon substantial assistance (Hauser, 1993).  For example, the 
prosecution may file a motion for a downward departure in exchange for substantial 
assistance rendered by the defendant in prosecuting other offenders and co-conspirators 
involved in the criminal activity.  Hence, substantial assistance departures rely upon a 
different source of discretion in the decision making process.  The issue of whether to 
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group substantial assistance departures together with judicial departures by classifying 
them in the same category or to scrutinize them separately for analytical purposes has not 
yet been settled (Tonry, 1993a; Hebert, 1997). 
By excluding substantial assistance departures, one runs the risk of providing an 
incomplete measure of judicial influence on the overall departure decision.  Certainly, 
there appears to be some degree of overlap between the two types of downward 
departures, although this amount varies between circuits.  During the eleven fiscal years 
included in the current study, federal judges provided the following three reasons as the 
primary rationale for granting a judicial downward departure in 520 cases: substantial 
assistance at motion, cooperation without motion, and cooperation.   
The vast majority of departures are downward departures that lessen the sentence 
imposed.  Although rare, upward departures do occur.  A downward departure from the 
Guidelines results in a criminal sentence imposed by a district judge that is outside and 
below the prescribed sentencing range.  Downward departures are justified when a case 
involves either atypical, extraordinary, or otherwise mitigating circumstances that were 
not adequately considered in the formulation of offense characteristics for the categories 
of crimes contained in the Sentencing Guidelines (Hauser, 1993). 
Offense characteristics may fall into one of three categories: relevant, “not 
ordinarily relevant,” or irrelevant in the determination of a departure sentence.  Examples 
of mitigating factors that may call for a reduction in the sentence below the suggested 
Guideline range include circumstances such as provocation by the victim, or because of 
serious duress or coercion, or other atypical circumstances deemed “not ordinarily 
relevant” (USSC Guidelines Manual, 2001, §5K2.0 “Grounds for Departure).  The 
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Commission does not indicate what it considers to be extraordinary circumstances.  The 
federal courts have struggled to reach a consensus regarding the language of the policy 
statement issued by the Commission concerning these factors, resulting in different 
interpretations and applications.   
Very few offenders receive upward departures outside and above the 
recommended Guideline’s range.  Examples of aggravating factors that may call for a 
sentence above the prescribed Guideline penalty range include actions that resulted in 
death, extreme physical or psychological injury, abduction, possession of a weapon, 
serious disruption of a governmental function, endangerment of national security or 
public health, or when the defendant has committed an offense for the purpose of 
concealing another offense (Pribil, 1992). 
Before reviewing studies of departures from sentencing guidelines among the 
states and at the federal level, a brief summary outlining the major findings from the 
departure study recently completed by the Sentencing Commission will be reviewed.  
This departure study was part of its congressionally-mandated fifteen year review of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  It was submitted to Congress in the fall of 2003 along 
with an emergency amendment to clarify the grounds for a departure from the Guidelines 
as outlined in numerous Guidelines Manual sections such as §5K2.0, departures under 
Chapter 5, Part H, §5K2.10, §5K2.12, §5K2.13, §5K2.20, §4A1.3, §5K3.1, and §1A1.1. 
The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Departure Study 
 In October 2003, the U.S. Sentencing Commission released a study on the trends 
in downward departures from the Sentencing Guidelines from fiscal years 1991 through 
2001 as part of their review of sentencing practice in the federal court system.  Despite 
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the Commission’s attempt to restrict the use of downward departures through policy 
statements and amendments that have narrowed the definition of extraordinary 
circumstances and flatly prohibited other departures under certain circumstances outright, 
they found that the downward departure rate for reasons other than substantial assistance 
to the government has increased from 5.8 percent in fiscal year 1991 to 18.1 percent in 
fiscal year 2001.  The Commission posited that the reason behind this increase is the high 
rate of downward departures for judicial districts along the southwest border, which 
appears to be propelling the increase in the overall national departure rate.   
In order to make the data comparable, the Commission recoded data in fiscal 
years 1999 through 2001, which they refer to as “revised data files” in a footnote of their 
report (p. 31).  The fact that they recoded three years of data on departures will make 
replication studies very difficult.  Nevertheless, the Commission found wide variation 
across the districts in the rate of judicial downward departures during fiscal year 2001, 
ranging from a mere 1.4 percent in the Eastern District of Kentucky to an astonishing 
62.6 percent in the District of Arizona.  This is similar to other findings of wide variation 
in departure rates between the judicial districts (Weinstein, 1999; Farabee, 1998).  
Moreover, the Commission found that those districts located in the low or high 
downward departure categories tended to remain generally constant over time. 
 When departures are compared by region, the five districts along the southwest 
border do appear as significant outliers, increasing almost four-fold, from 10.2 percent in 
fiscal year 1991 to 38.2 percent in fiscal year 2001.  Nor are judicial downward 
departures the only type of departures that have increased during the Commission’s study 
period.  Substantial assistance departures have likewise increased from 11.9 percent in 
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fiscal year 1991 to 17.4 percent in fiscal year 2001.  Thus, the Commission found that 
less than two-thirds (63.9 percent) of the cases in fiscal year 2001 were sentenced within 
the Guidelines sentencing range, compared to 80.7 percent in fiscal year 1991. 
In addition, the Commission’s study found that the majority of downward 
departures are justified for a small number of reasons, but these reasons vary from year to 
year.  The Commission believes that the increase in the departure rate was due to certain 
legislative measures that substantially increased penalties for such crimes as immigration-
related offenses.  They also assert that the increase is due, in part, to lack of oversight by 
the courts of appeals at the circuit level.  For these reasons, the Commission has amended 
the chapter in the Guidelines Manual that describes the conditions under which a 
departure is warranted.  They are also trying to implement a standardized “statement of 
reasons” form for judges to record the reasons for departures in more detail for the 
Commission to track these trends better in the future. 
 
Studies of Departures in State Sentencing Guidelines 
There are a number of studies of judicial departures in sentencing outcomes in 
state guideline jurisdictions, each using different samples and different research methods 
to measure the influence of extralegal factors (Kramer and Ulmer, 1996; Langan, 1996; 
Miethe and Moore, 1986a; Ulmer, 1997; Johnson, 2003; 2005; Zatz, 1985).  These 
studies share the same common purpose—determining who is more likely to receive a 
downward departure.  This is accomplished by measuring the magnitude of the effects of 
numerous legal and extralegal characteristics.   
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Significant differences have been found between the interaction of variables such 
as the type of conviction, type of plea, court size, and defendant demographic 
characteristics such as age, gender, race, and ethnicity in determining who is more likely 
to receive downward departures.  A downward departure is “any sentence that is less than 
the lowest sentence in the mitigated range of the guidelines” (Kramer and Ulmer, 2002, 
p. 908). 
Engen, Gainey, and colleagues (2003) analyzed departures from the sentencing 
guidelines of Washington State and found that males and minority offenders were less 
likely to receive departures below the prescribed guideline ranges.  They also found that 
race, ethnicity, and gender had inconsistent effects on departures above the prescribed 
guideline ranges.  Their findings led them to conclude that departures were “structural 
sources of unwarranted sentencing disparity” (p. 99). 
Among violent offenders in Pennsylvania, those convicted by trial, young 
Hispanic males, and offenders sentenced in small rural courts were less likely to receive 
downward departures (Kramer and Ulmer, 2002).  Moreover, differences in the effects of 
legal and extralegal factors across modes of conviction have demonstrated that both black 
and Hispanic defendants are less likely to receive downward departures and more likely 
to receive upward departures compared to their white counterparts.  Males and younger 
defendants are likewise treated more harshly at sentencing than female and older 
defendants (Johnson, 2003). 
The departure rate has also been correlated with the size of the court, the caseload 
pressure, the guidelines compliance rate, and the social context of the court.  Departures 
have been shown to vary among county jurisdictions, even in the same state.  Convicted 
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offenders who were sentenced in large courts are more likely to receive leniency in their 
sentencing outcomes.  Departure rates are closely related to court considerations for 
efficient case processing.  Thus, increased trial rates were associated with greater 
likelihoods of upward departures.  Finally, the percent of Hispanics and other minorities 
in the county population had significant effects on the likelihood of upward or downward 
departures (Johnson, 2005). 
Like other states and the federal criminal justice system, Minnesota formulated its 
sentencing guidelines to increase neutrality in the application of criminal sanctions 
(Miethe and Moore, 1985; 1986a; 1986b; 1989; Moore and Miethe, 1986).  However, 
there has been a gradual yet measurable slide back to the pre-guidelines level of disparity 
in sentencing outcomes over time (Moody, 1995; Moody and Marvell, 1996).  Two 
possible explanations have been proposed to clarify the way sentences have appeared to 
revert to pre-guideline inequalities. These explanations were, first, the number of first 
time offenders who fell outside of the authority of the guidelines and, second, the 
increased pressure to control the growing prison population necessitated a concomitant 
increase in the departure rate (Stolzenberg and D’Allessio, 1994). 
 Recently, the discretion exercised by judges in deciding whether to depart below 
the prescribed guideline range in the state of Maryland was isolated and found to account 
for twenty percent higher sentences for African Americans than for whites (Bushway and 
Piehl, 2001).  This was done by modeling the guidelines themselves, rather than crime 
severity and criminal history scores.  The recommended sentence range in the guidelines 
represents the actions of all the other actors in the system and their decisions up to the 
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point of sentencing.  Thus, differences between the recommended sentence and the actual 
sentence imposed are solely attributable to judicial discretion. 
 Taken as a whole, studies of departures at the state level demonstrate that a host 
of factors can influence the departure decision.  By drawing a distinction between what 
sentence the guidelines tell judges to impose and what sentence the judges actually do 
impose, these factors can be isolated and measured.  The same extralegal characteristics 
that influenced the in/out incarceration decision and the length-of-term decision can also 
influence the departure decision. 
 
Studies of Departures in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
 Departures from the Guidelines have been a common outcome variable for much 
of the research on federal sentencing decisions (Maxfield and Kramer, 1998; U.S. 
Sentencing Commission, 1995; 2003).  The defendant’s personal characteristics such as 
race, ethnicity, gender, educational level, and citizenship status have all been shown to 
significantly influence the departure decision in the federal system (Albonetti, 1997).  
Similar to Zatz (1984), who uncovered evidence of discrimination against Chicanos 
under California’s determinate sentencing system, federal defendants’ ethnicity 
conditions the effect of guilty pleas and departures on sentence severity. 
 Blacks, males, and offenders with low levels of education and income receive 
substantially longer sentences, and these disparities are due in large part to departures 
from the prescribed Guideline ranges.  These differences have been found across offense 
types.  Blacks and males are also less likely to receive downward departures or receive 
smaller reductions if they do receive departures (Mustard, 2001).  When ethnicity is 
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included, white offenders are treated most leniently by receiving downward departures 
more frequently while Hispanic offenders received the harshest penalties and received the 
fewest downward departures.  Black offenders are treated in between the other two 
groups (Steffensmeier and DeMuth, 2000). 
 Studies that measure the influence of jurisdictional characteristics on sentencing 
patterns and discretionary decisions also replicate those done at the state level (Kramer & 
Ulmer, 1996; Ulmer, 1997; Ulmer and Kramer, 1996; Daly, 1995; Spohn and Delone, 
2000).  These findings suggest that the geographic location of sentencing may be just as 
important a factor in determining sentencing outcomes as the influences of the courts’ 
contextual characteristics.  Significant variation has been found between districts for 
virtually all legal and extralegal factors.  Even the influence of offense seriousness and 
criminal history has been shown to vary from circuit to circuit (Kautt, 2002).   
 Studies of departures in the federal system have focused on specific offenses such 
as crimes involving drugs (Semisch, 2000; Gomez, 1995; Kautt, 2002) and also on 
specific reasons for granting downward departures.  The most common departure reason 
is based on the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility (Everett and Nienstedt, 1999). 
Acceptance of responsibility hinges on the defendant’s ability to display remorse and can 
result in a fifteen percent decrease in sentence length.  The ability to publicly exhibit 
penitent emotions varies by race and ethnicity (Hebert, 1997).  An offender’s race and 
ethnicity has been shown to have a significant influence on the decision to reduce the 
sentence for acceptance of responsibility, even after controlling for both offender and 
offense characteristics (Everett and Nienstedt, 1999). 
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Another frequently cited downward departure reason is described as the 
“extraordinary family circumstances” of the defendant.  Findings from these studies 
suggest that courts should not overlook atypical features such as the impact of 
incarceration upon small children of offenders (Ellingstad, 1992).  The Guidelines should 
be flexible enough to provide for situational downward departures based on extraordinary 
family circumstances.  As Gomez (1995, p.77) reminds his readers, “the Sentencing 
Reform Act did not mark sentence disparities for elimination, but rather ‘unwarranted 
sentence disparities.’”  However, the Commission has discouraged and restricted 
departures from the Guidelines to such a degree that the result has been sentences 
imposed with “unwarranted uniformity” (p. 78).  The consensus of these studies is that 
the Guidelines should not require the judge to ignore compassion and common sense 
when determining a sentence for low-level or first-time offenders. 
 Overall, the Guidelines “do not actually reduce sentence disparity.  Instead, they 
simply give the illusion of uniformity via their strict control of discretion when, in reality, 
they enable indirect extralegal disparity to persist” (Kautt, 2002, p. 660).  Federal judges 
continue to be influenced by the offenders’ personal characteristics (Hanbury, 2000).  
Evidence illustrates that this is the case for race and ethnicity factors.  Gender has also 
been found to exert a significant influence on the sentencing outcome.  Women receive 
slightly more lenient sentences and more departures than men when convicted of the 
same crime.  These differences are often a consequence of the offender’s perceived role 
in the offense (Semisch, 2000).  
Certainly, the Guidelines were developed to make the punishment fit the crime 
rather than fit the offender.  The underlying logic was to create penalties equal to the 
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gravity of the offense, and whether the effects of such punishment were equivalent for 
each offender was deemed to be unimportant.  However, treating like offenders alike 
based solely on their offense of conviction may not always produce just or proportionate 
punishment.  Owing to differing life circumstances, numerically equivalent sentences 
may affect one defendant much more severely than another.  This is the premise upon 
which the jurisprudence of departures is based.  While the punishment should be 
equivalent to the severity of the offense, judges may exercise their discretion and depart 
outside of the recommended Guideline penalty range based on the offender’s 
“extraordinary” life circumstances.  Thus, while the explicit reason for punishment is to 
balance the harm attributed to the offense, studies conducted on departures from the 
federal Guidelines demonstrate that the effects of punishment on the individual offender 
are still relevant. 
 
Judicial Contextual Effects on Sentencing Outcomes 
 Federal judges are the Commission’s most important constituency.  It is the 
judges that determine the applicability and usefulness of the Guidelines.  The extent to 
which they abide by the sentencing ranges prescribed by the Guidelines, or depart from 
them, and by so doing point out their apparent inadequacies, determines the success of 
the Guidelines.  Measuring whether the Sentencing Guidelines are successful in 
achieving their purpose depends on whether they are consistently applied.  For these 
reasons, the Commission is very careful in safeguarding the anonymity of the federal 
sentencing judges contained in their data sets. 
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In the meantime, research conducted on judicial decision making behavior at the 
state level has attempted to measure the extent to which the personal characteristics of 
judges do influence dispositional outcomes.  The findings from these studies demonstrate 
the importance of considering these factors when analyzing sentencing outcomes.  Taken 
together, these findings leave little doubt that our understanding of the sentencing process 
would be greatly enhanced with the benefit of studies on judicial variation performed at 
the federal level. 
Initial research studies of state and county-level judicial behavior were unable to 
definitively isolate the effects of judges’ personal characteristics, and “mixed results” was 
the conclusion drawn by many researchers in examining social attributes of judges and 
their sentencing behavior.  For example, Gruhl et al. (1981; see also Spohn, 1990) 
examined conviction and sentencing decisions of male and female judges in a large, 
metropolitan city to determine whether gender significantly influenced the decision 
process.   They analyzed data from over 30,000 cases with both male and female 
defendants and found little distinction in the conviction and sentencing decisions of male 
and female judges.  The one interesting result uncovered by the analysis was that, 
compared to male judges, women judges were considerably more likely to sentence 
convicted female defendants to prison.  
 More recent studies have demonstrated a measurable impact on sentencing 
outcomes attributable to the personal sociological characteristics of judges (Sisk et al., 
1998).  For example, Coontz (2000) examined the effects of gender on judicial decisions 
using data collected from state trial judges in Pennsylvania.  In the study, vignettes were 
presented to the judges who were then asked to make decisions regarding the facts of the 
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case.  In this manner, comparisons of case outcomes based on the gender of the judge and 
the defendant were facilitated.  Results of the analysis showed that the gender of the 
judge was significant. 
 Steffensmeier and Britt (2001) analyzed state sentencing data from Pennsylvania 
in order to determine whether the sentencing judge’s race was a significant factor in the 
sentencing decision.  The study’s purpose was to determine if black judges were more or 
less lenient than white judges, and whether they used similar criteria in reaching their 
sentencing decisions.  Results showed that the judges weighed case and offender 
information the same regardless of race when making punishment decisions, although 
black judges were more likely to sentence both black and white defendants to prison.  
They concluded that, while individual racial characteristics were significant, they were 
not as significant as the judicial role factor. 
Overall, in analyzing the successful application of sentencing under the federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, the effectiveness of all participating courtroom actors in 
responding to the crime problem is being assessed (Ulmer, 1997).  In particular, this 
study will consider the ability of judges to balance their exercise of discretion with a fair 
and just penalty at sentencing.  Under the Guidelines, judges still retain enough discretion 
to decide what Special Offense Characteristics (SOCs) within the Guidelines’ offense 
categories to apply, when to depart (except in cases of substantial assistance motions by 
the prosecution), and by how many levels, and the final penalty range (Schulhofer, 1992).  
Every offense category contains a list of SOCs that attempt to capture the exact nature of 
the offense behavior and raise or lower the seriousness of the offense score in order to 
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approximate the corresponding statute’s intent to make the penalty fit the unique 
characteristics of the particular offense. 
Ultimately, judges decide how to apply the Guidelines and whether the Guidelines 
are even the most appropriate, or constitutional, way to sentence convicted offenders 
(Wilkins and Steer, 1993).  Federal judges still retain the power to make the final 
sentencing decision.  Their decision is the final decision at the sentencing hearing.  It 
would be unrealistic to assume, therefore, that their individual views and proclivities can 
be totally compartmentalized and have no impact whatsoever on the sentencing outcome.   
In the end, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines minimize, but do not eliminate 
entirely, the discretion of federal judges over the sentencing decision.  Upon accepting 
the determination of the federal probation officer’s final offense computation and 
criminal history score contained in the pre-sentence investigation report, the court has the 
discretion to impose a sentence within the applicable Guideline range, or in extraordinary 
circumstances, to depart above or below the prescribed range (Nagel and Johnson, 1994).  
However, a departure below the Guideline range is subject to appeal by the prosecution 
and a departure above the specified Guideline range is subject to appeal by the defense 
(Stith and Cabranes, 1997; 1998). 
 Simultaneously, federal prosecutors have the potential to influence sentencing 
outcomes through the exercise of discretion concerning charges, relevant conduct of the 
current offense, substantial assistance motions, and plea negotiations.  Historically, the 
U.S. Attorney decides whether charges are readily provable in court.  These independent 
and un-reviewed decisions are justified on the grounds of case pressure and the temporal 
constraints of case processing (Reitz, 1998).  Hence, the majority of cases are resolved 
83
through a guilty plea within the context of a plea agreement whereby the defendant 
agrees to plead guilty in exchange for certain concessions by the government (Kessler 
and Piehl, 1998).  Prosecutors may engage in charge bargaining in order to induce a plea, 
and they often do so (Parent et al., 1997).  The plea bargaining process is traditionally 
discretionary and unreviewed.  The result of these behind-the-scenes negotiations is that 
much of the case outcome is decided before any formal involvement by a federal judge 
and therefore never subject explicitly to an application of formal law.  Consequently, 
although the judge remains the final arbiter of a sentence regardless of its disposition, the 
prosecution can affect the outcome of a case where the defendant pleads guilty by 
controlling what facts are presented to the court for use by the judge in rendering a 
sentence (Payne, 1997).  This phenomenon has been described as “hidden departures” 
(Berman, 2000; Schulhofer and Nagel, 1997). 
Just as arbitrary or unfettered discretion of judges during the era of indeterminate 
sentencing resulted in unlike sentences for similar offenders convicted of the same 
offense, unfettered prosecutorial discretion has historically resulted in dissimilar 
convictions for similar offenders who have engaged in the same criminal conduct (Burns 
et al., 1997). The discretion exercised by the prosecuting attorney in charging and in the 
plea negotiation process poses an obstacle to reducing disparity for which the Guidelines 
have no answer.  For example, defendants convicted of bank robbery under similar 
circumstances may all receive the same sentence, but defendants who commit bank 
robbery under similar circumstances may receive different sentences if they are convicted 
on different offenses with different penalty ranges as a result of the charge bargaining 
process (Nagel and Schulhofer, 1992).   
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The federal legal code contains numerous options for charging a defendant from 
which the prosecuting attorney is empowered to choose. Many statutes are similar or 
overlapping, and they often contain various degrees of seriousness to encompass the 
offense conduct.  If the evidence is weak, less serious charges may be brought against the 
offender.  If the evidence is very strong, the most serious charges may be filed.  The 
prosecutor wants to win the case.  Thus, charges are influenced to a large degree by the 
strength of the evidence rather than the actual offense conduct (Smith and Damphousse, 
1998).  The fact cannot be ignored that when judicial discretion at sentencing is 
constrained, there is a concomitant increase in prosecutorial charge bargaining, 
particularly when the Sentencing Guidelines require more severe sentences than were 
common before the Guidelines were implemented, such as in the case of mandatory 
minimum sentences (Tonry, 1992; Vincent and Hofer, 1994; Wicharaya, 1995; Wallace, 
1993). 
The Sentencing Commission has recognized that plea bargaining negotiations can 
introduce disparity at later stages in the sentencing process.  Charging decisions that limit 
or bypass the normal application of the Guidelines can result in different sentences that 
are both disproportionate to the severity of the offense and disparate between similarly 
situated offenders who engage in similar offense conduct.  It was with the intent to offset 
these potential disparities arising during the process before sentencing that the original 
Commission formulated Guidelines that would capture all relevant offense behavior 
rather than the charges of conviction alone.  In this manner, the Commission 
characterizes their system as a “real offense system,” that factors in all conduct proved at 
the sentencing hearing, not just the elements to which the defendant pleads guilty or is 
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convicted of at trial (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2004, p. v, xii).  In addition to the 
relevant conduct rule, the Guidelines also use multiple count rules and cross-references 
among the Guidelines as mechanisms to offset the effects of uneven charging practices.   
In summary, factors regarding the courtroom context should be included in a 
study of sentencing outcomes if a thorough understanding is to be achieved.  The current 
study will focus on evaluating the impact of judicial influence as an overall body since 
the data do not permit the unraveling of their individual characteristics.  Nor do the data 
permit the analysis of factors arising from prosecution or defense attorneys.  The study 
will, however, look at the impact of judicial decisions on whether to incarcerate, how 
long to incarcerate, and whether to depart downward from the Guidelines across federal 
judicial districts and over eleven years time. 
 
Research Questions Derived from the Literature Review 
 A number of possible research questions came to light while reviewing studies of 
sentencing guidelines in the states’ and federal criminal justice systems.  For example, 
after controlling for legal factors such as offense seriousness and criminal history, does 
the likelihood of incarceration vary significantly due to the influence of extralegal factors 
such as gender, race, and ethnicity?  Does the mean sentence length vary under similar 
circumstances?  Are these sentencing outcomes affected by whether the defendant pleads 
guilty or is convicted in a trial?  Does the district court location or the year of sentencing 
have a significant influence on the sentencing outcome?  Under what circumstances do 
gender, race, and ethnicity factors influence sentencing outcomes under the federal 
Sentencing Guidelines?  How influential are other extralegal characteristics such as 
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citizenship, age, educational level, and family status on the sentencing outcome?  Finally, 
under what circumstances, and to what extent, is a judicial downward departure more 
likely to occur?  These questions suggest numerous possibilities for potential lines of 
relevant research.  In the following section, the major theoretical perspectives on the 
sentencing process will be reviewed to discern which outcomes are predicted. 
 
TABLE 3.1. SUMMARY OF STATE-LEVEL AND OTHER STUDIES OF SENTENCING SYSTEMS
Author(s) & Publication Year Data Description Relevant Findings
Britt, 2000 Pennsylvania State data, 1991-1994
N= 128,916 (in/out)
N = 76,120 (length of sentence)
Examines racial disparity in in/out decision and
length of sentence. Finds that the effects vary by
court jurisdiction. Punishment severity also varies
by court jurisdiction. The effects of extralegal
factors such as race, gender, offense severity, and
prior record are used differently by judges.
Bushway and Piehl, 2001 Maryland State data, July 1987 to 1995 (8 yrs)
N = 14,633 offenders convicted of person
offenses
Isolated the discretion of judges in the sentencing
decision by modeling the guidelines themselves.
Finds that blacks receive 20% longer sentences
than whites.
Chiricos, Welch, and Gertz,
2004
National Random Survey of Households, 2002
N = 885
Uses OLS regression to show that racial
typification of crime is a significant predictor of
punitiveness.
Engen and Gainey, 2000 Washington State data, July 1989 - June 1992
N = 36,949
Controls for the presumptive sentence to improve
the fit of the models predicting sentencing
decisions. This lessens the effects of sex and race
considerably. They demonstrate that linear
additive models are misspecified. Concludes that
sentence length is “overwhelmingly” determined
by seriousness of offense and criminal history.
Engen, Gainey, Crutchfield,
and Weis, 2003
Washington State data, July 1989 - June 1992
N = 46,552 convicted offenders
Looks at departures and structured sentencing
alternatives. Finds that males and minority
offenders are less likely to receive alternative
sentences below the standard range. Race,
ethnicity, gender, age, and type of plea all have
significant effects on the likelihood of downward
departures. Finds inconsistent effects above the
TABLE 3.1. SUMMARY OF STATE-LEVEL AND OTHER STUDIES OF SENTENCING SYSTEMS
Author(s) & Publication Year Data Description Relevant Findings
range.
Griffin and Wooldredge, 2006 Ohio State data
5,472 felony convictions from 24 of 88 trial
courts, including all 6 urban counties. (3,951
for imprisonment & 1,963 for sentence length)
Info gathered from prosecution & felony
probation offices.
Before = July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1996
After = Jan. 1, 1997 to Dec. 31, 1997
Studies gender disparity before and after
sentencing reforms by looking at imprisonment
decision and length-of-term decision. Finds that
females were less likely to go to prison before and
after the reforms. Drug convictions increased the
likelihood of imprisonment. Sentence length
disparities based on race and children were
reduced after the reforms.
Holleran and Spohn, 2004 Pennsylvania State data, 1998
N = 4, 026
Emphasized the need to distinguish between jail





N = 194 matched pairs of men and women
Examines gender differences in sentencing using
path analysis and finds that women are treated
more leniently than men for both the in/out
decision and the length of term decision. Builds
on evidence that sex-based decision making earlier
in the process contributes to sex-based outcomes
later on at the end stages of the process.
Johnson, 2003 Pennsylvania State data, 1996-1998
N = 109,931
Examines race and ethnicity effects on departures
among 4 different types of convictions. Finds that
the extralegal effects vary considerably across the
modes of conviction. Overall, blacks and
Hispanics have a reduced likelihood of receiving a
downward departure in comparison to whites.
Johnson, 2005 Pennsylvania State data, 1997
N = 42,325 downward departures
Uses HLM to find that likelihood of departures
varies across courts and is conditional on court size
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N = 143,102 upward departures (large), caseload pressure (trial tax), guidelines
compliance rate, and social court context.
Koons-Witt, 2002 Minnesota State data
N = 635 (pre-guidelines)
N = 1,545 (early guidelines)
N = 835 (later guidelines)
Compares the effect of gender on the decision to
incarcerate before and after implementation of
guidelines. Finds that women with small children
were less likely to be incarcerated before
sentencing guidelines. Evidence suggests that
judges tend to return to previous patterns of
sentencing to satisfy ideals of justice and fairness.
Kramer and Steffensmeier,
1993
Pennsylvania State data, 1985-1987
N = 61,294 cases
Uses additive and interactive models to test effects
of race on imprisonment decisions. Finds that race
affects in/out decision by favoring whites. Race
doesn’t have a direct effect on length of sentence,
but blacks are more likely to be incarcerated.
Kramer and Ulmer, 2002 Pennsylvania State data, 1997-1999
N = 3,243
Looks at downward departures. Defendants who
go to trial, young Hispanic males, and offenders
sentenced in small rural courts are less likely to
receive downward departures. Those who plead
guilty, are convicted of aggravated assault, are
young black women, and are sentenced in large
urban courts more likely to depart.
Lee, 2001 13 States with Sentencing Guidelines Finds considerable variation between the states’
guidelines systems. Guidelines can reduce or
control prison populations. Finds little evidence of
any association between guidelines and crime
rates.
Marvell, 1995 9 States with Sentencing Guidelines Examines the relationship between sentencing
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guidelines and prison populations in 9 states.
Found that prison populations decreased in 6 of the
9 states.
Sorensen and Stemen, 2002 State Sentencing and Corrections Archive at
the Vera Institute of Justice. All 50 states
N = 36 state sentencing policies
Looks at the relationship between sentencing
policies, incarceration rates, prison admission
rates, and average length of sentence during the
late 1990s. Concludes that determinate sentencing,
mandatory minimums, and truth-in-sentencing
laws have no effect on rates of incarceration or
prison admission rates. Instead, they are
determined more by crime rates, percentage
minority population, and citizen ideology. Finds
sentencing guidelines are associated with lower
prison admission rates.
Spohn and Holleran, 2000 3 Large Urban Jurisdictions in 3 states
(Illinois, Florida, Missouri)
Extends the study of Steffensmeier et al. (1998).
Replicated findings that young, black males
received harsher sentences due to the interaction
effects. Looks also at Hispanic ethnicity and
employment status in a multi-jurisdictional
approach. Younger, unemployed minority
defendants face higher odds of incarceration.
Steffensmeier, Kramer, and
Streifel, 1993
Pennsylvania State data, 1985-1987
N = 61,294
Plus interviews with judges
Examines the effect of gender and finds that it has
a small effect on the likelihood of incarceration,
but no effect on the length of term decision.
Steffensmeier, Kramer, and
Ulmer, 1995
Pennsylvania State data, 1989-1992
N = 120,300 offenders, for 15 offense types
Examines age effects (elderly offenders) for in/out
decision and length of term decision. Finds that
older offenders (in 50s and 60s) receive the most
TABLE 3.1. SUMMARY OF STATE-LEVEL AND OTHER STUDIES OF SENTENCING SYSTEMS




Pennsylvania State data, 1989-1992
N = 139,000 cases
Examines race, age, and gender effects on in/out
and length of term decisions (logit and OLS
regression). Finds that young, black males are
sentenced more severely than any other group.
The interaction effects are greater than the effects
of these variables individually.
Steffensmeier and DeMuth,
2001
Pennsylvania State data, 1991-1994
N = 96,000 cases
Finds that Hispanic defendants have the highest
likelihood of punishment severity for in/out
decision and length of term decision, for drug and
non-drug crimes.
Ulmer and Kramer, 1996 Pennsylvania State data, 3 counties 1985-1991
Plus qualitative data from interviews
Examines effects of race, gender, and trial versus
plea (mode of conviction). Finds that they are still
influential, even in a structured sentencing system.
Women were 2.13 times as likely as men to
receive a downward departure.
Ulmer and Kramer, 1998 Pennsylvania State data – 3 Counties,
1991-1992
Finds significant gender and race differences in all
three counties for in/out decision and length of
term decision.
Ulmer and Johnson, 2004 Pennsylvania State data, 1997-1999
N = 108,169 (in/out)
N = 59,852 (length of sentence)
Uses HLM to show that court organizational
culture, caseload pressure, and racial and ethnic
composition affect sentencing outcomes for both
in/out and length of sentence. Large courts were
least likely to incarcerate. Caseload pressure was
negatively related to likelihood of incarceration.
Minority effects varied with pop % minority.
..
TABLE 3.2. SUMMARY OF FEDERAL-LEVEL STUDIES OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING
Author(s) & Publication Year Data Description Relevant Findings
Albonetti, 1997 USSC data, FY1991-1992
N= 14,000 drug offenders
Ethnicity significant for guilty pleas and
departures.
Bush-Baskette, 2000 USSC data, FY1996
N = 42,436 convicted offenders
Finds that mandatory minimums for crack cocaine
are related to both the in/out decision and the
length of sentence decision for black females.
Chanhatasilpa, 2000 USSC data, FY1994-1997
N = 170,375 convicted offenders
Concluded that the Guidelines do not discriminate
against Asian defendants. Race was not significant
in the in/out decision. Asians received a bit longer
sentences than white defendants, but less than
black defendants.
Everett and Nienstedt, 1999 USSC data, between Dec. 1990 – April 1991
N = 4,731 Cases
1 district from each of the circuits (n=12) was
randomly chosen for face-to-face interviews
Examines offenders who received downward
adjustments for “Acceptance of Responsibility.”
Minority defendants are less likely to receive this
adjustment. Women are more likely than men.
Farabee, 1998 2 federal district courts (MA & CT).
FY1993-1996 drug and fraud convictions
where the defendant received a downward
departure.
Plus interviews with judges, prosecution and
defense attorneys, and probation officers
Analyzes departures and the discretion used to
justify them. Finds that more downward
departures are the result of prosecutor’s motion for
substantial assistance in Mass, but a wide variety
of judicial downward departures were the most
common in Connect.
Gomez, 1995 USSC data Departures for “extraordinary family
circumstances.” Finds that a series of factors
which, in isolation, will not remove a case from
the heartland may, when considered together,
invite departures. Low level drug offenders who
are non-citizens and under-educated are “over-
punished.”
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Hanbury, 2000 USSC data, FY1995
N= 1,918 (5% Random Sample)
Offender’s personal characteristics affected the
probability of receiving downward departures after
controlling for legal variables.
Hebert, 1997 USSC data, 1989
N = 5,557 drug offenders (in/out)
N = 5,336 (length of sentence)
Examines race effects for drug offenders for in/out
decision (logistic regression) and length of
sentence (OLS regression). Finds that blacks
convicted of cocaine offenses and Hispanics
convicted of cocaine and marijuana offenses were
more likely to be incarcerated than white
offenders. Blacks received longer sentences than
whites.
Kautt, 2002 USSC data, FY 1999
(Matched to Census data, UCR data, and
federal criminal case processing statistics)
Drug trafficking cases (single offense only)
Examines the geographical location of sentencing
through hierarchical linear modeling (HLM).
Found that both district and circuit location
affected length of sentence. Hispanics, males, and
going to trial also significantly increased the
duration of a sentence.
Kautt and Spohn, 2002 USSC data, FY 1998
N = 13,183 drug offenders
Looks at interaction between race (black) and drug
type (crack cocaine). Finds that race conditions
the effects of drug type using a data partitioning
strategy (3 groups) and OLS to model length of
sentence. Race exerts a complex and strong
influence over sentencing outcome using
mandatory minimums, and “deliberate mitigation”
in Guidelines sentencing outcomes.
TABLE 3.2. SUMMARY OF FEDERAL-LEVEL STUDIES OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING
Author(s) & Publication Year Data Description Relevant Findings
Kempf-Leonard and Sample,
2001
USSC data, FY1993-1994 in 1 Circuit (8th
Circ)
N = 4,730 Cases
Examines disparity by sex, race, socioeconomic
status, and family status for in/out decision, length
of term decision, and departures from the
Guidelines (OLS regression). Finds that
sentencing is dictated largely by relevant legal
factors, but personal circumstances do negatively
influence case outcomes for some defendants.
Disparity persists.
Kesler, 2003 USSC data, FY1999 Examines gender effects and finds differences.
Concludes that gender-related factors such as role
in the offense and criminal history may help
explain and possibly justify gender differences in
sentencing.
LaCasse and Payne, 1999 2 federal districts of New York.
Cases initiated and resolved between 1981 and
1995 for before/after Guidelines comparison
(USSC data from 1991 through 1995)
Examines plea bargaining behavior pre- and post-
reforms. Contrary to expectations, finds that the
variation in sentences attributable to the judge has
increased rather than decreased after sentencing
reforms. Sentencing guidelines have failed to
reduce the amount of variation attributable to
judge assignment.
Mustard, 2001 USSC data, FY1991-1994
N= 77,236 offenders
Finds that large differences in the length of
sentence exist on the basis of race, gender,
education, income, and citizenship. Over half of
the unaccounted-for differences are generated by
departures. Finds gender and racial differences in
in/out decision. Finds these differences exist
across offense types.
TABLE 3.2. SUMMARY OF FEDERAL-LEVEL STUDIES OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING
Author(s) & Publication Year Data Description Relevant Findings
Nagel and Johnson, 1994 USSC data, 1991-1992 Examine the effect of gender on female offenders
sentenced under the Guidelines for drug offenses,
embezzlement, and fraud. Finds that differential
(favorable) treatment of women has not been
eliminated.
Payne, 1997 3 federal district courts 1980-1991 (NY & PA) Examines case resolution, mandatory minimums,
and mean length of prison sentences pre- and post-
guidelines. Finds that more offenders plead guilty
post-guidelines, and sentences for drug offenses
have increased due to Mand. Mins., but sentences
have not increased for other crimes. Guidelines
effects on sentence variation was negligible and
decreased inter-judge disparity in some courts.
Semisch, 2000 USSC data, FY1995
N = 2,657 drug trafficking cases
34 Matched Pairs for Qualitative Study
Finds gender disparity among offenders convicted
of drug trafficking. Women have lower odds of
imprisonment and receive larger Guideline
departures than men for the same drug crime.
Perceived role in the offense was primary
influence.
Sisk, Heise, and Morriss, 1998 294 federal case dispositions regarding the
constitutionality of the sentencing guidelines
during 1988.
Finds that individual district judges who reached
the same decision arrived at the outcome using
different constitutional theories, alternative styles
of analysis, and different modes of legal reasoning.
179 judges (60.9%) invalidated the Guidelines and
115 judges (39.1%) sustained the Guidelines
against constitutional challenges.
TABLE 3.2. SUMMARY OF FEDERAL-LEVEL STUDIES OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING
Author(s) & Publication Year Data Description Relevant Findings
Smith and Damphousse, 1998 111 convicted terrorists
482 convicted non-terrorists
(Model estimates were based on 500 cases—
97 terrorists and 403 non-terrorists)
Those identified as terrorists by the FBI’s list were
less likely to plead guilty and go to trial. Their
average sentence length was four times longer than
for non-terrorists. Finds that increased public and
political support for getting tough with what are
perceived to be especially heinous crimes can lead
to more consistent and harsher punishment for
particular types of offenses. A proactive political
environment may be a more important predictor of




(*limited to only males and U.S. citizens)
N = 89,637 convicted offenders
Extends the study of Albonetti (1997) and
examines race and ethnicity differences in
sentencing outcomes for in/out decision (probit
regression) and length of sentence (OLS and tobit
regression). Finds white defendants are favored,
blacks are in the middle, and Hispanic defendants
are penalized the most. Blacks and Hispanics had
higher offense severity scores, lengthier criminal
histories, were younger and less educated than
white defendants.
Weinstein, 1999 USSC data, FY1996 for all districts Examines the rate of substantial assistance
departures through an analysis of supply and
demand in the cooperation market (game theory).
Suggests that a numerical limit on the number of
defendants who may receive 5k departures be
imposed on prosecutors.
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CHAPTER IV:  THEORY 
According to Lubitz and Ross (2001), sentencing guidelines have proven to be 
more than just a temporary trend in the state and federal court systems.  Whether they are 
the panacea that legislatures are looking for when deciding how to solve the “crime 
problem” has yet to be determined or acknowledged.  However, it is the ideological 
neutrality of guidelines that has constituted both their strength and staying power.  In this 
day and age, no politician can afford to be viewed by their constituents as “soft” on crime 
and expect to receive the votes necessary to ensure political victory and longevity in 
public office. 
 Sentencing guidelines, regardless of their place of implementation, promise to 
introduce more uniformity and consistency into the sentencing process.  The reasoning 
behind many of the proposed sentencing guidelines systems is to standardize the 
sentencing decision by prescribing proportionate punishments and appropriate 
incapacitation.  This is true whether the guidelines are voluntary and advisory or 
presumptive and even mandatory.  Hence, in order to determine the success or failure of a 
guidelines system, the philosophy driving the system must be specified, the goals of its 
implementation must be enumerated, and the resulting outcomes measured by those 
criteria. 
Philosophies of Punishment 
 There are four purposes of sanctions.  These purposes are to punish, to deter, to 
incapacitate, and to rehabilitate (Tonry, 1996).  These four sanction purposes often have 
overlapping goals.  They also have competing goals.  Overall, they share the ideal of 
halting the criminal behavior that is harmful to society.  Each purpose of sanctioning is 
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based on a theory of why people engage in criminal conduct and what will influence 
them to desist and stop committing crime, voluntarily or otherwise (Karle and Sager, 
1991). 
Thus, sentencing is a decision-making process affected by the goals of 
sanctioning and dependent upon the particular sentencing system being used, the 
philosophy in which it is framed, and the actual custody options available.  These goals 
are outlined in sentencing reform legislation with varying degrees of specificity.  The 
most frequently emphasized goals are public safety, just deserts, maintaining moral order, 
and treating and rehabilitating the offender (Mears, 1998).  More often than not, several 
goals are emphasized, as are the means by which these goals are achieved.  This situation 
may lead to ambiguity among courts in determining the appropriate sentence, depending 
on which goal of sentencing is used to influence the sentencing decision. 
Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
 A sentencing guidelines system can be based on different philosophies of 
sentencing, some of which may appear to compete with one another, but do indeed 
coexist based on the amount of emphasis or importance placed on one versus the other.  
In the federal system, rehabilitation coexists with just deserts, but the amount of weight 
placed on the importance of rehabilitation is far less than, and some would argue, 
overshadowed by, that of just deserts. 
Following the writings of Andrew von Hirsch (1980), a leading just desert 
theorist, offense seriousness in the Guidelines is measured along two dimensions, namely 
harmfulness of the offense conduct and culpability of the offender (von Hirsch and 
Hanrahan, 1981; von Hirsch et al., 1987).  The principle of proportionality prescribes that 
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the imposed sanction reflects the gravity of the offense and the criminal background of 
the offender.  It requires that offenses be ranked according to their seriousness.  
Consistency and uniformity prescribe that offenders who have similar records and were 
convicted of similar crimes receive similar sanctions.  Rationality and transparency hold 
that sentences be based on clearly articulated rules and policies that apply equally to all 
offenders, and that the sentencing process is open and observable (Mustard, 2001). 
 The original Commissioners’ time expired before they could ever work out their 
differences and reach a consensus on the driving theoretical orientation of the Guidelines 
(Tonry, 1996).  Because of tight deadlines, the Sentencing Commission failed to 
articulate a philosophy of punishment when promulgating the initial Sentencing 
Guidelines.  Without a clearly stated purpose of punishment, federal judges have been 
left without a fixed systematic rationale to inform their application of the Guidelines.  A 
shared philosophy of punishment must be applied uniformly by all judges in all cases if 
arbitrary sentencing decisions and unwarranted disparities in sentencing outcomes are to 
be prevented (Yakren, 2003).   
 Since its creation, the Sentencing Commission was invested with the authority to 
develop Sentencing Guidelines, an authority which gives a very small group of highly 
educated, elite, and politically-influential people power over a very large class of 
powerless individuals who have received the label of convicted offenders by the courts 
(Parent et al., 1996).  In addition, legislative interference is seldom beneficial for a 
uniform philosophy of punishment.  When Congress pushes through rushed legislation 
that is enacted in response to the “crime of the day,” the rationality of the Guidelines 
system often takes a direct hit.  Thus, preventing micromanagement by members of 
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Congress while preserving the policymaking function vested in the Sentencing 
Commission will be an enduring challenge (Parent et al., 1997). 
 Hofer and Allenbaugh (2003), current and former employees of the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission, respectively, have offered a philosophy of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, although they conceded that their article did not reflect the 
official position of the Commission or its individual Commissioners.  They reason that 
the philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines can be identified through a process 
of “rational reconstruction.”  In other words, a clear philosophy would emerge through a 
process of reconstruction and examination of important correlates such as departures, 
judicial decisions at sentencing and appellate review, and amendments to the Guidelines 
over time.  Using this approach, the authors assert that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
were formulated and exist within a “modified just deserts framework” (p. 20). 
 The just deserts philosophy of punishment is clearly the foremost philosophy in 
the implementation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  The primary factor in 
determining a just sentence under the Guidelines system is matching the severity of the 
imposed sentence to the seriousness of the offense, based on the inflicted harm and the 
culpability of the offender.   The second philosophy of punishment, incapacitation, is the 
utilitarian reason why it is called a “modified just deserts” framework.  According to the 
theory of incapacitation, the more danger the offender poses to society at large, and the 
increased odds of recidivism, the greater the need to incapacitate them for longer periods 
of time.  Hence, an offender committing his fifth crime would be punished more severely 
than an offender committing the same crime for the first time. 
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Deterrence is the third philosophy of punishment in order of importance in the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  Deterrence relies on three components, namely certainty, 
celerity (swiftness), and severity.  The emphasis on certainly and celerity is much greater 
in the preliminary stages of the criminal justice system, and both fade in importance at 
the sentencing stage of the criminal justice process.  Severity, on the other hand, takes on 
greater importance at this stage.  Severity is one of the primary factors weighed by the 
Sentencing Guidelines.  In other words, the most severe or harmful offenses require 
imposing the most severe penalties. 
 Rehabilitation is the fourth and final philosophy of punishment contained in the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  Critics of the Sentencing Guidelines have argued that the 
philosophy of rehabilitation has been pushed so far down the list of penal priorities, that it 
exerts no influence whatsoever over the sentencing process (Tonry, 1996; 1999).  It 
should be remembered, however, that the Guidelines were developed in an era when 
conclusions from research proclaimed that rehabilitation “doesn’t work” (Martinson, 
1974).  Treatment and training programs were subsequently scaled back or disappeared 
altogether in many state and local penal systems as well.  As currently formulated in the 
federal Guidelines, it is simply not possible for rehabilitation to take precedence over the 
other three penal philosophies in the modified just deserts model. 
 The “hybrid theory” proposed by Hofer and Allenbaugh (2003, p. 24) has been 
criticized as inherently flawed because it rests on the integration of incommensurable 
principles of punishment.  In other words, any theory of punishment that seeks to meld 
utilitarianism and retribution necessarily fails the test of both horizontal and internal 
consistency.  The two theories are mutually incompatible, which means they cannot be 
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integrated in any principled manner (Rappaport, 2003).  A hybrid sanctioning theory 
would prevent the Commission from offering a fully principled justification for the 
process of sentencing offenders within a Guidelines system.  As a result, this approach 
would only reintroduce a degree of arbitrariness back into the sanctioning process.  
Adopting a pure utilitarian philosophy would meet the requirements leading to a fully-
developed rational system, make the Commission appear more principled and legitimate, 
and encourage more theoretical research of the Guideline’s performance (Parker and 
Block, 2001). 
 Moreover, if the Guidelines operated under a modified just deserts philosophy, 
the defendant’s cooperation would not be rewarded with a substantial assistance 
departure.  Cooperation at adjudication has nothing to do with the defendant’s mental 
state at the time the crime was perpetrated.  Actions taken in order to receive a reduced 
sentence are not indicative of a commendable or less blameworthy character.  Thus, the 
adjustments constructed within the Guidelines themselves undermine their proposed 
philosophy (Schwartz, 2003). 
 It is also worth noting that the paradigm of restorative justice is entirely excluded 
from the philosophy of the Sentencing Guidelines.  Again, this absence speaks to the era 
in which the Guidelines were developed.  In recent years, proposals have been put 
forward on how to integrate the principles of restorative justice into a guidelines system 
(i.e. Lubitz and Ross, 2001), but they have not yet drawn substantial attention from 
Congress or the Commission. 
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Theoretical Explanations for Sentencing Outcomes 
 The sentencing process has been described empirically much more than it has 
theoretically.  This is especially true for sentencing studies conducted in the federal court 
system.  Theoretical explanations allow for prediction and testing, increasing the 
explanatory power of independent and dependent variables over time in a cumulative 
fashion.  An overview of the major perspectives for predicting sentencing outcomes is 
useful before introducing the theoretical predictions of the current study. 
Attribution Theory 
 At sentencing, judges are required to make decisions that will affect the convicted 
offenders for a very long time, and frequently they must make these decisions with 
insufficient information, resulting in considerable uncertainty.  This process whereby 
judges attempt to reduce uncertainty in the sentencing process through stereotypical 
attributions has been described in detail by Albonetti (1991).  Kramer and Ulmer (2002) 
describe the process in a similar way.  They suggest that judges and prosecutors cannot 
always digest the information they have at their disposal.  Therefore, they make 
attributions about case and defendant characteristics to manage this uncertainty. 
These attributions that court officials develop and employ mental images often are 
based on offenders’ similarities to other offenders they have dealt with in the past or to 
officials’ personal conceptions or mental images of such offenders.  The court makes 
judgments about the offender’s character, attitudes, motivations, and background that 
influence the sentencing outcome.  An offender’s attitude displayed in the courtroom can 
become its own aggravating or mitigating factor at sentencing. 
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Differential attributions about the causes of crime act as a mediating factor 
between race and sentencing recommendations (Bridges and Steen, 1998).  In studies of 
state court systems, judges commonly assign attributes to offenders during a brief 
assessment process in order to determine the likelihood of recidivism.  Court officials 
attribute crimes by minorities to negative personalities and attitudinal traits whereas the 
crimes committed by whites are attributed to negative influences in their social 
environments. The socially advantaged are the most likely to avoid punishment.  When 
minority offenders are stereotyped as particularly predatory or disposed to chronic 
criminal offending, they “are seen as more villainous and therefore as deserving of more 
severe penalties” (Peterson and Hagan, 1984, p. 67).   
The Court Community Perspective 
 Sentencing outcomes are produced in organizational contexts, and it therefore is 
logical to expect that these contexts are influential in producing variation in sentencing 
(Ulmer, 1997).  The organizational context of court communities has typically been 
measured by describing a court’s caseload, structure, size, location, and organizational 
norms, or by distinguishing them as rural or urban, tightly coupled versus loosely 
coupled, or bureaucratic versus non-bureaucratic (Mears, 1998).  Likewise, it is important 
to consider the larger cultural, political, and social contexts in which sentencing occurs 
(Smith and Damphousse, 1998).  The courts are ensconced in ecological context (Jacob, 
1997).  They exist as part of a larger institutional environment whereby they are 
continuously engaged in exchange relationships with other organizations such as prisons, 
law enforcement agencies, legislatures, politicians, and other government social welfare 
agencies (Dixon, 1995). 
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The court community perspective magnifies the dynamic interactions of 
courtroom workgroups and views courts as “communities of action and communication 
based on participants’ shared workplace, interdependent working relations between key 
sponsoring agencies, and local legal and organizational culture” (Kramer and Ulmer, 
2002, p. 902).  These court communities determine sentencing outcomes and processes in 
a manner equivalent to that shared by formal policies and legal structures (Eisenstein et 
al., 1988; Ulmer, 1997; Ulmer and Kramer, 1996; 1998).  Savelsberg’s (1992) theoretical 
analysis of sentencing guidelines is based on the same line of reasoning—that the 
substantive rationality of local court contexts and the individual proclivities of the 
workgroup may undermine formal rational decision-making practices such as those 
prescribed in the sentencing guidelines. 
 In the court community’s perspective, criminal courts are composed of judges, 
prosecutors, and defense counsel whose relations and decisions are interdependent, and 
who form workgroups that often remain stable over considerable periods of time 
(Eisenstein and Jacob, 1977).  This interdependence is created by the bureaucratic social 
settings in which they work, their sponsoring organizations, and the local legal culture 
(Ulmer and Kramer, 1998).  Moreover, it implies that courts are localized, diverse, and 
embedded within the larger context of case processing, sentencing practices, and state 
criminal justice policies. 
In the social organizational setting of the court community framework, coupling 
refers to “the degree to which actions of one participant have predictable consequences 
for another” (Jacob, 1997, p. 6).  When activities are tightly coupled, the consequences 
are immediately predictable.  When activities are loosely coupled, the consequences of 
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one individual’s actions in this interdependent relationship may not be readily discernable 
or predictable. 
 Similar to other organizations, the federal district courts contain elements of both 
tight and loose coupling.  Typically, the result of this commingling is that a constant 
tension exists between the push to couple more tightly and the pull to couple more 
loosely.  The thrust of the Sentencing Guidelines is to increase predictability in the 
federal criminal courts.  At the same time, the courtroom workgroup is attempting to 
impose a just and equitable sentencing outcome to fit the crime and the individual needs 
of the convicted offender.  In particular, district judges are acutely aware of this tension 
in coupling as they are called upon to make expedient managerial decisions and simplify 
and routinize the sentencing procedure.  In state courts, the consequences of this tension 
have been found to result in a conciliar judicial leadership role and sluggish, incremental 
change that promotes responsiveness to the interests of powerful clientele while short-
changing less influential clients of the courts (Jacob, 1997). 
The Organizational Efficiency Perspective 
The need to process cases in an efficient and expeditious manner, or at least to 
avoid backlogs, characterizes the organizational efficiency perspective.  This perspective 
is characterized by the need to be sensitive to the finite nature of criminal justice 
resources (Johnson, 2003).  The push to rapidly process cases and to conserve scare 
resources may explain certain circumstances of circumvention of the sentencing 
guidelines and rewarding individual offenders for pleading guilty.  At a minimum, it 
highlights the need to examine the influence of caseload pressures on courtroom 
decision-making outcomes (Dixon, 1995; Johnson, 2005).  The Federal Sentencing 
107
Guidelines have a policy called “Early Disposition Programs (EDP)” that reward 
defendants who agree to allow their cases to be fast-tracked through the system. 
Research has shown that the implementation of sentencing guidelines in state 
court systems depend on local relationships and activities of the courtroom actors along 
with informal decision-making criteria such as that used during plea negotiations.  Owing 
to circumstances such as time constraints, courtroom actors use the formal decision 
making criteria set by the guidelines in an interpretative, situationally-contingent manner 
to aid them in coping with uncertainty in case processing and sentencing (Albonetti, 
1991; 1997).  Federal judges, like everyone else, operate in a world of imperfect and 
incomplete information (Hebert, 1997).  Because of this, they develop and use a 
“perceptual shorthand” when faced with situations of incomplete information that is 
linked to race, ethnicity, gender, and age characteristics.  The contexts of these 
stereotypes are internalized by the court actors and are utilized in order to make case 
processing more efficient (Steffensmeier et al., 1998, p. 769). 
This is done in the context of furthering their respective organizational interests 
and ideals of justice (Ulmer and Kramer, 1998; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004; Johnson, 
2005).  For convictions that are the product of a guilty plea, Albonetti (1999, p. 304) 
surmised that sentence severity is likely to be the result of interplay between legality, 
case complexity, and “bureaucratic interests in efficient case processing.”  The primary 
way in which court actors achieve efficiency is by inducing guilty pleas.  Thus, more 
lenient outcomes should occur in courts with greater caseload pressures and lower trial 
rates while more severe penalties should be expected when courts are experiencing higher 
trial rates. 
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The Focal Concerns Perspective 
 The most common perspective proposed to describe the mechanisms underlying 
the sanctioning process under a guidelines regime is that of “focal concerns.”  The 
premise of the focal concerns perspective contends that judges’ sentencing decisions 
reflect their assessment of the culpability of the offender, their desire to protect the 
community, and their concerns about the social costs of sentencing decisions (Kautt and 
Spohn, 2002; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004; Kramer and Steffensmeier, 1993; Kramer and 
Ulmer, 1996; Kramer and Ulmer, 2002; Steffensmeier and Britt, 1998; Steffensmeier and 
DeMuth, 2001; Steffensmeier et al., 1993; 1995; 1998).  This explanation is an extension 
of the court community perspective.  The development of the focal concerns perspective 
also draws on the work of Albonetti (1991). 
According to this perspective, judges and other court community actors assess the 
implications of these imputed characteristics on the three focal concerns of 
blameworthiness, dangerousness/community protection, and practical constraints and 
consequences.  The relative weight and emphasis of these concerns are embedded in local 
court community culture, organizational contexts, and politics.  Thus, they are understood 
and communicated without the necessity of verbal or written explanations among 
workgroup members. 
The focal concerns perspective expects legal factors to influence the sentencing 
decision to a much greater extent than extralegal factors (Steffensmeier et al, 1998).  
Blameworthiness attempts to capture the degree of offender culpability and quantify the 
amount of injury or damage caused by the commission of the offense.  This is derived 
from the retributive philosophy of punishment and is dependent on such factors as the 
109
offender’s role in the offense.  Protection of the community refers to the need to 
incapacitate more dangerous offenders and deter other potential offenders.  Practical 
constraints and consequences encompass both the concerns for organizational efficiency, 
stability, and continuity, and the impact of punishment on the individual offender 
(Johnson, 2003).  The relative emphasis and subjective interpretation of these three focal 
concerns varies across court communities (Ulmer and Johnson, 2004). 
By integrating and expanding concepts from the other perspectives, the focal 
concerns framework offers the most comprehensive explanation available for sentencing 
outcomes.  Yet, to date, it has not been applied to the sentencing process with federal-
level sentencing data.  Perhaps this is due to the idea that federal courts appear to be more 
removed from the surrounding community environment than state and local courts.  If 
sentencing outcomes vary between districts, as suggested in prior research, then this 
supposition of an insulated courtroom workgroup is not warranted.  Nor is it warranted if 
sentencing outcomes change over time.  This study will examine the influence of both 
legal and extralegal factors on the sentencing outcome in federal district courts from 1993 
through 2003.  Whether these measures are equivalent to those done with state-level data 
to capture blameworthiness, protection of the community, and practical constraints and 
consequences has not yet been determined.
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Theoretical Predictions of the Study 
The purpose of this research is to evaluate judicial discretion and unwarranted 
disparities in sentencing outcomes using eleven consecutive annual data sets collected 
and disseminated by the U.S. Sentencing Commission from fiscal years 1993 through 
2003.  After reviewing the literature on research conducted on both state and federal 
determinate sentencing systems and evaluating relevant theories and paradigms regarding 
sentencing decisions and court contexts, seven hypotheses were derived.  These 
hypotheses will draw upon the existing theoretical framework surrounding courts and 
sentencing practices, while testing their degree of influence over time. 
As is apparent from these predictions, the underlying rationale for this analysis is 
that unwarranted disparities which existed before the Guidelines were enacted, and which 
might have persisted in the early years, should have diminished significantly over time as 
the Guidelines became institutionalized throughout the federal judicial conference.  If the 
Guidelines are functioning properly, these predictions should be borne out over the 
decade of sentencing data analyzed in this study.  However, if the specific unwarranted 
disparities targeted by this study do not diminish significantly, the issue must be raised as 
to whether determinate sentencing reform in the federal judicial system in general, and 
the Guidelines in particular, have contributed to a more just system of sentencing than did 
the previous indeterminate sentencing system. 
 The first three hypotheses focus on the effects of gender, race, and ethnicity on 
the three judicial decisions of whether to impose a sentence of incarceration, of defining 
the length of the term of incarceration, and whether to grant a downward departure below 
the prescribed guideline penalty range.  The predictions embedded within these 
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hypotheses are grounded in both attribution theory and the focal concerns perspective 
which suggest that discretion exercised by judges is affected by stereotypical patterned 
responses and perceptual shorthands (Albonetti, 1991) tied to extralegal offender 
characteristics.  In other words, judges take ascribed offender characteristics into account 
when determining sentencing outcomes.  Moreover, with regard to race and ethnicity, 
group threat theory would predict harsher sentencing outcomes for minority groups since 
they have historically been viewed as more threatening and dangerous to the community. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Disparities attributable to the exclusive influence of specific extralegal 
factors on the imprisonment decision should decrease over the eleven years of data in the 
study period as the Guidelines become more institutionalized. 
(a) Racial and ethnic disparities on the in/out decision will decrease over time.  
Specifically, white defendants will be less likely to receive incarceration 
sentences than Hispanic defendants, who in turn, will be less likely to receive 
incarceration sentences than black defendants, but these differences will 
converge over time. 
(b) Gender disparities on the in/out decision will decrease over time.  Female 
defendants will be less likely to receive incarceration sentences than male 
defendants, but these differences will converge over time. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Disparities attributable to the exclusive influence of specific extralegal 
factors on the length-of-term decision should decrease over the eleven years of data in the 
study period as the Guidelines become more institutionalized. 
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(a) Racial and ethnic disparities in mean sentence length will decrease over time.  
White defendants will be less likely to receive as long a mean sentence as 
Hispanic defendants, who in turn, will be less likely to receive as long a mean 
sentence as black defendants, but these differences will converge over time. 
(b) Gender disparities in mean sentence length will decrease over time.  Female 
defendants will be less likely to receive as long a mean sentence as male 
defendants, but these differences will converge over time. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Disparities attributable to the exclusive influence of specific extralegal 
factors on the decision to grant defendants a judicial downward departure should decrease 
over the eleven years in the study period as the Guidelines become more institutionalized.  
(a) Racial and ethnic disparities in the judicial downward departure rate will 
decrease over time.  White defendants will be more likely to receive 
downward departures than Hispanic defendants, who in turn, will be more 
likely to receive downward departures than black defendants, but these 
differences will converge over time. 
(b) Gender disparities in the judicial downward departure rate will decrease over 
time.  Female defendants will be more likely to receive downward departures 
than male defendants, but these differences will converge over time. 
 
The next hypothesis is derived from studies of courtroom working groups, 
wherein the theory of courtroom efficiency, with its primary emphasis on efficiently and 
smoothly managing courtroom caseloads, comes into play.  This efficiency theory 
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postulates that offenders convicted through a trial proceeding will receive more severe 
sentences.  Likewise, the focal concerns perspective would indicate that offenders who 
are convicted at trial show a sign of an explicit lack of remorse, leading to increased 
judicial attributions of offender blameworthiness, dangerousness, and community risk.  
Therefore, both organizational efficiency theory and the focal concerns perspective are 
used as a basis for the next hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The type of disposition will have a significant independent effect on the 
sentencing outcome.  Specifically, the sentencing outcomes of those defendants who are 
convicted by trial will be significantly different than defendants who plead guilty, and 
any significant differences will decrease over the study period as the Guidelines become 
more institutionalized. 
(a) Defendants who are convicted by trial will be more likely to receive sentences 
of incarceration (if located in Zones A or B) than defendants who plead 
guilty.  These differences will become non-significant over time. 
(b) Defendants who are convicted by trial will be more likely to receive a longer 
mean sentence length, when incarcerated, than defendants who plead guilty.  
These differences will become non-significant over time. 
(c) Defendants who are convicted by trial will be less likely to receive judicial 
downward departures than defendants who plead guilty.  These differences 
will become non-significant over time. 
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The fifth hypothesis is predicated on attribution theory, suggesting that the 
punishment decision will be affected by the judge’s perception of the characteristics of 
individuals who engage in a certain type of illegal activity, for example drug trafficking 
or illegal immigration.  These stereotypes surrounding the characteristics of the people 
based on the offense for which they are convicted will be applied generally to defendants 
as a group, superseding the degree of seriousness already contained within the 
Guidelines.  Hence, the type of crime will have an impact on the sentencing decision 
independent of the final offense category and presumptive sentence. 
 
Hypothesis 5: The type of offense conduct will exert a significant effect on the 
sentencing outcome independent of the final offense level.  Specifically, the type of 
offense for which the defendant is sentenced will exert an exclusive influence, but this 
influence will decrease over the study period as the Guidelines become institutionalized. 
(a) The offense type category will be significantly correlated with the likelihood 
of a defendant receiving a sentence of incarceration (if located in Zone A or 
Zone B).  These differences will become non-significant over time. 
(b) The offense type category will be significantly correlated with the likelihood 
of receiving an increased or decreased mean sentence length, when 
incarcerated.  These differences will become non-significant over time. 
(c) The offense type category will be significantly correlated with the likelihood 
of a defendant receiving a judicial downward departure.  These differences 
will become non-significant over time. 
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The last two hypotheses are formulated around predictions of the time and place 
of sentencing.  They are derived from theoretical work on organizational dynamics and 
courtroom workgroup interactions.  This theoretical framework postulates that sentencing 
practices will vary across courts owing to varying norms and varying priorities on 
different organizational goals.  In particular, caseload composition and pressure exerted 
by trial rates or other external influences such as pressure from the politicians in 
Congress or perceived public outrage at a particularly egregious crime, which often 
varies from year to year, can influence the sentencing outcome.  For these reasons, 
sentencing decisions, and the outcomes they engender, will vary from place to place and 
from year to year. 
Over time, the Sentencing Guidelines should become more widely accepted and 
standardized throughout the federal circuits.  Thus, the inequity in sentencing outcomes 
between district courts should dissipate.  Likewise, barring any major changes to the 
Guidelines that could offset the drive toward uniformity, disparities in sentencing 
outcomes for similarly-situated defendants arising from the location and time of 
sentencing should become narrower with each passing year. 
 
Hypothesis 6: The judicial district court where the defendant is sentenced will have a 
significant effect on the sentencing outcome.  Furthermore, any significant disparity 
attributable to the geographic location of the district court will decrease over the study 
period as the Guidelines become institutionalized. 
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(a) The district court location will be significantly correlated with the likelihood 
of a defendant receiving a sentence of incarceration (if located in Zone A or 
Zone B).  These differences will become non-significant over time. 
(b) The district court location will be significantly correlated with the likelihood 
of receiving an increased or decreased mean sentence length, when 
incarcerated.  These differences will become non-significant over time. 
(c) The district court location will be significantly correlated with the likelihood 
of a defendant receiving a judicial downward departure.  These differences 
will become non-significant over time. 
 
Hypothesis 7: The fiscal year in which the defendant is sentenced will exert a significant 
influence on the sentencing outcome independent of all other variables.  This effect will 
decrease over time as the Guidelines become institutionalized.   
(a) The fiscal year will be significantly correlated with the likelihood of a 
defendant receiving a sentence of incarceration (if located in Zones A or B) in 
the beginning of the study, but will decrease at the end of the study. 
(b) The fiscal year will be significantly correlated with the likelihood of receiving 
an increased or decreased mean sentence length, when incarcerated, in the 
beginning of the study, but will decrease at the end of the study.   
(c) The fiscal year will be significantly correlated with the likelihood of a 
defendant receiving a judicial downward departure in the beginning of the 
study, but will decrease at the end of the study.   
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The purpose behind the promulgation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines was to 
establish proportionate punishments for similar crimes and similar defendants (U.S. 
Sentencing Commission, 1991).  The Guidelines were developed under the auspices of 
appropriate incapacitation so that the convicted offenders who posed the greatest threat 
for committing future offenses would be prevented from doing so.  The question, then, is 
whether or not the goal of uniformity through sentencing reform as defined in the SRA 
have been achieved.  A multivariate analysis of sentencing data over a longitudinal time 
frame should promote a more definitive answer as to whether Sentencing Guidelines, by 
limiting judicial discretion, have reduced unwarranted disparity and created a better 
system for achieving justice. 
 Indeed, it is incumbent upon the research community to determine the extent to 
which the Sentencing Guidelines have been successfully implemented.  Success in this 
context refers to both the process of measuring the amount of adherence to the Guidelines 
(through the examination of both within-range sentences and departure sentences) and the 
resulting outcome of decreased disparity in sentencing outcomes under the Guidelines 
(through the examination of sentencing outcomes for similarly-situated offenders).  The 
present study proposes to add to the growing body of research findings through an 
inclusive and comprehensive study of federal sentencing data that examines differences 
in gender, race, and ethnicity for convicted federal defendants over eleven years of 
sentencing outcomes.  Its findings should assist in moving toward a more definitive 
conclusion of the feasibility of limiting judicial discretion while balancing unwarranted 
disparity in sentencing outcomes under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 
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CHAPTER V.  DATA AND METHODS 
Case Files of Convicted Federal Offenders 
 After a defendant is convicted and sentenced in a federal district court, a file copy 
containing all documents pertaining to sentencing is forwarded to the Monitoring Unit of 
the U.S. Sentencing Commission.  Upon arrival in the Monitoring Unit, each file is 
assigned its own unique Commission identification number with which it is thereafter 
identified.1 The documents in the file (excluding sealed documents) are gleaned for 
information, which is then coded and entered into the annual fiscal year database.  For 
each fiscal year, the Commission creates a data set in order to monitor Guideline 
compliance in the federal court system (Hebert, 1997).  Quality control procedures have 
been established at the Commission to ensure the integrity of the data entering the 
Commission’s database systems. 
 Not every file received by the Commission contains the exact same documents, 
but they are similar enough to extract much of the pertinent information.  This fact is 
significant to research because there are virtually no variables in the Commission’s data 
sets that do not contain some missing information for some cases.  Missing data can 
never be entirely accounted for, but it is much easier to extrapolate from the data when 
the complete population of convicted federal offenders is available rather than a sample.  
The advantage to the Commission’s data sets is that they contain the entire universe of 
convicted federal offenders. 
 Most case files received by the Monitoring Unit of the Commission contain a 
combination of court documents.  For example, some files may contain an indictment 
while others may contain an information due to regional differences in criminal justice 
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system practices for charging documents.  In cases where plea bargain agreements were 
reached as part of the sentencing process, these documents are also commonly included.  
In addition, case files will generally include the pre-sentence investigation report, a 
judgment and commitment order, and a statement of reasons document.  Additional 
documents may include amended judgments or orders that change a sentence.  Finally, 
documents regarding appeals might also be in the file. 
 Practically every file contains a pre-sentence investigation report (PSR) prepared 
by the district’s corresponding probation office for the judge.  It is frequently the largest 
document and contains the majority of information that is coded into the database.  The 
PSR contains standard chapters of information concerning the defendant’s conduct 
relating to the crime of conviction, personal history and current circumstances of the 
defendant, his/her criminal history, and the available sentencing options.  The report is 
primarily based upon an interview with the offender, a review of the prosecutor’s files, 
comments by the parties, and, in some instances, meetings with investigative agents 
(Farabee, 1998).  A federal probation officer relies on the convicted offender to be 
forthcoming with much of the information required in the PSR, and also to direct the 
officer to other individuals and sources that will likewise offer information in a timely 
manner.  Since much of the information is dependant upon the cooperation of the 
defendant, the depth and breadth of the PSR varies from case to case. 
 If the Commission’s annual databases were to be viewed in the context of a 
lifecycle, it would be highly dynamic.  Hardly a year passes without some minor 
modifications to the variables being collected, and some years have undergone extreme 
changes.  These changes add another dimension to the complexity in studying trends in 
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sentencing patterns over time.  The majority of these changes have resulted in an 
expansion of the number of variables being collected in the database.  For example, 
earlier databases collected information on the convicted offender’s unique statutes of 
conviction.  There were a maximum of ten fields.  Later, it was recognized that ten fields 
were not enough so they were expanded to seventeen.  Again, a few years later, the 
advance of technology assisted the recognition that there should not be a limit and 
extended the fields to open as demanded by the needs of each individual case file. 
 Another reason for expanding the number of fields was to gather greater detail 
about the characteristics of the convicted defendants.  The original databases collected 
demographic characteristics similar to other federal agencies.  The defendant’s race was 
simply categorized as “White,” “Black,” or “Other.”  The variable to capture ethnicity of 
Hispanic defendants was completely separate.  It was not until later that the two variables 
were merged into a new third variable that contained all the categories for race and 
ethnicity.  In subsequent years, more variables of interest were added, such as the type of 
defense counsel used by the defendant as well as the defendant’s marital status.   
The number of variables in the Commission’s data sets has swelled to more than 
five hundred.  Some of these additional variables are the result of complex variables 
being recoded into dichotomous variables.  Others have been added to meet the needs of 
capturing data on offenders sentenced under new amendments to the Guidelines as 
directed by the U.S. Congress.  For example, when additional enhancements were added 
to punish technology offenders who encrypted evidence of their crimes on their 
computers, a new variable was added to capture any offenders sentenced under this new 
amendment. 
121
At the same time, the source documents limit the breadth of the Commission’s 
data sets by virtue of the fact that they are legal documents prepared by the courts to 
sentence convicted offenders and justify those sentences to appellate courts.  The court 
documents were not designed as data collection tools for the purpose of conducting 
research and analysis.  For example, it would be extremely helpful to research regarding 
convicted sex offenders to document whether they were victims of similar crimes 
themselves.  However, the probation officers who write the pre-sentence reports are not 
required to gather this information in the defendant’s personal history.  Hence, these 
types of details are seldom available.  For certain fiscal years, the Commission has 
attempted to code the pre-sentence reports to determine the frequency of alcohol and drug 
involvement in sexual assault crimes, but this information is frequently missing as well.  
Research on sentencing outcomes of offenders in federal courts is therefore bounded by 
the data that currently exists.  It is very complete in some areas, but still remains deficient 
in other important areas. 
One example of this deficiency is the inability to identify the sentencing judge to 
isolate their individual characteristics.  Every federal judge is assigned a unique 
permanent four-digit identification number by the U.S. Sentencing Commission.  The 
judge’s name and identification number are entered into the Commission’s annual 
databases along with the case information for each case file.  However, in order to protect 
the privacy and anonymity of the federal bench, these variables are withheld from 
purview when the data sets are released into the public domain.  This decisive omission 
in the Commission’s public data sets makes it impossible to analyze the effects between 
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different federal judges and their exercise of discretion when sentencing offenders under 
the Sentencing Guidelines (Payne, 1997; Stith and Cabranes, 1998).   
The question of interjudge variation will remain unanswerable until identifying 
information is appended to the federal case-level data.  Pertinent information such as the 
judge’s gender, age, race/ethnicity, caseload, and time on the bench is not even gathered 
by the Commission.  Additional data collection might also include the political party of 
the president who nominated the judge, and whether the judge’s prior legal employment 
experience included work as a prosecutor in a criminal court or as a public or private 
defense attorney.  Until the Commission compiles this crucial data and provides them to 
the public for purposes of study, this vein of research will remain at a standstill (Kautt, 
2002).  Therefore, the opportunity to study differences in sentencing practices among 
federal judges is not currently possible.  Perhaps the Commission will see the value of 
such research in the future. 
Sentencing Guidelines Data 
 The data for this study were collected by the Monitoring Unit of the United States 
Sentencing Commission located in Washington, D.C.  The Commission’s Monitoring 
Unit collects case files sent to them from all the U.S. district courts on defendants 
convicted and sentenced in the U.S. federal courts.  The Commission also receives 
additional data on appeals from the circuit courts as they occur.  The data are collected 
and coded from documentation submitted by federal probation officers and judicial 
officers of the federal courts.  Therefore, the data in the current study are derived from 
the universe of federal criminal cases in the Commission’s data sets and are restricted to 
what is included in these official documents. 
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The Commission allows unidentifiable sentencing data to be released and 
disseminated into the public domain through annual fiscal year data sets.  These data sets 
are maintained by the Bureau of Justice Statistics and the Urban Institute through the 
Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center.  The data in this repository are retrievable 
through use of the World Wide Web.  This internet website allows registered users to 
download data sets, codebooks, and other types of pertinent information.  The data sets 
contain all publicly available information on convicted offenders who are sentenced 
under the Sentencing Guidelines in the federal criminal justice system.  Offenders whose 
cases were dismissed or declined for prosecution are not included in this data set since 
they were not convicted or sentenced under the Guidelines. 
 The Commission’s data sets have a high degree of accuracy and integrity.  The 
data collection and storage protocols also serve to enhance the overall reliability of the 
data.  When a case file arrives at the Monitoring Unit, the data are coded directly from 
the documents submitted by the district sentencing courts.  As the number of files has 
increased over the years, the period between receipt and the time- and labor-intensive 
task of data input has increased.  Notwithstanding this increased lag time to create a full 
fiscal year data set, the Commission has established consistent methods for extracting 
pertinent information contained in the submitted case file documents.  The data entering 
the Commission’s databases are cleaned and checked through a process involving 
multiple stages and numerous personnel.  Additionally, the data are verified through the 
use of computer programs designed to identify illogical variable values and flag those 
inconsistencies for reconsideration.  These edits are reviewed and, when necessary, 
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corrected.  The result of these data cleaning and edit checking procedures is a data set 
with strong reliability and validity. 
 Certainly, the Commission’s data sets are also incredibly complex.  In trying to 
capture all pertinent information from the case file documents, the Commission has 
created an immense database containing numerous sophisticated variables that are 
difficult to interpret, even for researchers with prior knowledge or experience in federal 
sentencing practice.  For example, annual amendments to the Guidelines have frequently 
resulted in a re-ordering of special offense characteristics, or the addition or deletion of 
others, resulting in changes to how the data are captured by static variables.  The scope of 
the data sets continues to increase as the Commission attempts to capture an ever larger 
proportion of foreseeable relevant case characteristics, a trend which appears to have no 
limits.  As such, these data sets “represent the richest source of information that have ever 
been assembled on federal crimes, federal offenders, and sentences imposed” (U.S. 
Sentencing Commission, 2004, p. xi). 
 The data sets selected for this study include fiscal years 1993 to 2003.  These 
eleven fiscal years were chosen for both substantive and empirical reasons.  The primary 
substantive reason was the attrition of the Commissioners.  By the early 1990s, most of 
the original Commissioners had left or were in the process of leaving the Commission.  
The first chair of the Commission, Judge William W. Wilkins, Jr. served from 1985 to 
1994.  After his term expired, a new chair, Judge Richard P. Conaboy, was appointed to 
lead a new set of Commissioners and served from 1994 to 1998.  After his tenure, Judge 
Diana E. Murphy was appointed to be the chair and served from 1999 to 2004.  
Therefore, this data set represents the sentencing outcomes of offenders under the tenure 
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of the second and third sets of Commissioners rather than the original Commissioners.  
Moreover, by the time the fiscal year 1993 data set was collected, most of the 
controversies reflecting the struggle between the Commission and the federal judiciary 
about how and when to apply the Guidelines were resolved and the application of the 
Guidelines at sentencing had become standardized throughout the system of federal 
district and circuit courts. 
 The primary empirical reason for choosing the data set comprising these eleven 
fiscal years is that “sentencing year” will be considered as a variable in the analysis to 
determine the extent of variation in sentencing, if any, over time.  Also, while the first 
few years of sentencing data have been extensively analyzed in a limited number of 
studies, more recent fiscal year data sets have not yet been so thoroughly analyzed.  The 
fiscal year 2003 data set was the most recent data set available at the commencement of 
this study.  The data were chosen with the most recent fiscal year data set available and 
then going back eleven years.  At a minimum, a decade of sentencing data should begin 
to answer the question of how disparity has changed over time.  Sentencing Commission 
data sets from 1989 through 1992 were not included as part of this longitudinal study 
because the data from these first few years are not extensive as successive years.  They 
include a portion of cases sentenced under the older indeterminate (pre-Guidelines) 
system.  Less than half of the federal criminal cases were sentenced under the Guidelines 
in 1991-1992 (Albonetti, 1997).  The fiscal year 1993 data set is the first year of full 
implementation of the Guidelines across the 94 federal district courts (Steffensmeier and 
DeMuth, 2000).  These early data sets also lack some important variables that were 
collected in later years.   
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The federal criminal justice system processes a different mix of criminal 
defendants than is commonly seen in state and local court systems.  For example, crimes 
committed on national parks and forests and on Native American reservations fall within 
the jurisdiction of the federal court system.  Drug trafficking offenses have comprised the 
largest portion of the federal criminal docket for over three decades (U.S. Sentencing 
Commission, 2004).  The most frequently applied Guidelines have remained surprisingly 
constant over the past decade, and they comprise the vast majority of all federal criminal 
court cases (Maxfield, 2001).  More than 85 percent of federal criminal cases fall into 
these categories:  (1) drug trafficking offenses, (2) fraud and deceit offenses, (3) firearms 
offenses, (4) larceny, embezzlement and theft offenses, (5) robbery offenses, (6) 
counterfeiting offenses, (7) unlawful alien smuggling offenses, (8) unlawfully entering 
the U.S., (9) fraudulently acquiring citizenship documents offenses, and (10) money 
laundering offenses.  The remaining ten to fifteen percent of cases each year are 
comprised of various crimes ranging from crimes as serious as homicide to less serious 
crimes such as illegal hunting of wildlife on national parks and forest lands.  This study 
will analyze the sentencing outcome by the presumptive sentence, the final offense level 
(FOL), and the specific type of offense in order to capture the seriousness of the offense 
conduct.  The final offense level will reflect the inclusion of both mitigating and 
aggravating sentencing enhancements that commonly change the perceived seriousness 
of a specific crime type. 
 This comprehensive study of federal sentencing outcomes is composed of a 
number of attributes that make its character unique in both scope and perspective.  The 
study will include both males and females, U.S. citizens and non-U.S. Citizens, and the 
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three most prevalent racial and ethnic categories of white, black, and Hispanic.  The 
study will include all offenses of conviction and include all the federal district courts in 
all of the federal circuits within the jurisdiction of the United States.  Finally, it will cover 
eleven years of data gathered by the Sentencing Commission, from fiscal years 1993 
through 2003. 
 The number of criminal case files received and coded by the Commission has 
increased substantially during the eleven years from fiscal year 1993 to fiscal year 2003.  
The data set for fiscal year 2003 is about two-thirds larger than the data set from fiscal 
year 1993.  It should be noted that the Commission’s databases reflect only those cases 
for which appropriate documentation was accordingly forwarded to them by the 
individual district courts.  Reporting problems among a few districts as well as reduced 
levels of cooperation in the initial years following the promulgation of the Sentencing 
Guidelines certainly contributed to this trend.  Thus, these totals should not be construed 
as an accurate representation of the overall number of convicted offenders processed 
annually through the federal court system.  Up until the Prosecutorial Remedies and 
Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today [PROTECT] Act passed by the 
U.S. Congress in 2003 that created statutory documentation submission requirements, a 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) was the only existing mechanism whereby the 
district courts were asked to respond to the Sentencing Commission’s request to send 
copies of pertinent sentencing documents to them.  The Commission also sends out 
annual letters to the district courts to request missing case file documents that are listed 
concurrently in a database maintained by the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts.  Each case file received by the Commission contains data on a defendant who 
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was convicted and sentenced in a federal circuit court.  The number of cases sentenced 
each fiscal year under the Sentencing Guidelines and received by the Sentencing 
Commission is represented in the following table. 
 
Fiscal Year   Number of Cases 
1990   29,011 
1991   33,419 
1992   38,258 
1993   42,107 
1994   39,971 
1995   38,500 
1996   42,436 
1997   48,848 
1998   50,754 
1999   55,557 
2000   59,846 
2001   59,897 
2002  64,366 
2003   70,258 
Independent Variables 
The independent variables selected for the analysis consist of factors that 
encompass characteristics of the offender, characteristics of the offense(s) of conviction, 
and characteristics of the sentencing court.  These causal, or control, variables have been 
shown to be important in previous quantitative research studies for predicting and 
explaining sentencing outcomes in both federal and state courts (Zatz, 2000; Spohn, 
2000).  The current analysis will measure the predictive influence of these variables on 
the determination of the final sentencing outcome.  Summary statistics (number of cases, 
mean, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum values) for the variables used in 
the analysis are displayed in Table 6.1. 
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An array of variables was chosen from the dataset to measure the influence of the 
defendant’s personal characteristics on the sentencing outcome.  The study focuses on 
sentencing outcomes for both male and female convicted offenders so gender will be an 
important independent variable.  The defendant’s gender is captured by a nominal 
categorical variable named MONSEX and coded in the most parsimonious manner: 0 for 
males and 1 for females. 
 A variable that measures racial and ethnic categories will likewise be included. 
The defendant’s racial and ethnic category is captured by a nominal categorical variable 
named NEWRACE and coded 0 for whites, 1 for blacks, 2 for Hispanics, and 3 for all 
other races.  This variable is actually created from the combination of two variables, one 
for race and one for Hispanic ethnicity.  To merge these two variables, the dichotomous 
Hispanic ethnicity (yes/no) variable was extracted for all Hispanic defendants, followed 
by a procedure whereby the racial category was paired with this new combination and 
replaced by it if the defendant was designated as being of Hispanic ethnic origin.  Using 
this procedure, the NEWRACE variable was replicated for the fiscal years where this 
variable was available (1997-2002) and created for the first time where this variable was 
not provided in the original fiscal year data sets (1993-1996).  
A citizenship variable will be used since the data sets contain sentencing 
outcomes for both citizens and non-U.S. citizens.  The defendant’s citizenship status is 
captured by a nominal categorical variable named NEWCIT and coded 0 for U.S. citizens 
and 1 for non-U.S. citizens.  This dichotomous variable is derived from the original 
nominal categorical citizenship variable that identifies the distinct alien status of each 
defendant through the use of more than one non-U.S. citizen variables.  The NEWCIT 
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variable just combines all the non-U.S. citizen categories into one group in order to 
facilitate the use of the citizenship status variable for data analysis purposes. 
 The defendant’s age at sentencing is captured by a continuous variable named 
AGE  that is  coded by the Commission to reflect the exact age of the defendant at 
sentencing.  This variable ranges from age 16 to 102.  A second continuous age variable, 
AGE_SQRD, was created for the present study.  It is the value of age squared and will be 
included in the multivariate analysis. 
 The defendant’s education is captured by an ordinal categorical variable named 
NEWEDUC and coded into four categories, each one with a greater level of educational 
achievement.  The first (lowest) category groups offenders who range from a complete 
absence of any formal education to some education, but excludes graduation.  The second 
category groups offenders who have obtained a high school diploma or G.E.D certificate.  
The third category groups offenders who have received some education at a college or 
university.  The fourth category groups offenders who have graduated from a college or 
university, including both undergraduate and graduate degrees.  This variable is derived 
from the original continuous ratio education variable that captures the actual number of 
years of education acquired by the offender prior to sentencing.  Thus, this new education 
variable collapses the original variable’s categories into more meaningful categories for 
data analysis purposes.   
 The number of dependents for whom the defendant is responsible is captured in 
an ordinal categorical variable created for the current study and named NUMDEPEN2 
and recoded into a dummy variable to represent defendants with no dependents and 
defendants with dependents.  This variable was derived from the original continuous ratio 
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variable used by the Commission to capture the defendant’s number of children, which 
ranged from 0 to 96, and was collapsed into a dichotomous variable for data analysis 
purposes. 
 To capture the predictive influence of offense characteristics, independent 
variables that describe the type of offense, the counts of conviction, the offense level 
seriousness score, the presumptive sentences, adjustments for role in the offense, and 
other aggravating and mitigating circumstances will be included.  The type of offense 
will be categorized in terms of the most serious count of conviction.  Albonetti (2003) 
suggested that offense aggregation can result in model misspecification.  For example, 
she claims that it is incorrect to place all types of drug offenses under the same umbrella.  
Instead, a dummy variable for the Guideline offense for which the defendant is sentenced 
should be included in the model equation, thereby capturing the offense-specific and 
relevant conduct structure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  Equations which 
exclude the legally relevant offense characteristics can produce misspecified models of 
sentencing resulting in inaccurate estimates of the significance of coefficients. 
 At the same time, the number of Guideline computations will be taken into 
account for multiple counts of conviction.  This continuous variable, NOCOUNTS, 
ranges from 1 to 495, but almost eighty percent of the cases only have one count.  
Therefore, this variable was recoded into a dichotomous variable representing those 
defendants with one count of conviction and those defendants who have more than one 
count of conviction for this particular analysis. 
 The defendant’s final criminal history score is captured by a continuous ratio 
variable named XCRHISSR and coded 1 through 6 to match the corresponding six 
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available criminal history categories that are aligned along the abscissa of the sentencing 
table.  This variable is coded from the ‘statement of reasons’ document written by the 
judge to explain and justify the sentence given to the convicted offender.  The first 
(lowest) category corresponds with a criminal history category score of 1.  These 
categories increase until they reach the sixth (highest) category, which signifies the 
defendant’s accumulated criminal history points place him or her in the highest possible 
criminal history category. 
 The defendant’s final offense level is also captured by a continuous ratio variable.  
It is named XFOLSOR and coded 1 through 60 to reflect the corresponding final offense 
level score assigned to the offense of conviction.  This variable depicts the offense level 
that is aligned along the ordinate side of the sentencing table.  This variable also 
originates from the ‘statement of reasons’ document.  The first (lowest) category 
corresponds with a final offense level score of 1.  These categories increase until they 
reach the 43rd (highest) offense level category.  Any offense level scores above 43 are 
truncated into this topmost level. 
 The presumptive sentence was captured through the creation of a variable 
(PRESUMP) that captures the number of months at the minimum point of the Guideline 
penalty range of the sentencing table where the defendant’s final offense level score and 
final criminal history category intersect.  The majority of sentences that are within the 
Guideline’s penalty ranges are at the minimum amount, although this proportion 
fluctuates by offense type.  The presumptive sentence variable is a continuous ratio 
variable and is coded to correspond to the appropriate penalty, an amount ranging from 0 
months to 470 months (life sentence). 
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Finally, independent variables that describe the characteristics of the court and the 
type of disposition will be included.  These variables will capture the district and circuit 
where the court is located, the type of disposition or plea, and the year of sentencing. 
These variables will be used to predict the effects of courtroom characteristics on 
sentencing outcomes under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 
 Whether the defendant pled guilty or was convicted by trial was captured by a 
nominal categorical variable named NEWCNVTN and coded 0 for pleading guilty and 1 
for conviction by trial.  This dichotomous variable was derived from another nominal 
categorical variable which has five different categories to describe the defendant’s 
disposition.  The new variable collapses both guilty pleas and pleas of Nolo Contendere 
within the guilty plea category.  It also collapses both trials by jury and bench trials into 
the conviction by trial category.  The fifth category of the earlier variable, which captures 
data on defendants that both plead guilty to one or more charges and are convicted in a 
trial for one or more other charges (when the defendant is charged with more than one 
count), is categorized as missing in the new dichotomous variable since it does not fit 
exclusively into either category. 
 The circuit court where the defendant was sentenced is captured by a nominal 
categorical variable named MONCIRC and coded 0 through 11 to reflect each of the 
federal circuit courts (including the D.C. Circuit Court).  This variable had no missing 
values.  Table 2 of Appendix A contains a list of the federal circuit courts by district and 
state, and the number of authorized judgeships for each circuit. 
 The district court where the defendant was sentenced is captured by a nominal 
categorical variable named CIRCDIST and coded 1 through 94 to reflect each of the 94 
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district courts located throughout the U.S. federal court’s jurisdiction.2 This variable 
codes the district courts in the order that they appear in the Commission’s Annual Report 
published and disseminated to summarize each fiscal year’s sentencing data.  In this 
manner, when more than one district court is located within the same state, they are 
grouped together in sequential order.  This variable is also organized sequentially by 
circuit court.  In other words, districts coded 2 through 6 comprise the first circuit court; 
districts coded 7 through 12 comprise the second circuit court; districts coded 13 through 
18 comprise the third circuit court; districts coded 19 through 27 comprise the fourth 
circuit court; districts coded 28 through 36 comprise the fifth circuit court, etc. 
 The year of sentencing is captured through the creation of a categorical ordinal 
variable named SENTYEAR and coded 1 through 11 to represent the eleven fiscal years 
contained in the study.  It was created by the researcher rather than provided in the 
original Commission data sets.  This variable was derived from the date of sentencing 
variable listed in each fiscal year data set in order to maintain the integrity and unique 
characteristics of each case file when all the data sets were merged together into one large 
data set.  This variable facilitates a longitudinal analysis of the data by allowing each 
fiscal year to be grouped separately and independently from the other fiscal year case 
files.  Thus, this variable will be useful in predicting and measuring the extent of 
differences in sentencing outcomes over time. 
 There are two additional independent variables that would have been important to 
include in the study.  These are the defendant’s type of defense counsel and marital 
status.  The type of defense counsel is captured by a nominal categorical variable named 
DEFCONSL and codes the type of legal representation used by the defendant during the 
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court process.  Unfortunately, this variable was only included in the data sets beginning 
in fiscal year 1996.  The defendant’s marital status is captured by a nominal categorical 
variable named MARRIED and coded into six categories to describe the defendant’s 
current domestic status at sentencing.  This variable was only available beginning in 
fiscal year 1999.  Because the main purpose of this study involves the measurement of 
differences in sentencing outcomes over time, it is not useful to include variables that 
were not available during substantial portions of time covered in the study.  Perhaps these 
variables can be included in future studies that are not conditioned by time or where the 
data sets only begin in later years. 
Dependent Variables 
 At sentencing, the federal district court judge must make three major decisions.  
The first sentencing decision is whether to incarcerate the convicted offender, commonly 
termed the “in/out” decision.  Whether incarceration is an option or a requirement 
depends upon the Zone of the sentencing table where the offender’s final offense level 
and criminal history category intersect.  The second sentencing decision is the 
determination of the length of the sentence, also known as the “length-of-term” decision.  
The Guidelines prescribe a range of months for each offense level, and the judge must 
determine the appropriate sentence within the penalty range.  The third sentencing 
decision is whether extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant a departure outside of 
the prescribed Guidelines penalty range.  This decision is the departure decision, and the 
judge can depart upward or downward from the Guideline’s range depending on 
mitigating or aggravating circumstances not adequately taken into account by the 
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Guideline’s special offense characteristics or other Guidelines Manual chapter 
adjustments.   
 The dependent or outcome variables in this study are those that depict the 
sentencing outcome in the federal criminal justice system.  The first dependent variable 
will portray the first sentencing decision.  This variable was created to be used in 
circumstances where the availability of non-prison sentences is relevant.  In other words, 
only those defendants who are located in Zones A and B of the sentencing table are 
eligible for non-prison sentences.  It is captured by a nominal categorical variable named 
INOUT and coded 0 for a sentence of incarceration or 1 for a non-incarceration sentence, 
thus indicating whether or not the defendant received a prison sentence.  It will capture 
the dichotomous in/out decision.   Logistic regression is the preferred method for 
developing a prediction equation when the outcome variable is dichotomous and will 
therefore be the method for testing predictions according to this outcome.   
 Unlike the states’ criminal justice systems which provide two types of 
incarceration, namely jails and prisons, and they divide their offender populations 
between these institutions by crime severity and sentence length, the federal system 
offers only one type of incarceration, the federal penitentiary.  Thus, the assertion that 
offenders sentenced to prison are qualitatively different than those offenders who receive 
a jail sentence and should not be combined into the same incarceration outcome is not an 
issue when analyzing federal data on convicted offenders (Holleran and Spohn, 2004).  
However, the federal level data do combine intermediate sanctions with incarceration 
sentences because they are frequently imposed in combination with one another, and such 
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aggregation can potentially engender mistaken conclusions about the correlates of 
sentencing decisions.   
 The second dependent variable portrays the second sentencing decision and 
depicts the length of the term of incarceration.  Specifically, for those convicted offenders 
who receive a sentence of incarceration, how long will be their incarceration.  This will 
be characterized in terms of the number of months to which the individual is sentenced.  
It is captured by a continuous ratio variable named TOTPRISN and ranges from 0 to 469 
months of imprisonment.  Life imprisonment is coded as 470 months, and any sentences 
that were longer than this amount were truncated down to equal a life sentence.  Death 
penalty sentences are not included in this variable’s range of valid sentence length values. 
 The outcome of sentence length for defendants who receive a prison sentence will 
be tested through the use of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.  Commonly, log 
transformations of sentence length are performed in this type of analysis when a 
distribution is highly skewed to avoid violating the assumptions of normality (Albonetti, 
1997).  The current study does not apply this transformation to the dependent variable of 
sentence length to prevent complicating the model unnecessarily and to facilitate ease of 
model interpretation. 
 The third dependent variable illustrates the third sentencing decision of whether 
the judge grants the defendant a departure outside of the Guideline’s penalty range.  This 
decision is captured by a nominal categorical variable called DEPART and coded 0 for 
no departures, 1 for upward departures, 2 for downward departures, or 3 for substantial 
assistance departures.  Beginning with the fiscal year 2003 data set, four additional 
categories of possible combinations of departures were captured and coded, as well as 
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two additional departure variables that collapse the departure categories into two or three 
categories for annual reporting purposes.  This new coding scheme necessitated the 
recoding of 232 case files in the fiscal year 2003 data set to align with the original codes 
of the earlier fiscal year data sets.  Defendants whose departure status was coded as 
inapplicable or missing will be excluded from the departure analysis. 
 Since both judicial downward departures and substantial assistance downward 
departures grant leniency to the defendant by resulting in a sentence that is below the 
prescribed Guideline penalty range, the question might be raised as to why this study is 
only focusing on the former and excluding the latter from the analysis.  Perhaps this is 
because it appears on the surface that these two types of downward departures are just 
different means to the same end.  One court might prefer to rely on judicial downward 
departures while another court might influence the prosecution by exerting pressure to get 
the case rapidly adjudicated and, therefore, rely more on substantial assistance departures 
to achieve the same goal of a reduction in sentence length.  However, there are significant 
differences in both the means and the end result of judicial downward departures and 
substantial assistance departures, enough for even the Commission to keep them separate 
as they study not only the sentencing process, but also the appeals process.  After all, 
many appeals stem from the departure decision. 
 Judicial downward departures are part of the overt transparent sentencing process 
that is governed by official policy, and they must be accompanied by a statement from 
the court outlining the reason(s) for the departure, and be justified in a written opinion 
that becomes part of the case record.  The opinion in the case record must be able to 
withstand the rigorous scrutiny of higher courts of appeals.  Moreover, the sentence 
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reduction granted in judicial downward departures cannot fall below a statutory minimum 
sentence (Steffensmeier and DeMuth, 2000). 
 On the other hand, substantial assistance departures must originate from a motion 
filed by the prosecution.  As described by Kramer and Maxfield (1998), the substantial 
assistance departure constitutes a unilateral prosecutorial decision that is not subject to 
challenge by the defense and is not reviewable by the court.  Hence, this type of departure 
is part of the covert, invisible process that occurs in meetings behind closed doors, and its 
motion to the court does not require the rigorous standard for justification and appellate 
review as do judicial downward departures.  The prosecution cannot appeal a substantial 
assistance departure.  Most important of all, substantial assistance departures can fall 
below the statutory minimum sentence.  In effect, a substantial assistance departure can 
do more than supplant the Guideline range.  It can turn a sentence which requires time in 
prison into a sentence which involves no prison time at all. 
 In their study of departures, Steffensmeier and DeMuth (2000, p. 722) used the 
designations “judge-controlled downward departures” and “prosecutor-controlled 
downward departures” to distinguish between the two types of departures.  In keeping 
with previous research, the current study will likewise keep separate the two types of 
downward departures.  However, while Steffensmeier and DeMuth (2000) focused more 
on the outcomes of substantial assistance departures, this study will focus on outcomes 
that result from the use of judicial downward departures.   
The argument can be made that the decision to exclude substantial assistance 
departures results in an incomplete picture of the departure outcome.  For this reason, the 
current research is limited to offering an explanation for only one type of downward 
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departure—those that are identified as judge-initiated.  The findings from this study 
should not be construed as asserting an overall generalized explanation for all types of 
departures by any means, but only for this small slice of the departure pie.  
Similar to other research, this study will assess what factors influence the rate of 
downward departures, including the presumptive sentence, criminal history category, 
racial and ethnic categories, gender, age, citizenship, education, district court location, 
and guilty plea versus trial conviction.  It will also measure the significance of these 
independent variables on the judicial downward departure rate across judicial districts 
over time.  In order to test the effects of these independent variables on judicial 
downward departures, multinomial logistic regression will be used in the analysis.   
Multinomial logistic regression is an extension of binary logistic regression.  
However, multinomial or polytomous logistic regression differs from binary regression in 
that it allows the categorical dependent variable to contain more than two categories.  In 
this case, the categories are: no departure (control), upward departure, judicial downward 
departure, or substantial assistance departure.  The assumptions of the multinomial 
logistic regression model, with the exception of the outcome variable following a 
multinomial (rather than a binomial) distribution, are identical to those of binary logistic 
regression.  In SPSS syntax, this procedure is called “Nomreg.”  
 When using binary logistic regression, a single odds ratio summarizes the 
outcome.  When there are more than two outcome categories, however, ratios of the 
category probabilities can still describe the outcome, but additional ratios are required.  
Thus, multinomial logistic regression estimates a ratio based on the probability of each 
outcome category divided by the probability of the reference or baseline outcome 
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category.  The most striking feature of the parameter estimates in this model is that there 
are three sets of parameters, each with its own intercept and coefficient estimates.  As 
with ordinary and logistic regression, these coefficients are interpreted as estimates for 
the effect of an independent variable, controlling for the other variables in the equation. 
 The results of the multinomial regression model are similar to logistic regression 
in that they provide the estimated B coefficients and their standard errors, a test of 
significance based on the Wald statistic, and the exponentiated values of the estimated B 
coefficients (Exp(B)), along with their 95 percent confidence intervals.  The multinomial 
logistic regression procedure uses a General Linear Model (GLM) coding scheme.  Thus, 
for each categorical predictor, the last category value is made the reference category and 
the other coefficients for that predictor are interpreted as offsets from the reference 
category.  Because of this, the coefficient of any other category can be interpreted as the 
change associated with shifting from the reference category to the category of interest, 
controlling for the other predictors.   
 In order to maintain continuity of reference categories between models, each of 
the categorical independent variables have been recoded for the multinomial analysis.  
For example, the gender variable is coded 0 for males and 1 for females.  It is then 
recoded 0 for females and 1 for males for the multinomial analysis so that males remain 
as the reference category similar to that used in the Binomial Logistic and OLS models.  
This recoding allowed all of the models to have similar categories against which to draw 
comparisons and inferences. 
 Judicial downward departures are allowed to occur in all four zones of the 
Sentencing Guidelines table.  Since defendants in every zone of the table received 
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judicial downward departures during the period encapsulated in this study, they are all 
included to gather the most comprehensive picture possible of this particular type of 
departure.3 The departure is first and foremost about a decrease in offense levels.  While 
it is possible to receive a sentence other than incarceration such as fines and/or probation 
for defendants located in offense levels one through eight with minimal criminal 
histories, the probability of receiving a non-incarceration sentence is greater for a 
defendant in the lowest levels, even within a zone where all the sentences range between 
zero and six months.  It only makes sense that the lower the offense level, the greater the 
probability of receiving a sentence other than imprisonment.  The same could be said for 
criminal history categories.  The likelihood of a defendant whose offense level score is a 
one or two, but whose criminal history points place him in category five or six, is more 
likely to receive a more severe sentence than a similarly-situated defendant with little to 
no criminal history points.  Thus, any savvy defense attorney would try to get his client 
into the lowest levels of Zone A. 
 
Studies with Large Ns 
 It should be stressed that there is an important difference between the significance 
and the strength or importance of a relationship between variables.  Even if there is only a 
very slight relationship between two variables, it may be a statistically significant one 
with a large sample size.  Therefore, after establishing that a relationship exists between 
the independent and dependent variables, it is also important to examine the direction, 
magnitude, and strength of that relationship. 
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In this study, the strength of a relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables will be analyzed in two ways.  First, the strength can be judged by 
examining the spread of data points around the regression line and determining how well 
the data cluster around it using regression techniques.  The closer the data points are to 
the regression line, the stronger the correlation.  Second, the prediction table that is 
generated with the models can allow for an examination of an improvement or 
deterioration in predicting the sentencing outcome, as well as the change in prediction 
rates within each category of the predicted outcome.  By reducing the amount of 
prediction error, the interpretations of association between the variables of interest will be 
reliable and will serve as accurate estimates of the relationship. 
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TABLE 5.1: DATA VARIABLE TABLE 
AGE Range: 16 to 102 Indicates the defendant’s age at the 
time of sentencing, as determined by 
the date of birth variable. 
CIRCDIST Range:  1 thru 94 Indicates the judicial district where the 
defendant was sentenced.  Recoded 
from USSC variable DISTRICT. 
 
NOTE: Each category was recoded 
(0,1) for the multivariate analyses. 
CRIMETYPE 0 = Other Offenses 
1 = Fraud, Deceit, and  
 Counterfeiting Offenses 
2 = Larceny, Embezzlement,  
 Theft, & Money  
 Laundering Offenses 
3 = Immigration Offenses 
4 = Drug Offenses 
5 = Robbery and Firearms  
 Offenses 
6 = Missing 
Primary Offense Type.  Recoded from 
USSC variable OFFTYPE2 which 
contains 35 offense categories.   
 
NOTE: Each category was recoded 
(0,1) for the multivariate analyses. 
DEPART 0 = No Departure 
1 = Upward Departure 
2 = Downward Departure 
3 = Substantial Assistance 
 Departure (§5K1.1) 
Indicates defendant’s departure status 
INOUT 0 = Non-Incarceration 
1 = Incarceration 
Indicates if the defendant received a 
prison sentence.  Limited to defendants 
located in Zones A & B of the 
sentencing table. (Original coding by 
the USSC was 0 for incarceration and 
1 for non-incarceration.) 
MONCIRC Range:  0 thru 11 Indicates the judicial circuit where the 
defendant was sentenced. 
 
NOTE: Each category was recoded 
(0,1) for the multivariate analyses. 
MONSEX 0 = Male 
1 = Female 
2 = Missing 
Indicates the offender’s gender. 
NEWCIT 0 = U.S. Citizen 
1 = Non U.S. Citizen  
 (Includes Legal and Illegal 
Alien status) 
2 = Missing 
Citizenship of defendant.  Recoded 
from USSC variable CITIZEN. 
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NEWCNVTN 0 = Plea 
1 = Trial 
2 = Missing 
Indicates whether the case was settled 
by plea agreement or trial.  Recoded 
from USSC variable DISPOSIT. 
 
NEWEDUC 0 = Less than H.S. Graduate 
1 = H.S. Graduate 
2 = Some College 
3 = College Graduate 
4 = Missing 
Highest level of education for the 
offender.  Recoded from USSC 
variable EDUCATN. 
 
NOTE: Each category was recoded 
(0,1) for the multivariate analyses. 
NEWRACE 0 = White 
1 = Black 
2 = Hispanic 
3 = Other 
4 = Missing 
Race of defendant.  Recoded from 
USSC variables MONRACE and 
HISPORIG. 
 
NOTE: Each category was recoded 
(0,1) for the multivariate analyses. 
NOCOUNTS 1 = 1 count of conviction 
2 = 2 or more counts 
3 = Missing 
Indicates the number of counts of 
conviction.  Recoded from the original 
USSC continuous variable which 
ranged from 1 to 495. 
NEW#DEPEN 0 = No dependents 
1 = 1 to 96 dependents 
2 = Missing 
 
Number of dependents whom the 
offender supports.  Recoded from 
USSC continuous variable 
NUMDEPEN which ranged from 1 to 
96. 
PRESUMPTIVE Range: 0 to 470 Indicates the Presumptive sentence 
based on the minimum number of 
months contained in the range 
matching the defendant’s final offense 
level & final criminal history category. 
(Not a USSC variable.  Created for 
current study.) 
SENTYEAR Range:  1993 thru 2003 Indicates the fiscal year the defendant 
was sentenced and the case file was 
received by the USSC and entered into 
their database.  (Not a USSC variable. 
Created for current study.) 
TOTPRISN Range:  1 thru 470 The number of months of 
imprisonment ordered for defendants 
sentenced to a term of incarceration. 
 
Sentences above 470 were truncated 




XCRHISSR Range:  1 thru 6 Defendant’s final criminal history 
category (I-VI) as determined by the 
court. 
XFOLSOR Range:  1 thru 60 The final offense level as determined 
by the court. 
ZONE A = Zone A 
B = Zone B 
C = Zone C 
D = Zone D 
Z = Missing 
Sentence table group which determines 
eligibility for probation and non-
incarceration alternative sentences, as 
described in Guidelines Manual 
§5B1.1 and §5C1.1;  Zone A is located 
at the top of the table for the least 
serious offenders, and they increase 
sequentially with offense seriousness 
so that Zone D is for the most serious 
offenders at the bottom of the table. 
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Research Design and Analysis 
 To analyze the U.S. Sentencing Commission data sets, it was necessary to match 
the variables from each fiscal year, in particular the dependent and independent variables 
of interest to the current study.  This preliminary process involved the creation of a 
master variable list which showed the available variables in each fiscal year, if and when 
they were added or dropped from the data sets, and also whether the variable name was 
changed or modified.  It is interesting to note that not all the same variables are released 
by the Commission each year.   
For example, the variable containing information on the defendant’s date of birth 
was excluded from the 1996 and 1997 main data sets.  Also, a variable that the 
Commission created to recode the type of drug in offenses involving drugs 
(COMBDRG1) was only released in the fiscal year 1997 and 1998 data sets, even though 
the Commission used this variable name from fiscal year 1992 through 1998.  Other 
examples include the variables capturing the Guidelines (GDLINE1 – GDLINE5) 
disappearing from the data sets after fiscal year 1998 while the variable capturing the 
number of Guideline computations (NOCOMP) only starts with fiscal year 1999.   
A number of important variables begin to appear in the fiscal year 1997 data set, 
such as the variable that captures whether the defendant received a mandatory minimum 
sentence for a drug conviction (DRUGMIN), whether the defendant received a safety 
value reduction (SAFE), with what zone of the sentencing table the defendant’s sentence 
corresponds (ZONE), variables describing where the sentence falls (DEQUART, 
RANGEPT, INRANGE), and other important sentencing factors like the sentence 
imposed variable (SENTIMP), the dichotomous variable to capture the incarceration 
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decision (PRISDUM), and the length of the incarceration sentence (SENTTOT and 
SENTTOT0). 
Some examples of variable name changes are the variable name used to code the 
type of offense for which the defendant was convicted changing from OFFTYPE to 
MONOFFTP between fiscal years 1998 and 1999, the variable describing the defendant’s 
type of defense counsel was changed from DEFCNSUL to DEFCONSL between fiscal 
years 1996 and 1997, and the safety value application variable was originally SAFETY 
when it was introduced in fiscal year 1997, but was changed to SAFE in fiscal year 1999.  
Subsequently, a new variable was introduced in fiscal year 2002 as SAFETY.  Now, 
there are two variables to capture information on this Guideline application—SAFE and 
SAFETY. 
In some cases, it was possible to create missing variables using the same methods 
as described in the Commission’s codebook.  For example, the age of the defendant at the 
time of his sentencing (AGE) was used by the Commission to group defendants into age 
categories using a separate grouping variable (YEARS).  This recoding was 
accomplished for those fiscal years where the category or dichotomous variables were not 
readily available.  This same method was used to recode educational attainment into 
education categories, race and Hispanic origin into one combined racial and ethnicity 
category, recoded variables for citizenship status categories, type of offense categories, 
type of conviction categories, type of drug categories, and criminal history categories. 
After ensuring continuity across the fiscal years for each variable of interest 
selected for the current study, it became possible to perform the next necessary step in the 
analytical process, that is, to merge the eleven fiscal years into one large data set.  In 
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order to retain the unique annual identity of each fiscal year data set, a variable was 
created to designate the fiscal year to which the case pertained.  This variable, 
SENTYEAR, contains the year to which the case file belongs.  For example, all fiscal 
year 1999 cases would be designated as 1999, fiscal year 2000 as 2000, and so forth.  The 
creation of this variable allows for separate analysis of the data in each fiscal year as well 
as constructing the possibility for a temporal analysis of the data based on the fiscal year 
of sentencing as an independent variable. 
The result of the merging procedure was an unprecedented data set containing all 
case files on convicted federal offenders collected by the Sentencing Commission from 
fiscal years 1993 through 2003, a total of 572,540 case file records.  The unit of analysis 
is the individual case.  Each case contains information on one convicted offender.  Cases 
where the convicted offenders lack valid observations for necessary variables such as 
race, ethnicity, or gender will be excluded from the analysis.  To increase predictive 
accuracy, the analysis measures both direct and indirect effects by looking at the 
predictive influence of individual variables and by testing the combined interaction 
effects of variables that have intersecting predictive influences.   
This study is designed to estimate the extent to which a convicted offender who 
has the same criminal history score and offense seriousness score as any other convicted 
offender, and who is in the same federal district court, receives a different sentence owing 
to the influence of racial, ethnic, or gender factors and also to measure the change, if any, 
over time in the magnitude of these likelihood estimations.  The sentencing outcomes will 
be examined in two contexts: overall and during each of the eleven fiscal years contained 
in the study to capture changes that occur over time.  The sentencing outcome is 
150
measured in three ways, namely the in/out decision, the length-of-term decision, and the 
departure decision.  Certainly, the sentencing decision occurs in the final stages of 
criminal justice processing, and disparities may have already impacted the pool of 
offenders at earlier stages.  This analysis, however, will focus exclusively on how federal 
district judges interpret the Sentencing Guidelines to determine appropriate sentences for 
convicted offenders after pleading guilty or being found guilty of violating the federal 
criminal statutory code.  If differences exist, the findings from this study will be used as 
evidence to show that disparity continues to persist in the federal criminal justice system 
under the Sentencing Guidelines. 
The data are analyzed using Logistic regression analyses, Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression analyses, and Multinomial logistic regression analyses.  Because of the 
different levels of measurement ascribed to the nature of the dependent variables, 
different analytic procedures will be used to measure each outcome.  OLS regression is a 
common method of choice to analyze length of sentence variables for defendants who 
received a sentence of incarceration because it is a continuous variable.  Logistic 
regression analyses allow one to directly estimate the probability of an event occurring.  
In this case, it would be used to measure the likelihood of receiving a sentence of 
incarceration (in/out decision).  Similarly, multinomial logistic regression will estimate 
the likelihood of receiving a downward departure relative to receiving no departure.  The 
parameters of the logistic regression model are estimated using the maximum-likelihood 
estimation method.  That is, the coefficients that make the data “most likely” are selected. 
It will be especially significant in this analysis to determine the manner in which 
departures may generate disparity.  As Mustard (2001, p. 308) pointed out, disparity 
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arising out of sentences which invoked departure adjustments can be made along both the 
“extensive” and “intensive” margins.  In other words, one must examine not only who is 
more likely to receive departures, but also to measure how favorable these adjustments 
are compared to those groups who receive less favorable sentence reductions.  The results 
of the proposed analyses should contribute to the determination of whether the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines have been successful in balancing judicial discretion and 
unwarranted sentencing disparity to create a more equitable and just system of sentencing 
convicted federal offenders between fiscal years 1993 through 2003. 
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CHAPTER VI.  DESCRIPTIVE AND BIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
Descriptive Analyses of the Dependent and Independent Variables 
 The data set was first analyzed thoroughly using descriptive statistics to depict the 
characteristics of the key variables of interest and their interactions.  The distributions of 
these variables were obtained through the frequency and cross tabulation functions within 
SPSS.  These preliminary analyses are valuable because they provide important 
information about the variables in the data set and their associations with other significant 
variables.  They provide the first glimpse of the distribution of gender, race, and ethnicity 
in sentencing outcomes for the decade of federal sentencing practice targeted for the 
current study.  Lastly, they are useful in constructing the initial framework from which 
subsequent inferential statistical analyses will be derived.   
Table 6.1 contains a complete list of both the continuous and categorical variables 
chosen for this study.  This table shows overall distributions of all variables included in 
the models used to test the predictions.  The most notable and relevant part of the table 
depicts the distribution of the gender, race, and ethnicity variables.  In sum, of the 
572,540 case files on convicted federal offenders received by the Sentencing Commission 
during fiscal years 1993 through 2003, the majority were male, and this distribution 
remained tremendously constant across all eleven fiscal years in the data set (see Table 
6.2).  When distributed by year, the racial and ethnic categories of convicted offenders 
shows that the number of white and black defendants have declined steadily throughout 
the study period, but the number of Hispanic defendants has steadily increased (see Table 
6.3).  Overall, white defendants comprised 33.1 percent, black defendants comprised 25.9 
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percent, and Hispanic defendants comprised 35.3 percent of the study cohort.  These 
three major racial and ethnic groups of white, black, and Hispanic offenders will be the 
categories used to test for differences in sentencing outcomes owing to the influence of 
race and ethnicity as an extralegal characteristic in subsequent analyses.   
 
The In/Out Incarceration Outcome 
The in/out incarceration decision was captured by a dichotomous variable 
(INOUT) indicating whether or not the defendant received a prison sentence and 
pertained to defendants located in Zones A and B of the sentencing table and were 
sentenced within the Guideline’s penalty ranges (N = 102,670).  Among this subset of 
defendants sentenced between fiscal years 1993 and 2003 (see Table 6.4), 39.1 percent 
received a sentence of at least one month of incarceration (N = 40,139).  The other 60.9 
percent did not receive a prison sentence (N = 62,531).   
As summarized in Table 6.5, slightly fewer than half of the male defendants (44.7 
percent) in this subset received a prison sentence.  Less than one quarter of the female 
defendants (24.4 percent) were sentenced to prison.  When the in/out variable was 
distributed by racial and ethnic category, white defendants had the lowest percentage of 
incarceration sentences (24.8 percent), followed by black defendants (31.3 percent).  
Hispanic defendants, on the other hand, were sentenced to prison in far greater 
proportions (67.4 percent). 
The differences in percentages between those defendants who pleaded guilty 
(39.3 percent) versus those who were adjudicated guilty by a trial proceeding (42.2 
percent) who were sentenced to prison were not that different.  The year of sentencing 
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demonstrated a steady upward trend in the percentage of defendants sentenced to prison 
over time (see Table 6.4).  Fiscal year 1993 had the lowest percentage of defendants (28.2 
percent) who received a prison sentence, but this percentage increased incrementally 
every year in the data set, until reaching a high of 50.4 percent in fiscal year 2003. 
The vast majority of federal criminal offenses for which the most frequent 
Guidelines are constantly applied fall into less than a dozen categories.  For the present 
study, these offenses were collapsed into the following six categories: drug offenses; 
fraud, deceit, and counterfeiting offenses; robbery and firearms offenses; larceny, 
embezzlement, theft, and money laundering offenses; immigration offenses; and other 
miscellaneous offenses.  Among defendants located in Zones A and B and sentenced 
within the Guideline’s range, who were sentenced for fraud, deceit, and counterfeiting 
offenses, 32.4% received a prison sentence (see Table 6.5).  Only 20.4% of defendants 
sentenced for larceny, embezzlement, theft, and money laundering offenses received a 
prison sentence.  The majority of defendants (78.7 percent) sentenced for immigration 
crimes received a prison sentence.  A little more than one-third of defendants sentenced 
for drug offenses (38 percent) and robbery and firearms offenses (36.3 percent) received 
a prison sentence. 
In addition, for both male and female offenders, the most common crime type 
category for which they were sentenced was for participation in drug offenses.  The top 
three offense categories among males were drug offenses (42.0 percent), immigration 
offenses (16.4 percent), and fraud, deceit, and counterfeiting offenses (15.3 percent).  
Among female offenders, the top three offense categories were drug offenses (36.2 
percent), fraud, deceit, and counterfeiting offenses (32.7 percent), and larceny, 
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embezzlement, theft, and money laundering offenses (14.9 percent).  For women, then, 
the top two crime type categories comprise more than two-thirds of the offenses for 
which they were sentenced. 
The location of the federal judicial court where the offender was sentenced is 
another key predictor variable in this analysis.  The sentencing court’s location is 
captured at both the district and circuit level.  The twelve federal judicial circuits do not 
all handle the same amount of cases, owing to differences in the size of the geographic 
area and populations encompassed by their jurisdictions.  For example, the districts 
within the ninth circuit, which covers the entire western United States, Alaska, Hawaii, 
Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands, have adjudicated one-fifth (21.5 percent) of all 
cases received by the Commission during the fiscal years 1993 through 2003, more than 
any other circuit in the federal court system. 
Nor did the district courts adjudicate the same percentages of defendants by 
gender, race and ethnicity, type of offense, or mode of conviction.  More than 22 percent 
of the defendants sentenced in the districts of Guam, Kentucky West, Alaska, Hawaii, 
and Louisiana West were female.  However, less than ten percent of the defendants 
sentenced in the districts of Oregon, Arizona, and Rhode Island were female.  Less than 
five percent of the defendants sentenced in the following districts were black: Arizona, 
Idaho, California South, Puerto Rico, North Dakota, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming, and 
Montana.  On the other hand, more than 60 percent of the defendants sentenced in these 
judicial district courts were black: Virginia East, Maryland, and the District of Columbia.  
Less than five percent of the defendants sentenced in these districts were Hispanic: West 
Virginia North, Mississippi North, West Virginia South, Alabama North, and South 
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Carolina.  However, more than 75 percent of the defendants sentenced in these district 
courts were Hispanic: California South, Texas West, New Mexico, Texas South, Arizona, 
and Puerto Rico. 
The districts of New Mexico (3.5 percent) and Arizona (5.3 percent) sentenced 
the smallest proportion of defendants for crimes within the category of fraud, deceit, and 
counterfeiting offenses.  Yet, this same category comprised more than 30 percent of the 
crimes for which defendants were sentenced in these districts: New Jersey, Oklahoma 
North, Delaware, Ohio North, Louisiana Middle, and Illinois North.  Similarly, New 
Mexico (1.7 percent) and California South (2.0 percent) sentenced the smallest 
proportions of defendants for crimes within the category of larceny, embezzlement, theft, 
and money laundering.  Yet, these offenses comprised more than 20 percent of the crimes 
for which defendants were sentenced in these districts: Louisiana West, Georgia Middle, 
and Kentucky West.  
Very few districts sentenced significant proportions of defendants for immigration 
crimes.  In fact, less than one percent of the defendants in these district courts were 
sentenced for immigration offenses: Alabama South, West Virginia South, Alabama 
Middle, West Virginia North, Indiana North, and Florida North.  However, between 35 
and 45 percent of the defendants in these districts were sentenced for immigration 
offenses: Texas, South, New Mexico, California South, and Arizona. 
The proportion of defendants sentenced for drug offenses ranged from less than 
20 percent in the California Central district to more than 60 percent in the districts of 
Iowa North, Puerto Rico, Iowa South, West Virginia North, and Illinois South.  Fewer 
than five percent of the defendants in these districts were sentenced for robbery or 
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firearms offenses: California South, Texas West, Texas South, Arizona, and New York 
North.  At the same time, these offenses comprised more than 20 percent of the crimes 
for which defendants were sentenced in these districts: Maine, Louisiana Middle, North 
Carolina Middle, and Maryland. 
The amount of variation was small among defendants who pleaded guilty versus 
those defendants who were found guilty by a trial proceeding between the district courts.  
The district of Florida North had the lowest proportion of defendants who pleaded guilty, 
but it was still 85.3 percent.  Meanwhile, more than 97 percent of the defendants 
sentenced in these districts had pleaded guilty: Louisiana East, New Mexico, California 
South, and Arizona. 
Overall, these proportions show that the defendants who were sentenced in the 
federal district courts between fiscal years 1993 and 2003 were not evenly distributed by 
gender, race and ethnicity, type of offense, or mode of conviction across the 94 district 
courts.  The proportion of offenses sentenced in federal judicial courts certainly is not an 
accurate reflection of the gender or racial and ethnic distribution of the population, or of 
the regional crime rate, but it does show very well the priorities of both law enforcement 
and U.S. attorneys in deciding which cases to bring into the purview of the jurisdiction of 
the federal courts.  Certainly, the draconian penalties associated with federal drug offense 
convictions, coupled with the preferences of prosecutors to successfully prosecute the 
cases they bring to the courts also plays a role in deciding the final mix of cases. 
 The proportions of defendants in Zones A and B of the sentencing table who 
received prison sentences varied substantially from district to district.  The incarceration 
rate ranged from just 12 percent in the district of Kentucky West to 80.3 percent in the 
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district of California South.  Districts located along the southwest border of the United 
States all had high rates of incarceration (Arizona, 67.1 percent; New Mexico, 73.0 
percent; Texas South, 70.6 percent).  Districts located within the same state did not 
necessarily share similar incarceration rates (Wisconsin East, 13.0 percent; Wisconsin 
West, 62.6 percent), suggesting that other factors might be influencing these rates.  
Overall, no clear cut patterns emerged to explain the variance in the different proportions 
of the incarceration rate by judicial district court. 
 
The Length of Term Sentence Outcome 
Sentence length is the second outcome of interest in the current study.  The 
variable that captures this outcome (TOTPRISN) is coded to capture the number of 
months of incarceration that the offender received at sentencing.  Of those defendants 
sentenced to prison, the length of their term of incarceration ranged from one to 470 
months.  The mean average number of months of imprisonment ordered at sentencing 
was 59.4 months.  The median number of months was 34 months and the mode was 24 
months.  During the eleven fiscal years of this study, the overall mean sentence length 
has steadily declined from 66.8 months in fiscal year 1993 to 58.4 months in fiscal year 
2003 (see Table 6.6). 
Male offenders received much longer sentences, on average, than their female 
counterparts received (see Table 6.7).  Male offenders who received prison sentences 
received an average mean sentence length of 62.2 months.  Likewise, the median length 
of the prison sentence was 37 months and the mode was 24 months for male offenders.  
In contrast, female offenders who received prison sentences received an average mean 
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sentence length of 35.4 months, and their median and mode sentence lengths were 21 and 
12 months, respectively. 
 There were also stark contrasts in the different sentence lengths among defendants 
classified by their racial and ethnic categories.  White defendants’ mean sentence length 
was 51.5 months (median, 30; mode, 12), and Hispanic defendants’ mean sentence length 
was slightly less at 46.3 months (median, 29; mode, 24).  However, the mean sentence 
length for black defendants was much higher at 88.23 months (median, 60; mode, 60). 
 Defendants who pleaded guilty received an average mean sentence length of 52.1 
months (median, 30; mode, 24).  In contrast, defendants who were found guilty by a trial 
received about three times as long mean sentence length at 151.8 months (median 109, 
mode 470).  Apparently, a large proportion of defendants who received life sentences 
chose to go to trial rather than plead guilty. 
 Defendants sentenced for robbery and firearms offenses had the longest mean 
sentence length of 83.1 months.  They were followed by defendants sentenced for drug 
offenses (79.2 months), other offenses (50 months), larceny, theft, embezzlement, and 
money laundering offenses (41.6 months), immigration offenses (26 months), and fraud, 
deceit, and counterfeiting offenses (18.5 months).  These categories are closely aligned 
with the offense level seriousness scores assigned to these types of crimes. 
 The mean sentence length appears to decline slightly over time during the eleven 
years used in the current study.  In fiscal year 1993, the mean sentence length was at a 
high of 66.78 months.  It declined by almost twelve months to reach a low average of 
55.26 months in fiscal year 2001.  During the final two fiscal years of the data set, the 
mean sentence length rose slightly to end at 58.4 months in fiscal year 2003. 
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Finally, the mean average sentence length varied by judicial district and circuit.  
Among the judicial circuits, mean sentence length varied from a low of 40.1 months in 
the ninth circuit to a high of 87.2 months in the fourth circuit.  The district court with the 
highest mean sentence length was Florida North at 117 months.  The districts of North 
Carolina East and North Carolina Middle also had high mean sentence lengths at 111.7 
and 100.9, respectively.  The districts of California South (25.3 months) and Arizona 
(31.7 months) had the lowest mean sentence lengths. 
 
The Judicial Downward Departure Decision 
The likelihood of receiving a judicial downward departure is the third outcome on 
interest to be analyzed in this analysis.  Distributions of this variable show that, more 
often than not, convicted federal offenders sentenced under the Sentencing Guidelines do 
not receive departures outside of the prescribed Guideline ranges.  In the current study’s 
data set, between the fiscal years 1993 and 2003, 63.5 percent of offenders were 
sentenced within the Guideline’s ranges.  A small number of offenders (0.8 percent) 
received upward departures.  The U.S. attorneys who prosecuted the cases filed motions 
with the district courts to grant substantial assistance (§5K1.1) downward departures in 
17.0 percent of the cases.  The sentencing court itself decided to depart downward below 
the Guideline penalty range for 12.5 percent of offenders sentenced during this time 
period.  Because the current study is focusing on federal judicial discretion, substantial 
assistance departures will be kept separate from judicial downward departures for all 
subsequent analyses. 
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The proportion of defendants who received judicial downward departures 
increased each year during the study period (see Table 6.8).  Defendants in fiscal year 
1993 only comprised 3.7 percent of judicial downward departures.  This proportion 
increased to 11.6 percent in fiscal year 1999 and remained in double digits for the 
remaining five fiscal years.  Defendants who received judicial downward departures 
comprised 12.6 percent in the final fiscal year of the data set. 
Among defendants who received judicial downward departures, males comprised 
85.8 percent while females comprised only 14.2 percent (see Table 6.9).  Only 13.8 
percent of defendants who received judicial downward departures were black.  Twice as 
many white defendants (27.1 percent) received judicial downward departures.  Nearly 
four times as many Hispanic defendants (55.9 percent) received judicial downward 
departures. 
One particularly pronounced difference was found when the defendant’s 
departure status was distributed by citizenship status.  While similar proportions of U.S. 
and non-U.S. citizens did not receive departures, the proportions receiving the two types 
of downward departures (judicial and substantial assistance) were practically opposite.  In 
the case of U.S. citizens, about ten percent received judicial downward departures while 
nearly 22 percent received substantial assistance departures upon motion of the U.S. 
attorney assigned to prosecute the case.  On the other hand, about ten percent of non-U.S. 
citizens received substantial assistance departures while nearly 22 percent received 
judicial downward departures.  Thus, the fact that defendants who are Hispanic and non-
U.S. citizens are receiving judicial downward departures at a much higher rate than 
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whites, blacks, and U.S. citizens, but the opposite is true for substantial assistance 
departures merits greater attention. 
The vast majority of defendants who received judicial downward departures 
pleaded guilty (96 percent) rather than being found guilty at trial.  This rate was not 
unexpected since departures are commonly included as part of the plea arrangement 
between the defendant and the prosecution.  Defendants sentenced for drug offenses 
received more judicial downward departures (39.1 percent) than for any other crime type 
category.  They were followed by defendants who were sentenced for immigration 
offenses (29.8 percent), defendants sentenced for fraud, deceit, and counterfeiting 
offenses (11.6 percent), defendants sentenced for robbery and firearms offenses (8.1 
percent), defendants sentenced for other offense (6.5 percent), and defendants sentenced 
for larceny, embezzlement, theft, and money laundering offenses (4.9 percent). 
The distribution of judicial downward departures by judicial circuit also showed a 
large amount of variation.  Judicial downward departures ranged from a low of 4.2 
percent of defendants in the fourth circuit to a high of 29.2 percent of defendants in the 
ninth circuit.  The second, fifth, and tenth circuits each had judicial downward departures 
rates ranging between ten and twenty percent of defendants.  The D.C., first, third, sixth, 
seventh, eighth, and eleventh circuits all had judicial downward departure rates ranging 
from five to ten percent of defendants.  Overall, the second, fifth, and ninth circuits 
accounted for nearly three quarters (70.5 percent) of all the judicial downward departures 
granted to offenders in the data set. 
 The judicial districts of Arizona (19.3 percent) and California South (15.1 
percent) had the highest percentages of judicial downward departures.  No other districts 
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comprised more than eight percent of judicial downward departures.  There were four 
districts that comprised between four and eight percent.  These were the districts of Texas 
West (7.3 percent), Texas South (5.9 percent), New York East (5.3 percent), and New 
Mexico (4.5 percent).  All the other judicial districts comprised less than two percent of 
the judicial downward departures in the study. 
 
Descriptions of Additional Variables of Interest 
Certainly, the type of crime for which the offender was sentenced plays an initial 
role in determining the final outcome of his or her adjudication.  However, the variable 
that defines the final offense level (XFOLSOR) takes the type of crime, plus accounts for 
all the surrounding circumstances that might mitigate or aggravate the gravity of factors 
used by the judge to determine the seriousness of the offense.  In other words, the 
seriousness of the offense, rather than the type of the offense, should dictate the 
sentencing outcome.  An offender who is assigned a final offense level of 6 will receive a 
less severe sentencing outcome than an offender who is assigned a final offense level of 
26.  It is presumed that the Commission already took the seriousness of the offense into 
account when assigning each offense type an offense seriousness score within the 
Guidelines.  However, by including a variable representing offense type categories, this 
study will be able to determine whether the type of crime for which these offenders are 
sentenced exercises an independent influence on the sentencing outcome.  
As mentioned previously, the penalty table created by the Sentencing 
Commission contains 43 offense levels.  The seriousness of the offense increases with 
each offense level, as likewise do the corresponding penalty ranges.  In other words, the 
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greater the convicted offender’s criminal history category and offense seriousness level, 
the lower the probability that he will be assigned no prison term (Mustard, 2001).  The 
smallest penalty range for the first few offense levels is zero to six months.  This 
comprises Zone A of the sentencing table.  Each successive level and zone has larger and 
longer penalty ranges.  The highest offense levels encompass the longest penalty 
ranges—thirty years to life.  A death sentence is not included in the penalty table, but it is 
a possible sentencing option for a number of federal crimes, as defined by statute rather 
than incorporated into the Guidelines. 
While the sentencing table stops at 43 levels, the actual score computed for the 
offense conduct can go higher.  For these reasons, the final offense level variable in the 
data set ranges from one to 53.  Scores higher than 43 were truncated at 43 since they are 
treated the same by the sentencing table.  The mean value for this variable is 18.4 (mode 
is 21 and median is 18).  Offense level 18 is located in Zone D of the sentencing table, 
and depending on the criminal history category, directs the judge to sentence the 
convicted offender to a term of incarceration ranging between 27 and 71 months.  
Probation and intermediate sanctions, including alternative community confinement or 
split sentences, are not available sentencing options in Zone D of the sentencing table. 
When final offense level is distributed by gender, male offenders’ final offense 
level score ranges from one to 53, and the average mean score is 19.1.  Female offenders’ 
final offense level score ranges from one to 50, and the average mean score is 14.6.  
When distributed by racial and ethnic categories, white offenders have the lowest average 
mean offense level score (16.8), followed by Hispanic offenders (18.5), and black 
offenders have the highest average mean offense level score (20.9). 
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There are six criminal history categories in the sentencing table created by the 
Sentencing Commission.  Thus, the variable that captures the offender’s final criminal 
history category (XCRHISSR) ranges from one to six.  The mean criminal history 
category of the data set was 2.3 and the mode was 1.  Just over one-half of the offenders 
in the data set (50.9 percent) were placed in the first, or lowest, criminal history category 
of the sentencing table.  Another 10.4 percent of offenders were placed in the second 
criminal history category, and 12.9 percent of offenders were placed in the third criminal 
history category.  This distribution suggests that the majority of offenders convicted and 
sentenced in the federal criminal justice system between fiscal years 1993 and 2003 do 
not have extensive criminal histories. 
The number of counts of conviction among defendants in the dataset ranged from 
one to 495 separate counts.  The mean number of counts of conviction was 1.6 and the 
median number of counts of conviction was 1.0, suggesting that the vast majority (79.7 
percent) of convicted federal offenders were sentenced for just one criminal count.  In 
order to keep the model as parsimonious as possible, this variable was recoded into a 
dichotomous variable representing defendants with 1 count of conviction versus 
defendants with multiple counts of conviction.  Hence, subsequent analyses will use the 
recoded dichotomous variable to represent the number of counts of conviction. 
Nearly 85 percent of female defendants were sentenced for only one count of 
conviction.  The same was true for 79 percent of the male defendants.  Approximately 75 
percent of both white and black defendants were sentenced for only one count of 
conviction.  Hispanics, on the other hand, were sentenced for only one count of 
conviction in 87.5 percent of the cases in the data set. 
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A guilty plea is by far the most frequent type of disposition in the federal judicial 
system. Regardless of the method of case resolution (guilty plea or trial) however, a judge 
must use the same process to determine the appropriate sentence for each defendant 
(Payne, 1997).  In other words, defendants who exercise their right to a trial should not 
receive additional penalties, commonly called a “trial tax,” at sentencing (Smith and 
Damphousse, 1998; Johnson, 2005).  During fiscal years 1993 through 2003, 94.0 percent 
of federal criminal case outcomes were decided by a guilty plea. The remaining 6.0 
percent of cases were resolved by a trial conviction. 
When distributed by gender, the percent of female defendants (95.8 percent) who 
pleaded guilty was only slightly higher than for male defendants (93.6 percent).  The 
proportions for mode of conviction did not vary substantially by race and ethnicity either.  
Black defendants had the smallest proportion of guilty pleas (91.0 percent), followed by 
white defendants (93.8 percent), and Hispanic defendants had the highest proportion of 
guilty pleas (96.3 percent). 
 The age of the defendants ranged from a low of 16 years of age to a high of 102 
years of age at the time of sentencing.  The mean age of the offenders in the data set is 
34.4 years (median is 32 and mode is 26 years of age at the time of sentencing).  These 
averages did not vary between genders, but they did vary by race and ethnicity.  The 
mean age of white defendants is 38.5 years while it is 31.8 for black defendants and 32.3 
for Hispanic defendants.  Thus, the majority of offenders in the younger ages are black 
and Hispanic.  Older offenders are more often identified as non-minority. 
U.S. citizens comprise 66.8 percent of offenders while non-citizens comprise 29.7 
percent of the offenders in the data set.  A much higher proportion of female defendants 
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(83.3 percent) are U.S. citizens than male defendants (66.9 percent).  The vast majority of 
white offenders (95.0 percent) and black offenders (91.3 percent) are U.S. citizens, but 
the opposite is true for Hispanic offenders.  The majority of Hispanic offenders (71.9 
percent) are non-citizens, and, overall, Hispanic offenders comprise 83.0 percent of the 
total number of offenders in the non-citizen status category. 
The level of education of the offenders sentenced during fiscal years 1993 through 
2003 is captured in the variable that categorizes their highest achieved level of education.  
Interestingly, and perhaps owing to age differences, more than 25.6 percent of female 
offenders had taken some college courses while less than 17.4 percent of male offenders 
had enrolled or attended college.  Overall, 63.2 percent of white offenders, 74.3 percent 
of black offenders, and 87.4 percent of Hispanic offenders were located in the first two 
categories of less than a high school education or achievement of a high school diploma 
or G.E.D. certificate.  This lack of educational attainment was especially pronounced 
among the Hispanic offenders, 67.9 percent of whom had not completed their high school 
educations.   
The number of dependent minor children for whom the convicted offender was 
responsible as a parent or guardian was originally captured in a continuous variable 
ranging from 1 to 96.  In the interest of creating the most parsimonious model for this 
analysis, it was recoded into a dummy variable indicating either no dependents or 
dependents.  Approximately the same percentage of male and female offenders reported 
to have dependents while black and Hispanic offenders claimed dependents more often 
and in greater numbers than white offenders. 
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In summary, the descriptive analyses of the federal sentencing data used for this 
study appear to support the proposition underlying the hypotheses, namely that offense 
levels and criminal history categories are, by themselves, insufficient to explain the 
differences in sentencing outcomes for defendants of different genders and racial and 
ethnic combinations. There appears to be some residual evidence of the impact of judicial 
discretion on the outcome of the convicted offender’s sentence.  This disparity appears to 
stand out as a result of defendant’s ascribed characteristics.  Further analyses of the data 
should clarify the depth and extent of this hypothesized relationship. 
 
Bivariate Correlation Analysis 
After examining the characteristics and distributions of the variables of interest to 
the current study, the next step in the analysis involved determining the extent of the 
relationship, or covariance, between the independent variables themselves and between 
the independent variables and the dependent variables when all the other independent 
variables are held constant.  Bivariate correlation analysis was performed to check for 
multicollinearity between the independent variables as well as to verify the existence of a 
correlation between each of the selected independent variables and the dependent 
variables. 
Because the direction of the covariation between the variables is predicted in the 
proposed research hypotheses, one-tailed correlation tests were conducted on the 
variables.  Additionally, categorical variables containing more than two categories such 
as the race and ethnicity variable, the education level variable, and the offense type 
variable were separated out into dummy variables to facilitate a meaningful 
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interpretation.  The bivariate correlation analysis resulted in a varying amount of 
correlation between the independent variables, some greater than others.  This was not an 
unexpected result, owing to the overlapping influence of these variables on the 
sentencing outcome.   
 There was a large degree of correlation between the presumptive sentence and the 
final offense level (0.851), but only half as large a correlation between the presumptive 
sentence and the final criminal history category (0.348).  The presumptive sentence 
variable also had notable correlations with drug offenses (0.379), plea agreement of trial 
conviction (0.271), and if the defendant was black (0.210).  The dummy variable 
indicating a defendant is black produced notable correlations with the final offense level, 
the final criminal history category, and the presumptive sentence variables, whereas the 
dummy variables for white and Hispanic defendants were all negative.  Black defendants 
also produced significant correlations with robbery and firearms offenses.  On the other 
hand, female and white defendants were more highly correlated with the fraud, deceit, 
and counterfeiting offenses category. 
 Correlations between the independent and dependent variables also revealed some 
important relationships.  The largest correlations for the in/out decision and the judicial 
downward departure decision were the citizenship variables, the dummy variable 
indicating Hispanic ethnicity, and the dummy variable indicating immigration offenses.  
The largest correlations for the length-of-term decision was with the presumptive 
sentence, the final offense level, plea agreement or trial conviction, final criminal history 
score, the dummy variable indicating drug offenses, and the dummy variable indicating a 
black defendant.  The year of sentencing was moderately correlated with the in/out 
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decision, as was the dummy variable indicating larceny, embezzlement, theft, and money 
laundering offenses, but this was a negative correlation.  Fraud, deceit, and counterfeiting 
offenses were negatively correlated with the length-of-term decision. 
The bivariate correlation analysis suggests that the final offense level score and 
the criminal history score play an important role in effecting the length-of-term 
sentencing outcome.  In addition, the presumptive sentence variable, the type of 
conviction (plea or trial), and the crime type category represent important statistical 
controls for estimating the effects of gender, race, and ethnicity on the decision to 
incarcerate, the length-of-term of incarceration, and the decision to depart downward 
below the prescribed Guideline penalty range.   
As part of this analysis, diagnostic tests were performed to detect multicollinearity 
by regressing each independent variable on the other independent variables (see Table 
6.10).  In so doing, each independent variable acts as a dependent variable while the other 
independent variables operate as independent variables for the duration of the analysis.  
These tests revealed a very strong correlation between district court and circuit court 
locations.  The circuit court location variable was dropped from subsequent analyses in 
order to allow for the unique effects of sentencing location to be explained at the district 
court level.   
These tests also revealed a pretty strong correlation between the final offense 
level and the presumptive sentence.  In the preliminary analysis, both the final offense 
level and presumptive sentence variables were retained.   While some variance may be 
attributed to the shared influence of these two variables, the associated amount can be 
detected by removing one variable from the model each time it is run, thus allowing for 
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the influence of each variable to be distinguished separately.  In the final regression 
models, however, the final offense level variable was excluded in order to accurately 
predict the influence of the presumptive sentence variable and avoid misspecification of 
the regression model. 
The bivariate correlation analysis indicates the direction and strength of the 
relationship between variables when they are correlated with one another simultaneously.  
However, multiple regression analysis is necessary in order to measure the degree of 
association when the other independent variables are held constant.  It will also allow for 
more complex analyses of the interaction effects of gender and race and ethnicity on the 
outcome variables.  The results of this more sophisticated multiple regression analysis are 




Table 6.1.  Descriptive Statistics of Continuous and Categorical Variables from the 
 U.S. Sentencing Commission Data, FY1993-2003 (N = 572,540). 
Continuous Variables  N        Mean           S.D.     Min.   Max.       Missing 
Length of Incarceration 452,438 59.35 73.200 1 470 120,102 
Age at Sentencing 561,993 34.38 10.813 16 102 10,547  
Age2 561,993 1,298.79 857.455 162 1022 10,547 
Final Criminal History 540,960 2.26 1.672 1 6 31,580 
Presumptive Sentence 537,132 55.09 71.082 0 470 35,408 
Categorical Variables & Codes N  Percent Cumulative Percent 
Incarceration Outcome for Zones A & B 
 Non-Prison (0) 62,531 10.9 10.9  
 Prison (1) 40,139 7.0 17.9 
 Missing/Not Applicable 469,870 82.1 100.0 
Departure Status Outcome 
 No Departure (0) 363,549 63.5 63.5 
 Upward Departure (1) 4,384 0.8 64.3 
 Judicial Downward (2) 71,459 12.5 76.8 
 Sub. Assist. (5K) (3) 97,063 17.0 93.8 
 Missing 36,085 6.3 100.0 
Defendant’s Gender 
 Male (0,1) 487,446 85.1 85.1 
 Female (0,1) 83,728 14.6 99.8 
 Missing (0,1) 1,366 0.2 100.0 
Race & Ethnicity 
 White (0,1) 189,538 33.1 33.1 
 Black (0,1) 148,304 25.9 59.0 
 Hispanic (0,1) 201,905 35.3 94.3 
 Other (0,1) 22,119 3.9 98.2 
 Missing (0,1) 10,674 1.9 100.0 
Citizenship 
 U.S. Citizen (0,1) 382,734 66.8 66.8 
 Non-U.S. Citizen (0,1) 170,097 29.7 96.5 
 Missing (0,1) 19,709 3.4 100.0 
Primary Offense Type 
 Fraud & Counterfeiting (0,1) 101,555 17.7 17.7 
 Larceny & Theft (0,1) 48,430 8.5 26.2 
 Immigration (0,1) 84,762 14.8 41.0 
 Drugs (0,1) 234,366 40.9 81.9 
 Robbery & Firearms (0,1) 57,130 10.0 91.9 
 Other Offenses (0,1) 43,862 7.7 99.6 
 Missing (0,1) 2,435 0.4 100.0 
Type of Disposition 




Categorical Variables   N  Percent Cumulative Percent 
Trial Conviction (0,1) 34,384 6.0 99.5 
 Missing (0,1) 2,973 0.5 100.0 
Counts of Conviction 
 1 Count (0,1) 456,276 79.7 79.7 
 2+ Counts (0,1) 114,646 20.0 99.7 
 Missing (0,1) 1,618 0.3 100.0 
Educational Category  
 Less than H.S. (0,1) 230,134 40.2 40.2 
 H.S. or G.E.D. (0,1) 163,757 28.6 68.8 
 Some College (0,1) 98,659 17.2 86.0 
 College Grad. (0,1) 36,692 6.4 92.4 
 Missing (0,1) 43,298 7.6 100.0 
Dependents 
 No Dependents (0,1) 203,121 35.5 35.5 
 Dependents (0,1) 325,754 56.9 92.4 
 Missing (0,1) 43,665 7.6 100.0 
Sentencing Year 
 FY 1993 (0,1) 42,107 7.4 7.4 
 FY 1994 (0,1) 39,971 7.0 14.4 
 FY 1995 (0,1) 38,500 6.7 21.1 
 FY 1996 (0,1) 42,436 7.4 28.5 
 FY 1997 (0,1) 48,848 8.5 37.0 
 FY 1998 (0,1) 50,754 8.9 45.9 
 FY 1999 (0,1) 55,557 9.7 55.6 
 FY 2000 (0,1) 59,846 10.5 66.1 
 FY 2001 (0,1) 59,897 10.5 76.6 
 FY 2002 (0,1) 64,366 11.2 87.8 
 FY 2003 (0,1) 70,258 12.3 100.0 
U.S. Circuit Courts 
 First Circuit (0,1) 15,868 2.8 2.8 
 Second Circuit (0,1) 46,914 8.2 11.0 
 Third Circuit (0,1) 27,243 4.8 15.8 
 Fourth Circuit (0,1) 54,853 9.6 25.4 
 Fifth Circuit (0,1) 98,925 17.3 42.7 
 Sixth Circuit (0,1) 44,996 7.9 50.6 
 Seventh Circuit (0,1) 24,934 4.4 55.0 
 Eighth Circuit (0,1) 34,042 5.9 60.9 
 Ninth Circuit (0,1) 122,887 21.5 82.4 
 Tenth Circuit (0,1) 33,128 5.8 88.2 
 Eleventh Circuit (0,1) 63,989 11.2 99.4 
 D.C. Circuit (0,1) 4,761 0.8 100.0 




Table 6.2.  Year of Sentencing by Defendant’s Gender 
Variable       Males      Females       TOTAL 
Description   N  Percent    N Percent   N  Percent 
1993 35,614  (84.6%) 6,460 (15.4%) 42,074  (100.0%) 
1994 33,818  (84.6%) 6,148 (15.4%) 39,966  (100.0%) 
1995 32,745  (85.1%) 5,742 (14.9%) 38,487  (100.0%) 
1996 35,893  (84.6%) 6,540 (15.4%) 42,433  (100.0%) 
1997 41,478  (85.0%) 7,304 (15.0%) 48,782  (100.0%) 
1998 43,054  (84.9%) 7,646 (15.1%) 50,700  (100.0%) 
1999 46,946  (84.6%) 8,563 (15.4%) 55,509  (100.0%) 
2000 51,067  (85.7%) 8,555 (14.3%) 59,622  (100.0%)  
2001 51,197  (85.5%) 8,658 (14.5%) 59,855  (100.0%) 
2002 55,077  (86.0%) 8,962 (14.0%) 64,039  (100.0%) 
2003 60,557 (86.9%) 9,150 (13.1%) 69,707 (100.0%) 
TOTAL* 487,446 (85.3%) 83,728 (14.7%) 571,174  (100.0%) 
* There were 1,366 cases in the dataset where the Gender variable was missing. 
 
Table 6.3.  Year of Sentencing by Defendant’s Race and Ethnicity 
Variable       White         Black       Hispanic 
Description   N  Percent    N Percent   N  Percent 
1993 18,174  (43.6%) 12,175 (29.2%) 9,936  (23.8%) 
1994 16,470  (41.5%) 12,032 (30.3%) 9,764  (24.6%) 
1995 14,998  (39.2%) 11,139 (29.1%) 10,450  (27.3%) 
1996 15,152  (35.9%) 11,971 (28.4%) 13,095  (31.0%) 
1997 16,565  (34.7%) 12,891 (27.0%) 16,169  (33.8%) 
1998 16,059  (32.1%) 13,251 (26.5%) 18,465  (36.9%) 
1999 16,734  (30.7%) 14,249 (26.2%) 21,260  (39.1%) 
2000 17,780  (30.1%) 14,762 (25.0%) 24,263  (41.0%)  
2001 17,790  (30.4%) 14,767 (25.2%) 23,773  (40.6%) 
2002 19,216  (30.7%) 15,353 (24.6%) 25,669  (41.1%) 
2003 20,600 (30.4%) 15,714 (23.2%) 29,061 (42.9%) 
TOTAL* 189,538 (33.7%) 148,304 (26.4%) 201,905  (35.9%) 
There were 22,119 cases in the “Other” race category and 10,674 cases were missing information on the 
defendant’s race and/or ethnicity category.  The “Other” race category includes Asians, American Indians, 





Table 6.4.  Defendant’s Receipt of Prison Sentence (In/Out Status) by Fiscal Year 
Variable       Non-Prison Sentence      Prison Sentence 
Description       N  Percent     N         Percent 
FY 1993 6,768 (71.8%) 2,653 (28.2%) 
FY 1994 5,915 (71.7%) 2,332 (28.3%) 
FY 1995 5,405 (69.6%) 2,358 (30.4%) 
FY 1996 5,392 (66.4%) 2,727 (33.6%) 
FY 1997 5,805 (61.9%) 3,574 (38.1%) 
FY 1998 5,171 (60.6%) 3,367 (39.4%) 
FY 1999 5,565 (61.5%) 3,490 (38.5%) 
FY 2000 5,596 (54.4%) 4,685 (45.6%) 
FY 2001 5,263 (56.9%) 3,985 (43.1%) 
FY 2002 5,389 (53.9%) 4,601 (46.1%) 
FY 2003 6,262 (49.6%) 6,367 (50.4%) 
* There were 469,870 defendants who were either not sentenced within range, or located in Zones C or D, 
or missing this information. 
 
Table 6.5.  Descriptive Statistics for In/Out Incarceration Decision 
Variable       Non-Prison Sentence      Prison Sentence 
Description        N  Percent     N         Percent 
Defendant’s Gender 
 Male 41,316 55.3 33.348 44.7 
 Female 20,542 75.6 6,619 24.4 
 TOTAL 61,858 60.7 39,967 39.3 
Race & Ethnicity 
 White 30,012 75.2 9,879 24.8 
 Black 15,886 68.7 7,228 31.3 
 Hispanic 9,596 32.6 19,824 67.4 
 Other 4,010 68.6 1,834 31.4 
 TOTAL 59,504 60.6 38,765 39.4 
Primary Offense Type 
 Fraud & Counterfeiting 25,423 67.6 12,183 32.4 
 Larceny & Theft 15,373 79.6 3,938 20.4 
 Immigration 4,338 21.3 16,068 78.7 
 Drugs 6,318 62.0 3,868 38.0 
 Robbery & Firearms 1,321 63.7 752 36.3  
 Other Offenses 8,861 73.7 3,165 26.3 
 TOTAL 61,634 60.7 39,974 39.3 
Type of Disposition 
 Guilty Plea 60,567 60.7 39,199 39.3 
 Trial Conviction 1,134 57.8 828 42.2 




Table 6.6.  Description of Defendant’s Sentence Length by Fiscal Year 
Variable 
Description  N        Mean           S.D.     Med.   Mode      Missing 
FY 1993 31,668 66.78 81.231 37 60 10,439  
 FY 1994 30,325 66.48 82.554 37 60 9,646 
 FY 1995 29,498 63.58 79.571 36 24 9,002 
 FY 1996 33,258 62.82 79.072 36 24 9,178 
 FY 1997 37,509 59.84 77.489 33 24 11,339 
 FY 1998 40,600 58.29 73.559 32 24 10,154  
 FY 1999 44,743 57.42 71.850 33 24 10,814 
 FY 2000 48,600 55.49 67.811 33 12 11,246 
 FY 2001 49,103 55.26 66.043 33 12 10,794 
 FY 2002 51,584 56.65 66.849 34 24 12,782 
 FY 2003 55,550 58.41 68.874 36 24 14,708 
* There were 120,102 defendants who were missing information on the sentence length variable. 
 
Table 6.7.  Descriptive Statistics for Defendant’s Sentence Length 
Variable 
Description   N        Mean           S.D.     Med.   Mode      Missing 
Defendant’s Gender 
 Female 47,729 35.41 46.114 21 12 35,999 
 Male 404,385 62.20 75.264 37 24 83,061 
 Missing 324 32.92 61.437 12 24 1,042 
Race & Ethnicity 
 White 133,560 51.51 64.500 30 12 55,978 
 Black 121,814 88.23 93.264 60 60 26,490 
 Hispanic 178,333 46.30 56.804 29 24 23,572 
 Other 15,444 51.06 68.091 27 12 6,675 
 Missing 3,287 54.80 79.489 24 6 7,387 
Primary Offense Type 
 Fraud & Counter. 57,160 18.54 21.296 12 12 44,395 
 Larceny & Theft 26,372 41.63 66.872 21 12 22,058 
 Immigration 73,994 26.01 22.344 24 24 10,768 
 Drugs 214,412 79.23 80.605 57 60 19,954 
 Robbery & Firearms 52,977 83.09 82.815 57 60 4,153 
 Other Offenses 26,874 50.00 82.049 24 12 16,988 
 Missing 649 58.92 73.390 35 24 1,786 
Type of Disposition 
 Guilty Plea 419,031 52.11 59.763 30 24 116,152  
 Trial Conviction 32,330 151.80 137,771 109 470 2,054 




Table 6.8.  Defendant’s Receipt of Departures by Fiscal Year 
Variable  No Departure          Jud. Downward       Sub. Assist.           Up Departure 
Description N Percent         N        Percent         N    Percent  N        Percent 
FY 1993 30,470 75.3 2,676 6.6 6,840 16.9 456 1.1  
FY 1994 27,591 71.7 2,932 7.6 7,524 19.5 451 1.2 
FY 1995 26,259 71.0 3,110 8.4 7,271 19.7 335 0.9 
FY 1996 28,445 69.6 4,201 10.3 7,845 19.2 388 0.9 
FY 1997 31,233 67.9 5,574 12.1 8,823 19.2 387 0.8 
FY 1998 31,772 66.3 6,509 13.6 9,224 19.3 391 0.8  
FY 1999 34,020 64.9 8,304 15.8 9,788 18.7 313 0.6 
FY 2000 35,219 64.5 9,286 17.0 9,754 17.9 358 0.7 
FY 2001 35,128 64.0 10,026 18.3 9,390 17.1 307 0.6 
FY 2002 38,159 65.0 9,865 16.8 10,203 17.4 457 0.8 
FY 2003 45,253 69.4 8,976 13.8 10,401 16.0 541 0.8 
* There were 36,085 defendants who were missing information regarding their Departure status. 
 
Table 6.9.  Descriptive Statistics for Judicial Downward Departure Decision 
Variable         Judicial Downward Departure 
Description        N  Percent Cum. Percent     
Defendant’s Gender 
 Male 61,283 85.8 85.8  
 Female 10,131 14.2 100.0  
 TOTAL 71,414 100.0  
Race & Ethnicity 
 White 19,222 27.1 27.1 
 Black 9,813 13.8 40.9 
 Hispanic 39,697 55.9 96.8 
 Other 2,319 3.2 100.0 
 TOTAL 71,051 100.0 
Primary Offense Type 
 Fraud & Counterfeiting 8,287 11.6 11.6 
 Larceny & Theft 3,505 4.9 16.5 
 Immigration 21,266 29.8 46.3 
 Drugs 27,857 39.1 85.4 
 Robbery & Firearms 5,777 8.1 93.5 
 Other Offenses 4,624 6.5 100.0 
 TOTAL 71,316 100.0  
Type of Disposition 
 Guilty Plea 68,428 96.0 96.0 
 Trial Conviction 2,838 4.0 100.0 
 TOTAL 71,266 100.0 
Table 6.10. Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables, FY1993-2003 (N = 572,540)











Gender 1.00 - - - - - - - - - - -
White 0.054** 1.00 - - - - - - - - - -
Black 0.041** -0.427** 1.00 - - - - - - - - -
Hispanic Ethnicity -0.101** -0.534** -0.448** 1.00 - - - - - - - -
Citizenship -0.126** -0.400** -0.287** 0.661** 1.00 - - - - - - -
Age 0.012** 0.276** -0.146** -0.139** -0.102** 1.00 - - - - - -
Educ Level 1 -0.087** -0.272** -0.059** 0.345** 0.313** -0.163** 1.00 - - - - -
Educ Level 2 0.037** 0.113** 0.062** -0.174** -0.189** -0.006** -0.587** 1.00 - - - -
Educ Level 3 0.075** 0.109** 0.042** -0.156** -0.136** 0.066** -0.420** -0.320** 1.00 - - -
Educ Level 4 -0.014** 0.159** -0.062** -0.118** -0.059** 0.228** -0.239** -0.183** -0.131** 1.00 - -
Dependents 0.011** -0.117** 0.040** 0.087** 0.067** 0.060** 0.047** -0.023** -0.038** 0.008** 1.00 -
Plea or Trial -0.032** 0.003** 0.074** -0.073** -0.060** 0.062** -0.029** 0.009** 0.009** 0.027** 0.007** 1.00
Counts of Conviction -0.046** 0.071** 0.075** -0.143** -0.133** 0.069** -0.067** 0.018** 0.028** 0.056** -0.004** 0.283**
Offense Level -0.173** -0.131** 0.158** 0.002 -0.043** -0.047** 0.077** 0.023** -0.065** -0.094** 0.047** 0.224**
Criminal History -0.186** -0.111** 0.157** -0.005** -0.015** -0.072** 0.122** 0.041** -0.108** -0.148** -0.037** 0.019**
Presumptive Sentence -0.151** -0.128** 0.210** -0.051** -0.082** -0.046** 0.058** 0.040** -0.059** -0.097** 0.041** 0.271**
Other Offenses -0.009** 0.116** -0.057** -0.122** -0.117** 0.064** -0.069** 0.025** 0.024** 0.051** -0.037** 0.024**
Fraud & Counterfeiting 0.162** 0.208** 0.013** -0.230** -0.169** 0.193** -0.230** 0.001 0.151** 0.214** -0.003* -0.023**
Larceny & Theft 0.096** 0.098** 0.013** -0.126** -0.113** 0.073** -0.102** 0.034** 0.060** 0.046** -0.004** 0.006**
Immigration Offenses -0.105** -0.258** -0.217** 0.472** 0.549** -0.088** 0.264** -0.139** -0.124** -0.073** 0.013** -0.082**
Drug Offenses -0.042** -0.122** 0.081** 0.080** -0.026** -0.124** 0.105** 0.017** -0.067** -0.133** 0.054** 0.038**
Robbery & Firearms -0.094** 0.050** 0.145** -0.176** -0.185** -0.064** -0.006** 0.066** -0.027** -0.065** -0.062** 0.037**
Sentencing Year -0.017** -0.086** -0.047** 0.130** 0.095** -0.024** 0.058** -0.012** -0.040** -0.030** 0.001 -0.100**
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).
























Gender - - - - - - - - - - -
White - - - - - - - - - - -
Black - - - - - - - - - - -
Hispanic Ethnicity - - - - - - - - - - -
Citizenship - - - - - - - - - - -
Age - - - - - - - - - - -
Educ Level 1 - - - - - - - - - - -
Educ Level 2 - - - - - - - - - - -
Educ Level 3 - - - - - - - - - - -
Educ Level 4 - - - - - - - - - - -
Dependents - - - - - - - - - - -
Plea or Trial - - - - - - - - - - -
Counts of Conviction 1.00 - - - - - - - - - -
Offense Level 0.222** 1.00 - - - - - - - - -
Criminal History 0.011** 0.188** 1.00 - - - - - - - -
Presumptive Sentence 0.213** 0.851** 0.348** 1.00 - - - - - - -
Other Offenses -0.013** -0.117** -0.041** -0.078** 1.00 - - - - - -
Fraud & Counterfeiting 0.055** -0.361** -0.156** -0.277** -0.134** 1.00 - - - - -
Larceny & Theft 0.015** -0.174** -0.086** -0.108** -0.088** -0.142** 1.00 - - - -
Immigration Offenses -0.162** -0.184** 0.205** -0.142** -0.121** -0.195** -0.127** 1.00 - - -
Drug Offenses -0.018** 0.515** -0.087** 0.379** -0.241** -0.389** -0.255** -0.349** 1.00 - -
Robbery & Firearms 0.091** 0.088** 0.217** 0.061** -0.096** -0.155** -0.102** -0.139** -0.279** 1.00 -
Sentencing Year -0.056** 0.011** 0.063** -0.015** -0.008** -0.050** -0.075** 0.135** -0.008** -0.006** 1.00
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).
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Table 6.11.  Bivariate Correlations between Independent Variables and 










Gender -0.181** -0.112** -0.005** 
White -0.254** -0.070** -0.058** 
Black -0.092** 0.241** -0.114** 
Hispanic Ethnicity 0.378** -0.145** 0.168** 
Citizenship 0.430** -0.166** 0.163** 
Age -0.174** -0.017** 0.000 
Educ Level 1 (Less Than High School) 0.267** -0.003* 0.085** 
Educ Level 2 (High School or GED) -0.100** 0.063** -0.055** 
Educ Level 3 (Some College) -0.116** -0.028** -0.038** 
Educ Level 4 (College Degree) -0.096** -0.074** -0.008** 
Dependents -0.017** 0.027** -0.004** 
Plea or Trial 0.010** 0.352** -0.036** 
Counts of Conviction -0.030* 0.285** -0.070** 
Offense Level 0.021** 0.735** 0.005** 
Criminal History 0.285** 0.258** 0.040** 
Presumptive Sentence 0.126** 0.856** -0.037** 
Other Offenses (Crime Type Category 1) -0.101** -0.032** -0.009** 
Fraud & Counterfeiting (Crime Type Category 2) -0.118** -0.212** -0.064** 
Larceny & Theft (Crime Type Category 3) -0.183** -0.060** -0.051** 
Immigration Offenses (Crime Type Category 4) 0.404** -0.202** 0.172** 
Drug Offenses (Crime Type Category 5) -0.003 0.258** -0.024** 
Robbery & Firearms (Crime Type Category 6) -0.011** 0.118** -0.025** 
Sentencing Year 0.146** -0.044** 0.094** 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).  
 * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).  
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CHAPTER VII.  RESULTS OF MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES 
The results of the analysis of each of the three sentencing decisions within the 
purview of federal judges are presented along two dimensions.  The first dimension 
consists of an aggregate summary of sentencing disparity under the Guidelines 
throughout the entire eleven fiscal years of 1993 to 2003.   Therefore, the first section 
will summarize the overall findings in order to demonstrate whether the effects of the 
independent variables are in accordance with the hypotheses of the study.  The second 
dimension summarizes the changes over time when the data were separated by each 
individual fiscal year to facilitate a temporal analysis.  Thus, the second section will 
determine the effects of the independent variables on the three sentencing outcomes over 
time by examining trends of convergence and/or divergence in the data.  Together, these 
two sets of findings produce a broader and more meaningful framework for interpreting 
warranted and unwarranted disparity and change in sentencing outcomes under the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines than has heretofore been presented. 
 
SECTION 1.  Results of the Overall Aggregate Analysis 
The In/Out Decision (Overall Results) 
The Effects of Gender and Race and Ethnicity 
The incarceration decision is restricted to defendants whose final criminal history 
category and offense seriousness score place them in the upper two zones of the 
sentencing table and who are sentenced within the Guideline’s range.  The results of the 
logistic regression analysis on this applicable subset of offenders revealed that the 
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coefficient value for gender is negative and significant (-.393), indicating that gender 
does exercise a significant effect on the in/out incarceration decision (see Table 7.1).  
Thus, female defendants, as a group, are less likely to receive a sentence of incarceration 
(.675) than similarly situated male defendants, when that option is available.   
The effects of the defendant’s racial and ethnic category also produced significant 
coefficients in the overall model.  The coefficient for black defendants was positive and 
significant, indicating that black defendants were 1.22 times more likely to be sentenced 
to prison than the reference category of white defendants.  The coefficient for Hispanic 
defendants was also significant and had an even greater magnitude.  Hispanic defendants 
in these upper two tiers of the sentencing table were 1.42 times more likely to be sent to 
prison than were white defendants.  Finally, for the defendants who were placed in the 
“other” racial category, a significant negative coefficient was produced by the model, 
indicating a moderate decrease in the likelihood of imprisonment for defendants in the 
other racial category compared to similarly-situated white defendants.   
 
The Effect of Type of Conviction 
Overall, the type of conviction—pleading guilty versus trial conviction—
produced a positive and significant coefficient, suggesting that being found guilty after a 
trial rather than pleading guilty earlier in the judicial process increases the odds of 
receiving a prison sentence.  The odds ratio produced for defendants who were convicted 
by a trial indicated that the likelihood of receiving a sentence of incarceration was nearly 
two times as great (1.897) as the odds for a defendant who pleaded guilty at an earlier 
stage in the judicial court process. 
183
This finding suggests that it would be more advantageous for defendants whose 
offenses place them in the upper two tiers of the sentencing table to plead guilty as part of 
a negotiated plea agreement offered by the prosecution than to go through the long 
process of a trial.  It also suggests that there is more at stake when a defendant chooses to 
gamble on the outcome of a trial.  A trial conviction raises the likelihood of receiving a 
sentence of incarceration, imposing a trial tax on the defendant who chooses to exercise 
his constitutional rights. 
 
The Effect of Offense Type Category 
 There were four categories of crimes that exerted a significant influence on the 
incarceration decision independent of the influence exerted by the presumptive sentence 
and the final criminal history score.  The categories representing fraud, deceit, and 
counterfeiting offenses, immigration offenses, and drug offenses each increased the 
probability of a defendant going to prison rather than receiving a non-incarceration 
alternative.  Immigration offenses had the largest effect, increasing the odds of receiving 
a prison sentence by three and one-half times in comparison to the reference category of 
“other” offenses.  On the other hand, the category representing larceny, embezzlement, 
theft, and money laundering offenses exerted a significant reduction in the likelihood of 
going to prison.  Meanwhile, the category representing robbery and firearms offenses 
produced a small positive coefficient, but it was not significant.  Taken as a whole, an 
increase in the explanatory power of the overall model with the inclusion of this variable 
suggests that all of the circumstances surrounding the instant offense were not entirely 
compensated for by the Guideline’s special offense characteristics and offense level 
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adjustments.  The offense itself still exerts a significant influence on the decision to 
incarcerate. 
 
The Effect of Judicial District Court Location 
Among the 94 district courts, all but three produced significant coefficients, the 
majority of which were negative coefficients, when the full model was regressed on all 
eleven fiscal years combined.  Only one district produced a significant positive 
coefficient—the western district of Wisconsin.  Among the districts that produced 
significant negative coefficients, indicating a decrease in the likelihood of receiving a 
prison sentence, defendants sentenced in the northern district of California had the lowest 
odds of imprisonment with an expected probability less than one-tenth as likely as 
defendants sentenced in the reference category of the district of Maine.  The districts of 
Oklahoma East (.099), Wisconsin East (.118), and Kentucky West (.131) also had very 
low odds of receiving a sentence of incarceration.  Thus, it appears that geographic 
location of sentencing does exert a significant effect on the in/out incarceration decision 
for many judicial districts, but these effects are, generally, in the same direction. 
 
The Effect of Sentencing Year 
The variable that captured the fiscal year of sentencing was also included in the 
full model to determine whether the year in which the defendant was sentenced exerted a 
significant effect on the incarceration outcome (see Table 7.1).  The year of sentencing 
produced significant negative coefficients during the first four fiscal years between 1993 
and 1996 in comparison to the midpoint fiscal year 1998, which was the reference 
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category.  The coefficients for fiscal years 1997 through 2001 were quite small and not 
very significantly different from the reference category.  However, during the final two 
fiscal years in the dataset, 2002 and 2003, the model produced coefficients that were both 
significant and positive, indicating increased odds of imprisonment for defendants 
sentenced during this period. 
Thus, the year in which the defendant was sentenced exerted an independent 
influence on the in/out incarceration decision that significantly decreased the likelihood 
of incarceration at the beginning of the study and significantly increased the likelihood of 
incarceration at the end of the study.  Fiscal year 2003 had the largest positive coefficient 
(.355), and fiscal year 1994 had the largest negative coefficient (-.246).  In other words, 
defendants sentenced in fiscal year 1994 had the lowest probability of receiving a prison 
sentence (.782), while defendants in fiscal year 2003 had the highest probability of 
receiving a prison sentence (1.425). 
In order to determine whether the coefficients were significantly different from 
one another, z scores were calculated between fiscal years 1993 and 2003 as well as 
between each of the ten consecutive pairs of fiscal years (Paternoster et al., 1998).4 The 
obtained z score between fiscal years 1993 and 2003 was negative and significant.  This 
value was larger than the critical t value, thus allowing for the null hypothesis of no 
difference between the coefficients produced for these two fiscal years to be rejected.  
Significant negative z scores were also obtained for four consecutive pairs of fiscal years 
between 1996 and 1997, 1999 and 2000, 2001 and 2002, and 2002 and 2003.  Hence, 
these z scores demonstrate that the odds changed over time from a decreased likelihood 
to an increased likelihood of incarceration.  Overall, defendants who were sentenced in 
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fiscal years 1993 had significantly different odds of receiving a sentence of incarceration 
than defendants who were sentenced in fiscal year 2003. 
 
The Length-of-Term Decision (Overall Results) 
The Effects of Gender and Race and Ethnicity 
When the full model is regressed on the entire eleven-year data set combined, the 
regression coefficients for gender, race, and ethnicity are all significant (see Table 7.2).  
Overall, female defendants received a decrease in average sentence length of nearly six 
months compared to male defendants, holding all other variables in the model constant.  
In comparison to the reference category of white defendants, defendants in the black 
racial category received 3.79 months longer average sentence lengths.  Hispanic 
defendants’ average sentence length is 1.99 months longer than white defendants.  
Defendants in the “other” racial category received prison sentences 2.83 months longer 
than white defendants.  Hence, among those defendants sentenced to a term of 
incarceration between fiscal years 1993 and 2003, the average sentence length was 
shortest among white defendants, followed by Hispanic and “other” race defendants, 
while black defendants received the longest average sentence length. 
 
The Effect of Type of Conviction 
The type of conviction (plea or trial) regression coefficient was positive and 
significant, and second only in magnitude to the presumptive sentence variable.  
Throughout the entire eleven-year period, the regression coefficient for this variable 
shows that, those defendants who were convicted by trial received a substantial increase 
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in average sentence length (32.4 months) compared to those defendants who pleaded 
guilty before going to trial.  Similar to the incarceration outcome, defendants who are 
convicted by a trial receive additional penalties for taking advantage of their 
constitutional rights.  In this case, it results in a sentence length more than two and one-
half years longer than the average sentence length of defendants who pleaded guilty. 
 
The Effect of Offense Type Category 
Overall, when the full model was regressed on the entire eleven-year data set, all 
five of the crime type categories produced significant coefficients.  These regression 
coefficients ranged from a decrease in the average sentence length of 9.5 months for 
larceny, embezzlement, theft, and money laundering offenses to an increase in the 
average sentence length of 10.8 months for robbery and firearms offenses.  Interestingly, 
the category for robbery and firearms offenses produced the only positive coefficient 
while the other four categories each produced negative coefficients. Thus, compared to 
the reference category of other offenses, defendants convicted of offenses included in the 
four categories of fraud, deceit, and counterfeiting offenses, larceny, embezzlement, theft, 
and money laundering offenses, immigration offenses, and drug offenses each received 
decreased average sentence lengths. 
 
The Effect of Judicial District Court Location 
The district court location where the defendant was sentenced produced a wide 
range of regression coefficients.  The district of Rhode Island was the excluded dummy 
variable for the 94 districts because it was located at the fiftieth percentile when the 
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districts were ranked by mean sentence length.  There were 28 district court dummy 
regression coefficients that were not significant and 65 were significant.  The significance 
of these regression coefficients indicates that geographic location of the federal district 
court did indeed significantly influence the average sentence length of the defendants in 
more than two-thirds of the district courts.  The difference in average sentence length 
ranged from a decrease of 16.3 months in Pennsylvania East district court to an increase 
of 13.1 months in the Wisconsin West district court.  More significant coefficients were 
negative (37) than were positive (28).  Overall, this difference of more than two years in 
average sentence length ranges meted out to the defendants in the federal courts indicates 
that sentencing is not stable across the federal judicial district courts throughout the 
eleven fiscal years in the study period. 
 
The Effect of Sentencing Year 
The year of sentencing variable was included in the full model using ten dummy 
variables to represent each year (fiscal year 1998 was not included).  These ten fiscal year 
dummy variables produced significant regression coefficients for five years: 1993, 1996, 
1999, 2002, and 2003.  Five of the ten fiscal years produced negative coefficients, 
indicating a relatively small decrease in the average sentence length of less than one 
month.  In the final fiscal year of sentencing, 2003, the regression coefficient was 
positive and significant, indicating an increase in the average sentence length of 2.6 
months.  Thus, the year in which the defendant was sentenced positively influenced the 
length of term decision in the first fiscal year, 1993, but exerted a negative influence for 
the next few years.  During the last three years of the study, between fiscal years 2001 
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through 2003, the sentencing year returned to exerting a positive influence on the length 
of term decision.  In the final fiscal year, 2003, the effect was nearly four times as large 
as it had been a decade earlier. 
In order to determine whether the coefficients were significantly different from 
one another, z scores were calculated between fiscal years 1993 and 2003 as well as 
between each of the ten consecutive pairs of fiscal years (Paternoster et al., 1998).  First, 
a z score was calculated to determine whether the increase in mean sentence length of 0.7 
months in fiscal year 1993 to 2.6 months in fiscal year 2003 was significant.  The 
obtained z score was significant, indicating that the null hypothesis of no difference in 
regression coefficients could be rejected.  The z score was also negative, opposite in 
direction to the predicted hypothesis that differences arising out of the year of sentencing 
variable would decrease over time, but instead the effect of year of sentencing increased 
over the study period.  While the overall z score was negative, z scores that tested for 
differences in consecutive fiscal year pairs resulted in three negative significant scores.  
These three significant z scores were between fiscal year pairs 1996 and 1997, 2001 and 
2002, and 2002 and 2003.  These z scores indicate that this trend occurred in the last few 
years of the dataset rather than during all eleven years in the study period. 
 
The Judicial Downward Departure Decision (Overall Results) 
The Effects of Gender and Race and Ethnicity 
 The parameter estimates in the full model give an overall picture of the 
probability of receiving judicial downward departures in federal sentencing outcomes for 
all eleven fiscal years together.  The parameter coefficients for each multinomial 
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regression model are displayed in Table 7.3.  In the full model, the coefficient for gender 
shows that, compared to male defendants, female defendants have a higher expected 
probability of receiving a judicial downward departure relative to receiving no departure.  
In essence, female defendants are nearly one and one-half times as likely to receive a 
judicial downward departure as male defendants.   
In addition, the coefficients for race and ethnicity variables show that Hispanic 
defendants have a decreased probability of receiving a judicial downward departure 
(0.909) compared to the reference category of white defendants.  Black defendants (.728) 
and defendants in the “other” racial category (.724) have an even lower expected 
probability of receiving a judicial downward departure relative to receiving no departure 
when all other variables in the model are held constant.  
 
The Effect of Type of Conviction 
 The coefficient for the type of conviction (plea or trial) resulted in intuitive 
changes in the effect of a one unit change on the log of the probability ratio.  The effect 
of a trial conviction continued to hamper defendants as it did in the other two sentencing 
outcomes of whether to incarcerate and how long to incarcerate the defendant.  As in the 
previous analyses, those defendants who pleaded guilty were the reference category for 
the type of conviction.  Compared to them, those defendants who were found guilty by 
trial had significantly decreased odds of receiving a judicial downward departure relative 
to receiving no departure.  This expected probability was decreased by a third (.672) for 
receiving a judicial downward departure relative to receiving no departure. 
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The Effect of Offense Type Category 
Interestingly, those defendants who were sentenced for offenses that had the 
highest offense levels were also more likely to receive judicial downward departures 
while those defendants who were sentenced for offenses associated with lower offense 
levels were less likely to receive a judicial downward departure.  The two crime type 
categories that produced significant negative coefficients, indicating a decreased 
likelihood of receiving a judicial downward departure, were the fraud, deceit, and 
counterfeiting offenses and the larceny, embezzlement, theft, and money laundering 
offenses.  The three crime type categories that produced significant positive coefficients, 
indicating an increase in the likelihood of receiving a judicial downward departure, were 
the immigration offenses, drug offenses, and robbery and firearms offenses. 
Notably, all of the coefficients for the five crime type categories were also 
significant.  Defendants convicted of offenses in the larceny, theft, embezzlement, and 
money laundering category had the lowest probability of receiving a downward departure 
relative to receiving no departure (0.694).  Defendants who were sentenced for 
immigration offenses had the highest probability of receiving a judicial downward 
departure relative to receiving no departure (1.421). 
 
The Effect of Judicial District Court Location 
 In this regression model, the district of Pennsylvania East was selected to be the 
reference category because it fell in the fiftieth percentile when the districts were sorted 
based on their percentage of judicial downward departures.  Overall, the majority (80) of 
the district courts where the defendant was sentenced produced significant coefficients, 
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indicating that geographic location exerted a significant effect on the sentencing outcome 
of whether to grant a judicial downward departure decision.  Only 13 district court 
coefficients were not significant.  Among the significant coefficients, three-fourths (62) 
were negative and one-fourth (18) were positive.  Hence, the influence of location of the 
district court where the defendant was sentenced lowered the expected probability for 
defendants in many district courts, raised the expected probability for defendants in some 
other district courts, and had no impact on the expected probability for defendants in still 
a few other district courts for receiving judicial downward departures relative to receiving 
no departures.  Among those district courts which produced significant negative 
coefficients, signaling lower or decreased probabilities of defendants sentenced in these 
courts receiving judicial downward departures, this decreased probability ranged from 
0.179 for the district of Guam and 0.189 for the Wisconsin West district court to 0.852 
for the district of Utah and 0.884 for the Ohio North district court.  Among those district 
courts with significantly positive or increased probabilities, this ranged widely from 
1.198 for the North Dakota district court to 9.329 for the Arizona district court. 
 
The Effect of Sentencing Year 
 The coefficients representing the fiscal year of sentencing were all significant.  
Fiscal year 1998 was used as the reference category since it falls in the middle.  The first 
five fiscal years (1993-1997) are all negative, but this decreases incrementally with each 
succeeding year.  Then, beginning in fiscal year 1999, the coefficients are positive and 
significant.  These positive coefficients increase in magnitude each year through fiscal 
year 2001.  In fiscal year 2002, the coefficient is still positive and significant, but drops 
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down to levels of preceding fiscal years.  Finally, for fiscal year 2003, the coefficient 
produced in the model is again negative and significant.   
Thus, defendants sentenced in the first five fiscal years had decreased 
probabilities of receiving judicial downward departures relative to receiving no departure, 
but this decreased probability shrank with each fiscal year.  Meanwhile, those defendants 
sentenced between 1999 and 2002 all had greater expected probabilities of receiving 
judicial downward departures relative to receiving no departure, and these probabilities 
increased each year.  These results clearly show that fiscal year of sentencing exercises a 
significant and independent effect on the probability of receiving a judicial downward 
departure, emphasizing the need to study each subset of fiscal year data separately in 
order to analyze the effects of these variables over time.   
This markedly discernable trend was reinforced with the overall obtained z score 
value of -15.774.  This significant value allowed for the null hypothesis of no difference 
between fiscal years 1993 and 2003 to be rejected easily.  The effect of sentencing year 
changed over time, or in other words, it exercised a significantly different effect on the 
judicial downward departure decision depending on the year in which the defendant was 
sentenced.  This finding was underscored by the results of the tests of the regression 
coefficients for consecutive pairs of fiscal years.  All ten pairs obtained significant z 
score values, indicating that significant changes occurred annually in the probability of 
receiving a judicial downward departure. 
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SECTION 2.  Results of the Change Over Time Analysis 
The In/Out Decision (Change Over Time Results) 
The Effects of Gender and Race and Ethnicity 
To examine the effects of gender and race and ethnicity on the incarceration 
decision over time, the full logistic regression model was regressed on each of the eleven 
individual fiscal years between 1993 and 2003.  The corresponding parameter estimates 
of these eleven models are displayed in Table 7.4.  For female defendants, the model 
produced significant negative coefficients during all eleven fiscal years.  These negative 
coefficients indicate that gender exerted a significant effect on the incarceration decision 
throughout the entire study period. The size of the coefficients produced for each fiscal 
year suggests that differences in the likelihood of male and female defendants receiving a 
sentence of incarceration were experiencing a convergence between 1993 and 2000, 
when the smallest coefficient was produced.  However, these differences began to 
diverge during the final three years of the study, returning to likelihood levels similar to 
that found in the first few years of the study. 
The effect of race and ethnicity produced positive and significant coefficients for 
the incarceration decision, suggesting that minority status exerted an independent 
influence on the decision to incarcerate.  Among black defendants, these positive 
coefficients were significant in eight of the eleven fiscal years.  The coefficients produced 
for Hispanic defendants were similarly positive, indicating an increased probability of 
receiving a sentence of incarceration.  However, all but one of the eleven coefficients for 
ethnicity were highly significant (FY 1995).  The coefficients produced for the “other” 
racial category were positive in fiscal year 1993, but negative in the ten subsequent fiscal 
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years.  Moreover, these coefficients were only sporadically significant, during four fiscal 
years in the middle period of the study (1996-1999) and during the final fiscal year, 2003.  
Thus, Hispanic defendants experienced the most significant and continuous effect on the 
probability of incarceration, followed closely by black defendants.  Among defendants of 
other races, the race effect was only significant during a few years.  However, it did 
change direction from an increased likelihood in fiscal year 1993 to negative and 
significant, indicating a decreased likelihood of incarceration, in fiscal year 2003. 
To determine whether the coefficients were significantly different from one 
another, z scores were calculated between fiscal years 1993 and 2003 as well as between 
each of the ten consecutive pairs of fiscal years (Paternoster et al., 1998; Brame et al., 
1998).  The z test statistic facilitates the examination of the empirical relationship 
between two independent samples.  For purposes of this study, the independent samples 
were different fiscal year subsets.  Thus, z scores were calculated to verify whether the 
predicted differences in the incarceration decision due to gender, race, and ethnicity 
differences would diminish over time.   
The results of the z tests calculated between the gender coefficients were negative 
and significant, indicating that the null hypothesis of equality between the coefficients for 
fiscal years 1993 and 2003 could be rejected.  In other words, differences in the 
likelihood of receiving incarceration among female defendants did experience change 
over time.  However, none of the ten matched pairs of consecutive fiscal years produced 
significant z scores.  Thus, while the overall change was significant, the change from year 
to year was only incremental and not significant. 
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Obtained z scores for blacks, Hispanics, and defendants of “other” racial 
categories were all positive and significant, indicating that the influence of race and 
ethnicity did experience significant change over time.  Additionally, z scores were 
calculated for each pair of consecutive fiscal years (see Table 7.2).  These ten z scores 
were calculated to measure the significance of change from year to year.  For black 
defendants, significant z scores were obtained between fiscal year pairs 1996 and 1997, 
1997 and 1998, and 2001 and 2002.  For both Hispanic defendants and “other” race 
defendants, one obtained z score for consecutive pairs of fiscal years was significant.  For 
Hispanic defendants, this was between fiscal year pairs 1994 and 1995.  For other race 
defendants, this was between 1999 and 2000. 
 
The Effect of Type of Conviction 
The variable representing a trial conviction produced positive coefficients when 
the full model was regressed on each individual fiscal year of data from 1993 through 
2003 (see Table 7.5).  These coefficients were significant in every year except one: fiscal 
year 2002.  Thus, it appears that being found guilty by trial hindered those defendants in 
the upper zones of the sentencing table in almost every year of the data set, although the 
proportion of defendants who chose such a route were quite small.   
The obtained z score between fiscal years 1993 and 2003 was not significant, 
indicating a failure to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients were equivalent.  The 
increased likelihood of receiving a sentence of incarceration for those defendants who 
were found guilty at trial remained relatively stable throughout the eleven years of the 
study.  Indeed, none of the ten scores obtained for each pair of consecutive fiscal years 
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were significant.  In other words, there was no significant change over time on the 
probability of incarceration owing to the influence exerted by the defendant’s mode of 
conviction. 
 
The Effect of Offense Type Category 
 Whether the likelihood of incarceration was increased or decreased by this 
variable depended on the category in which the offense was located.  Similarly, the effect 
on the incarceration decision exerted by each crime type category varied when it was 
included in the full model and regressed on each individual fiscal year of data to 
determine what changes occurred over time (see Table 7.5).  The crime type category 
representing fraud, deceit, and counterfeiting offenses produced positive coefficients in 
all eleven fiscal years, and was significant in all but one fiscal year, 1996.  These 
coefficients grew in magnitude and significance over time, indicating an increasingly 
greater probability of receiving a sentence of incarceration over the study period.  On the 
other hand, the category representing larceny, embezzlement, theft, and money 
laundering offenses produced negative coefficients for all eleven fiscal years. The 
coefficient for fiscal year 1996 was the only significant coefficient for the first seven 
years of the study, but the coefficients produced for the final four fiscal years were all 
significant.  Hence, for this crime type, the probability of receiving a sentence of 
incarceration declined over time. 
The category for immigration offenses was positive and significant during all 
eleven fiscal years, indicating a stable increase in the odds of being imprisoned for these 
types of offenses.  Drug offenses also produced positive coefficients during all eleven 
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fiscal years, but these increased probabilities were only significant during five of the 
eleven fiscal years, namely, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1999, and 2003.  The coefficients that 
were produced for the crime type category of robbery and firearms offenses began in the 
positive direction, indicating an increase in the probability of imprisonment, but ended in 
the negative direction, indicating a decrease in the probability of imprisonment.  
However, only two of the eleven coefficients were significant, for fiscal years 1994 and 
2001.  Thus, these fluctuating probabilities for robbery and firearms offenses did not 
exert a very significant influence on the incarceration decision except during two fiscal 
years near the beginning and end of the study. 
To determine whether the coefficients were significantly different from one 
another, z scores were calculated between fiscal years 1993 and 2003 as well as between 
each of the ten consecutive pairs of fiscal years (Paternoster et al., 1998; Brame et al., 
1998) for each crime type category.  None of the crime type categories produced 
significant z scores between fiscal years 1993 and 2003, which would allow for the 
rejection of the null hypothesis of no difference between years. 
When z scores were calculated for consecutive fiscal year pairs, the fraud, deceit, 
and counterfeiting category had two significant z scores, between fiscal year pairs 1996 
to 1997 and 2000 to 2001.  The larceny, embezzlement, theft, and money laundering 
offenses category produced one significant z score between fiscal years 1996 to 1997.  
The immigration offenses category produced five significant z scores pairs in the middle 
of the study period.  Neither the drug offenses category nor the robbery and firearms 
offenses category produced any significant z scores during the study period.  The overall 
lack of significant z scores demonstrates that the influence exerted by the type of offense 
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for which the defendant was sentenced on the decision to incarcerate did not undergo 
substantial change over time.  For the most part, the influence of type of offense 
remained constant, except in the case of immigration offenses. 
 
The Effect of Judicial District Court Location 
When the full model was regressed on each individual fiscal year, the differences 
in odds ratios among the district courts appeared to be consistent over time.  In other 
words, when the odds of receiving a non-prison sentence were lower for defendants in 
certain district courts, these odds continued to be lower than for defendants in other 
district courts across all the fiscal years in the data set.  In fiscal year 1993, 65 of the 94 
districts produced significant coefficients, and in fiscal year 2003, 69 of the 94 districts 
produced significant coefficients. 
Whether the magnitude of district court coefficients was large enough to merit 
significance in the model fluctuated from year to year throughout the eleven fiscal year 
study period.  During fiscal years 1996 and 1997, the district court variable only 
produced 16 and 13 significant coefficients respectively.  However, during all other fiscal 
years in the study period, the number of significant coefficients produced in the full 
logistic model ranged from 38 in fiscal year 1999 to 87 in fiscal year 2001.  Therefore, a 
large number of districts exerted a significant influence on the incarceration decision for 
most of the years included in the study period. 
The obtained z scores for the difference in district coefficients were significant in 
just 17 of the 94 districts, indicating significant change over time.  Eight of these were 
significant obtained z scores were positive and nine were negative.  These significant z 
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scores were for the districts of Connecticut, Delaware, Louisiana East, Texas West, 
California Central, Oklahoma East, Oklahoma West, and Florida North.  The nine 
districts with significant negative obtained z scores were Maryland, Ohio North, Indiana 
North, Wisconsin East, Arkansas West, Iowa North, Arizona, Guam, and Wyoming. 
 
The Length-of-Term Decision (Change Over Time Results) 
The Effects of Gender and Race and Ethnicity 
During the eleven fiscal years in the data set, the general trend of the coefficients 
produced by the OLS regression model suggests that mean sentence length between 
genders decreased by approximately two months (see Table 7.6).  Whereas the difference 
in average sentence length between male and female defendants was 6.8 months in fiscal 
year 1993, it was reduced to 4.9 months by fiscal year 2003.  Notably, in every fiscal 
year, each of the obtained coefficients in mean sentence length between genders 
remained significant.  Nor did the differences disappear by the end of the study period as 
hypothesized.  A z test was conducted to determine whether there was a significant 
difference between the regression coefficients in fiscal years 1993 and 2003.  The 
obtained z statistic was equal to the critical t value needed for significance, indicating that 
the null hypothesis of no difference between the two regression coefficients could be 
rejected.  At the same time, however, these persistent differences in mean sentence length 
between genders do not support the prediction that this type of disparity would vanish 
under the promulgation and full implementation of the Sentencing Guidelines.  This lack 
of substantial change is reinforced by the finding of non-significant z scores when each 
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consecutive pair of fiscal years was tested.  None of the ten z scores was significant, 
indicating very minor fluctuations from year to year. 
Analysis of the full OLS regression model over time revealed that, beginning in 
fiscal year 1993, the average sentence length of black defendants was 5.5 months longer 
than for white defendants (see Table 7.6).  Likewise, the average sentence length of 
Hispanic defendants was 2.6 months longer than for white defendants in fiscal year 1993.  
Between 1993 and 1997, the mean sentence lengths for blacks and Hispanics did 
decrease, if somewhat unevenly.  Thus, by fiscal year 1997, the mean sentence length for 
black defendants had decreased to 2.9 months longer than for white defendants, and the 
mean sentence length for Hispanic defendants had decreased to only 1.7 months longer 
than for white defendants.  The last six fiscal years, from 1998 through 2003, portrayed a 
different picture of the average sentence length between defendants of different races and 
ethnicities.  During these years, the mean sentence length of black defendants increased 
and held steady at around four months greater than for white defendants.  Meanwhile, the 
mean sentence length for Hispanic defendants increased to a high of 3.1 months greater 
than for white defendants in fiscal year 2000 before dropping down to a low mark of just 
one and one-half months greater than white defendants in fiscal year 2003.  Defendants in 
the “other” racial category were sentenced to terms 4.3 months greater than white 
defendants in fiscal year 1993, and this gradually decreased to 2.1 months greater than 
white defendants in fiscal year 2003. 
Overall, neither the mean sentence lengths of black, Hispanic, nor “other” race 
defendants declined enough over the eleven fiscal years in the study period to converge 
with the mean sentence length of white defendants.  A z test was performed for each 
202
racial and ethnic category to verify whether the differences in mean sentence lengths 
between fiscal years 1993 and 2003 was significant enough to reject the null hypothesis 
of no difference between regression coefficients.  For both Hispanic and “other” race 
defendants, the obtained z statistic was not significant, indicating a failure to reject the 
null hypothesis that significant differences in mean sentence length would change over 
time.  For black defendants, the obtained z statistic was both positive and significant, 
indicating that the null hypothesis of no difference over time could be rejected.  Thus, 
black defendants did experience a significant decrease in mean sentence length over time 
in comparison to similarly-situated white defendants.   
The significance in the difference between the two regression coefficients for 
black defendants shared a similar pattern with the gender coefficients described above.  
When regression coefficients for consecutive pairs for fiscal years were tested, none of 
the ten resulting z scores for black defendants were significant.  Only one obtained z 
score for Hispanic defendants was significant.  This was for fiscal year pairs 2000 and 
2001.  The “other” race category of defendants also produced one significant z score 
between fiscal year pairs 1999 and 2000.  Overall, the incremental changes from year to 
year for race and ethnicity were not significant.  This finding of non-significance for each 
consecutive pair of fiscal years was relatively stable for black, Hispanic, and “other” race 
defendants. 
 
The Effect of Type of Conviction 
When the full model was regressed on each individual fiscal year, the coefficient 
for the type of disposition variable was significant during all eleven fiscal years (see 
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Table 7.7).  This coefficient was also the largest positive coefficient in the model.  
Interpreting this coefficient, being found guilty by trial rather than pleading guilty 
increased the mean sentence length by as much as 26 to 36 months, depending on the 
year of sentencing.  The largest coefficient was for this variable was produced in fiscal 
year 1996, when being found guilty by trial increased a defendant’s average sentence 
length by 36.7 months.  The smallest coefficient was produced in fiscal year 2001, 
indicating that being found guilty at trial increased the mean sentence length received by 
the defendant at sentencing by 26.6 months.   
The regression coefficients for fiscal years 1993 and 2003 were nearly identical, 
increasing a defendant’s sentence length by nearly 29 months for a trial conviction.  
When a z test was performed to test whether there was a significant difference between 
the regression coefficients for fiscal years 1993 and 2003, it was not significant, 
indicating that the null hypothesis of no difference could not be rejected.  Therefore, the 
prediction that differences in mean sentence length, which occurred as a result of the 
mode of conviction, would disappear over time with the full implementation of the 
Guidelines was not supported by the coefficients produced in this analysis.   
While the overall z score produced a non-significant statistic, six of the ten pair of 
consecutive fiscal years did produce significant differences.  Three of these z scores were 
positive, and three were negative.  The positive z scores were obtained for fiscal year 
pairs 1994 to 1995, 1996 to 1997, and 1999 to 2000.  The negative z scores were obtained 
for fiscal year pairs 1993 to 1994, 1995 to 1996, and 2001 to 2002.  These significant z 
scores indicate that the influence on sentence length exerted by the mode of conviction 
did fluctuate significantly from year to year. 
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The Effect of Offense Type Category 
When the full OLS model was regressed on each individual fiscal year to measure 
the effects of offense type on sentence length over time, these models also produced 
some interesting results (see Table 7.7).  Both the categories for fraud, deceit, and 
counterfeiting offenses and larceny, embezzlement, theft, and money laundering offenses 
produced negative coefficients in fiscal year 1993, indicating a decrease in the average 
sentence length of about three months.  By fiscal year 2003, however, these negative 
coefficients had increased so that defendants convicted of these offense types received 
decreased average sentence lengths of about ten months.  The coefficients produced for 
immigration offenses also increased over time, from -5.9 months in fiscal year 1993 to -
7.2 months in fiscal year 2003.  The coefficients produced for drug offenses were not 
significant for the first two years, but they also followed a similar pattern and became 
increasingly negative over time.  By fiscal year 2003, drug offenses produced a 
significant coefficient of -5.8 months.  The category of robbery and firearms offenses was 
the only category that declined over time.  This category’s coefficient was positive and 
indicated an increase in mean sentence length of 13.5 months in fiscal year 1993 but 
declined to 5.1 months in fiscal year 2003. 
Obtained z statistics for each of these crime type categories between fiscal years 
1993 and 2003 revealed that immigration offenses was the only category that did not 
produce a significant z score, indicating that coefficients produced by the other four 
categories were significantly different enough to reject the null hypotheses of no 
difference between regression coefficients over time.  However, only the robbery and 
firearms offenses category was in the direction predicted by the hypothesis that the 
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coefficients would decrease over time.  The other categories produced significant 
increases in their coefficients over time, contrary to the original hypothesized change. 
All of the crime type categories produced at least one significant z score when the 
regression coefficients from consecutive pairs of fiscal years were tested.  The fraud, 
deceit, and counterfeiting offenses category produced significant z scores between fiscal 
years 2000 and 2001 and 2002 and 2003.  Both the larceny, embezzlement, theft, and 
money laundering offenses category and the drug offenses category produced a 
significant z score between fiscal years 1999 and 2000.  The immigration offenses 
category produced two significant z scores: between fiscal years 1999 and 2000 and 
between 2000 and 2001.  The robbery and firearms offenses category also produced two 
significant z scores: between fiscal years 1998 and 1999 and between 2000 and 2001. 
 
The Effect of Judicial District Court Location 
The coefficients representing the judicial district courts where the defendants 
were sentenced were analyzed over time by regressing the full OLS model on each 
individual fiscal year.  The number of significant coefficients fluctuated from year to 
year.  In fiscal year 1993, 21 district courts produced significant coefficients.  In fiscal 
year 2002, 35 district courts produced significant coefficients, and 24 district courts 
produced significant coefficients in fiscal year 2003.  The majority of these significant 
coefficients in each of the eleven fiscal years were negative.  The direction and 
significance of these coefficients indicates that the geographic location of sentencing was 
indeed correlated with the mean sentence length for about one-third of judicial district 
courts by the end of the study period.  Furthermore, during each fiscal year, significant 
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differences in sentence length occurred among the district courts.  For example, in fiscal 
year 2003, these significant effects on the mean sentence length ranged from a decrease 
of more than six months for ten district courts to an increase of ten or more months for 
seven district courts. 
A z test was conducted on each of the 94 district courts to determine whether 
there was a significant difference in the regression coefficients that were produced when 
the full model was regressed on fiscal years 1993 and 2003.  Of these 94 test statistics, 
only ten obtained z scores were significant.  Seven of these significant z scores were 
positive and three were negative.  Overall, while a small handful of district courts 
experienced a significant difference in their effects on mean sentence length over time, 
only one district court reduced its significant effect of location on mean sentence length 
to a non-significant effect by fiscal year 2003 (North Carolina East). 
 
The Judicial Downward Departure Decision (Change Over Time Results) 
The Effects of Gender and Race and Ethnicity 
For each fiscal year, coefficients were derived for female defendants in the full 
multinomial regression model compared to the reference category of male defendants 
(see Table 7.8).  In all eleven fiscal years, the coefficients for female defendants were 
positive and significant, suggesting that female defendants had increased probabilities of 
receiving judicial downward departures compared to male defendants.  This significant 
expected probability ranged from 1.324 in fiscal year 1999 to 1.631 in fiscal year 1994.  
The results of regressing the full model on each fiscal year demonstrate clearly that the 
expected probability of receiving judicial downward departures was significantly higher 
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for female defendants compared to male defendants relative to receiving no departure, 
and remained so for all eleven fiscal years of the data set. 
To test the hypothesis that gender differences would become non-significant over 
time, a z score was calculated from the regression coefficients in fiscal years 1993 and 
2003.  The obtained z statistic was not significant (-1.431), indicating that there was no 
observed convergence in the probabilities over time.  Moreover, consecutive pairs of 
fiscal years were also tested for differences between regression coefficients.  None of the 
ten consecutive fiscal year pairs produced regression coefficients that were different 
enough to obtain a significant z score. 
When the data set was divided by each of the eleven fiscal years and regressed 
through the multinomial logistic regression procedure, interesting trends over time in the 
effect of race and ethnicity on the decision to grant judicial downward departures 
emerged (see Table 7.8).  Among black defendants, the coefficients representing the 
expected probability of receiving a judicial downward departure were negative and 
significant during every fiscal year.  Hence, compared to white defendants, black 
defendants had a significantly decreased probability of receiving a judicial downward 
departure, regardless of the year of sentencing.  This decreased likelihood over time was 
reinforced through the obtained z score which was used to test the null hypothesis of no 
differences between the regression coefficients in fiscal years 1993 and 2003.  The z 
statistic was not significant (-0.039), indicating that the null hypothesis could not be 
rejected because there was no significant change over time in the probability of black 
defendants receiving a judicial downward departure.  None of the obtained z scores for 
the ten pairs of consecutive fiscal years for black defendants were significant either. 
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The effect of ethnicity on the probability of Hispanic defendants receiving judicial 
downward departures compared to white defendants relative to receiving no departure 
showed more variation over time.  The coefficients produced for Hispanic defendants 
were significant in all but five fiscal years—1997 through 2001.  The coefficients were 
also negative during all eleven fiscal years.  While the trend in the first few fiscal years 
indicated that the probability of receiving judicial downward departures were merging for 
white and Hispanic defendants, this trend did not carry over during the second half of the 
fiscal years in the data set.  Instead, the differences in expected probabilities began to 
diverge, increasing the disparity between white and Hispanic defendants.  Thus, for 
Hispanic defendants, the hypothesis of convergence was supported in the first half of the 
study, but was not supported by the data during the latter half of the fiscal years in the 
study. 
Similarly, the obtained z score testing the difference between the regression 
coefficients in fiscal years 1993 and 2003 was not significant (-1.615), indicating that 
Hispanic defendants in fiscal year 2003 faced comparable decreased probabilities of 
receiving a judicial downward departure as they had faced eleven years earlier in fiscal 
year 1993.  Nor were any of the obtained z scores for the ten pairs of consecutive fiscal 
years for Hispanic defendants significant either. 
Finally, the effect of race of defendants in the “other” race category told a similar 
story.  All of the eleven coefficients were negative, indicating a decreased likelihood of 
receiving a judicial downward departure at sentencing.  These coefficients were 
significant in all fiscal years except one, 1996.  Obtained z scores between fiscal years 
1993 and 2003 were not significant, nor were the z scores that were calculated for the ten 
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consecutive fiscal year pairs.  Thus, the odds of receiving a judicial downward departure 
for “other” race defendants experience very little change over time. 
 
The Effect of Type of Conviction 
Those defendants who were convicted by trial rather than pleading guilty had 
decreased probabilities of receiving a judicial downward departure relative to receiving 
no departure for all eleven fiscal years in the study (see Table 7.9).  The coefficients 
produced by the full model were negative and significant for every fiscal year, and the 
probabilities ranged only from .718 in fiscal year 1993 to .549 in fiscal year 2003.  Thus, 
defendants who were convicted in a trial proceeding were about one-third less likely to 
receive a judicial downward departure in fiscal year 1993, and this likelihood decreased 
further over time so that defendants who were convicted by trial in fiscal year 2003 were 
only half as likely to receive a judicial downward departure at sentencing. 
The obtained z statistic for this set of coefficients was significant (2.414), 
indicating that the likelihood of receiving a judicial downward departure for those 
defendants who were found guilty by a trial did experience an overall change between 
fiscal year 1993 and 2003.  The change between consecutive fiscal year pairs was quite 
small, however, so that none of the ten z scores were significant. 
 
The Effect of Offense Type Category 
 When analyzed by fiscal year, the offense type category for which the defendant 
was sentenced portrays a similar picture to when the entire data set was analyzed together 
(see table 7.9).  It also highlights the exceptional trend in judicial downward departures 
210
for defendants sentenced for immigration offenses.  The coefficients produced for the 
crime type category representing fraud, deceit, and counterfeiting offenses were negative 
in all eleven fiscal years, and significant in all but one year, namely fiscal year 2001.  The 
coefficients produced for the crime type category representing larceny, embezzlement, 
theft, and money laundering offenses were negative and significant in all eleven fiscal 
years.  The drug offenses category produced negative coefficients at either end of the 
study, but positive coefficients between fiscal years 1995 and 2002.  Five of last six fiscal 
years in the study produced significant coefficients.  The coefficients produced for the 
crime type category representing robbery and firearms offenses were positive during all 
eleven fiscal years except one, namely fiscal year 1997.  Similar to the coefficients for 
drug offenses, the coefficients for robbery and firearms offenses were significant during 
the last six fiscal years.  The coefficient for fiscal year 1993 was also positive and 
significant. 
Meanwhile, the coefficients produced for the crime type category representing 
immigration offenses was significant in all but two of the eleven fiscal years.  These 
coefficients were negative during the first three fiscal years in the study period (1993-
1996), but changed direction and became mostly positive and significant in all eight 
succeeding fiscal years.  This remarkable trend in the likelihood of receiving judicial 
downward departures for defendants sentenced for immigration crimes suggests that the 
sentencing officials were not in agreement with changes in penalties associated with 
immigration laws that took effect in the mid to late 1990s. 
Moreover, this pronounced trend in the probability of receiving a judicial 
downward departure for defendants who are sentenced for immigration offenses was 
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confirmed through the use of a z test.  The obtained z score for immigration offenses was 
significant (-8.091), indicating that the null hypothesis of no difference in the regression 
coefficients from fiscal year 1993 and 2003 could be rejected.  In fact, the crime type 
category representing immigration offenses was the only category that obtained a 
significant z statistic, demonstrating that the probability of receiving a judicial downward 
departure, when convicted of an immigration offense, was significantly different in fiscal 
year 2003 than it was eleven years earlier in fiscal year 1993.  The other four crime type 
categories did not obtain significant z scores, suggesting that the effects of these offenses 
on the likelihood of receiving a judicial downward departure was relatively stable over 
time when compared to the reference category.  
When z tests were conducted on consecutive pairs of fiscal years, the fraud, 
deceit, and counterfeiting offenses category was the only category that did not produce 
any significant z scores.  The regression coefficients for larceny, embezzlement, theft, 
and money laundering offenses category produced significant z statistics for three fiscal 
year pairs, 1995 to 1996, 2000 to 2001, and 2001 to 2002.  The robbery and firearms 
offenses category produced one significant z scores, between fiscal year pairs 2002 to 
2003.  The significant obtained z scores for the immigration offenses category occurred 
in fiscal year pairs 1994 to 1995, 1997 to 1998, and in 1998 to 1999.  The significant 
obtained z scores for the drug offenses category occurred in fiscal years 2000 to 2001 and 
in 2002 to 2003. 
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The Effect of Judicial District Court Location 
 The district court where the defendant was sentenced produced a substantially 
varied number of significant coefficients from year to year when the full model was 
regressed on each individual fiscal year.  During three fiscal years, fewer than one-half of 
the 94 districts produced significant coefficients.  During the other eight fiscal years, 
significant coefficients were produced by 52 to 75 of the districts.  Thus, in every fiscal 
year, there were a substantial number of districts where the location of sentencing was 
significantly correlated with the probability of receiving a judicial downward departure 
relative to receiving no departure.  Overall, defendants sentenced in one-third to two-
thirds of district courts, depending on the fiscal year, experienced a geographic effect.  In 
other words, holding all other factors constant, a defendant’s likelihood of receiving a 
judicial downward departure relative to receiving no departure was significantly 
influenced by the geographic location of the sentencing court. 
 As a final test of the influence of district court location in the decision to grant a 
departure, z scores were calculated for all the districts to test whether their regression 
coefficients changed significantly over the eleven fiscal years in the study period.  
Significant z values were obtained for 52 of the district courts, the vast majority of which 
were positive (51 of the 52).  This punctuated result suggests that the influence of district 
court location was not static over time for the majority of district courts.  Rather, the 
influence of location on the departure decision altered between fiscal years 1993 and 
2003, and many of these transformations were characterized by a marked change from 
non-significance to significance. 
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Summary of Findings 
 The results of these analyses present clear evidence that a number of factors are 
exerting a significant influence on the sentencing decision process, in addition to the final 
offense level score and criminal history category associated with the federal sentencing 
guidelines.  The amount of influence these factors exerted in the sentencing decision was 
examined at three points: the decision whether or not to incarcerate, the decision 
regarding the length of the term of incarceration, and the decision regarding the bestowal 
of a judicial downward departure.  Most importantly, these factors were measured in the 
aggregate using over a decade of sentencing data between fiscal years 1993 and 2003, as 
well as annually using individual fiscal year subsets to analyze changes which may have 
occurred over time.  For this reason, the results of the multivariate analyses presented 
sentencing outcomes within the guidelines regime as both an overall portrait and as 
continuous snapshots that were produced over time.  The outcome of this two-pronged 
approach was to capture the sentencing process as a continuously evolving mechanism 
during this period, promoted by the guideline’s development and full hegemony in the 
federal court system. 
 The primary variables of interest to this study were the gender, race, and ethnicity 
of the defendants sentenced under the guidelines.  These extra-legal characteristics were 
shown to have a significant influence on all three sentencing decisions, adding support to 
previous studies that have used smaller data sets, reduced time frames, or otherwise 
limited their data sets in various manners.  While the overall findings were not very 
surprising, the way sentencing outcomes were influenced by these factors over time did 
produce some interesting results. 
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The influence of gender significantly influenced the incarceration decision 
throughout the entire study period, but the magnitude of its influence declined over time 
before increasing in strength during the final three years.  At the same time, the 
significant influence of gender actually increased over time for the departure decision.  
Regarding the length-of-term decision, the influence of gender did diminish enough to 
merit a significant z score, but its diminished effects did not ever approach the 
hypothesized convergence with male defendants. 
Likewise, the influence of race and ethnicity was significant in the overall 
analysis, but these effects eroded over time for the incarceration decision.  However, 
neither the effect of race nor ethnicity exhibited substantial change over time in the 
departure decision.  Black defendants experienced a significant decrease in mean 
sentence length in comparison to white defendants, but it did not experience the 
hypothesized convergence either.  Meanwhile, Hispanic defendants did not experience a 
significant mean sentence length reduction in comparison to white defendants when 
analyzing the length of term decision over time. 
 The method of conviction (pleading guilty versus trial conviction) exercised a 
highly significant influence on all three decision-making points of sentencing.  
Defendants who were convicted by trial rather than pleading guilty experienced 
significantly harsher outcomes in the decision to incarcerate, the length of the prison 
term, and in the receipt of judicial downward departures.  There was a slight decline in 
the effect of a trial conviction over time so that, after eleven years, the difference was 
significant, although the effect had still not diminished enough to become non-significant 
during the final fiscal year. 
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The type of offense for which the defendant was sentenced also exercised a 
significant influence on the three sentencing outcome decisions, but the amount of 
influence varied depending on the category.  For the incarceration decision, only the 
category of fraud, deceit, and counterfeiting offenses exhibited significant change over 
time, but this was in the opposite direction predicted.  Defendants sentenced for these 
offenses were more likely to receive a sentence of incarceration at the end of the study 
period than were defendants sentenced at the beginning. 
For the length of term decision, all offense type categories except immigration 
exhibited significant change over time.  However, only the change in the category of 
robbery and firearms offenses was in the direction predicted by the hypotheses.  The 
other three crime type categories exhibited increased divergence over time.  Finally, 
regarding the departure decision, immigration offenses was the only category to exhibit 
significant change over time, but this change was so dramatic that it converged within the 
first three years and then continued upward in a drastic divergence. 
 The geographic location of sentencing was captured by the district court variable 
and represented 94 distinct locations across the United States and its protected territories.  
In both the overall analysis and the year-by-year analysis, there were numerous districts 
that significantly influenced the sentencing outcomes of the defendants in their respective 
courts.  For some districts, this effect was minimal, but for others it was surprisingly 
substantial.  While this effect of location was not pronounced enough to radically alter 
the incarceration or length-of-term decisions over time, there was a significant difference 
over time in its influence on the departure decision. 
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The effect of time itself was the final variable of interest in the present study.  For 
the incarceration decision, seven fiscal years produced significant coefficients, indicating 
that when the defendant was sentenced significantly influenced the probability of 
imprisonment.  Nor did this influence diminish over time as originally hypothesized.  The 
year of sentencing began and ended significantly for the length-of-term decision, but, in 
the interim, half of the fiscal years did not produce significant coefficients.  The effect of 
fiscal year of sentencing on the length-of-term decision fluctuated quite a bit over the 
study period, and in the end, was in the direction of divergence rather than convergence.  
Lastly, the departure decision was significantly influenced by the fiscal year in which it 
occurred for every year in the study.  It also exhibited significant change over time, but 






Table 7.1.  Logistic Regression Models for In/Out Decision, FY1993-2003 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Variable  B / (S.E.)     Exp(B)       B / (S.E.)     Exp(B)     B / (S.E.)     Exp(B) 
Female -.715** .489 -.431** .650 -.393** .675 
 (.017)  (.019)  (.020) 
Black .407** 1.503 .252** 1.286 .197** 1.218 
 (.019)  (.021)  (.023) 
Hispanic 1.674** 5.335 1.106** 3.021 .353** 1.423 
 (.018)  (.022)  (.030) 
Other Race .366** 1.441 .318** 1.375 -.174** .840 
 (.031)  (.034)  (.040) 
Criminal History   .701** 2.017 .698** 2.009 
 (.010)  (.011) 
Presumptive Sentence   .151** 1.163 .187** 1.206 
 (.003)  (.004) 
Fraud Crimes   .447** 1.563 .432** 1.540 
 (.027)  (.029) 
Larceny & Theft   -.246** .782 -.221** .801 
 (.032)  (.033) 
Immigration   1.886** 6.592 1.257** 3.515 
 (.033)  (.037) 
Drug Crimes   .469** 1.598 .270** 1.311  
 (.034)  (.036) 
Robbery & Firearms   .115* 1.398 .010 1.010  
 (.060)  (.063) 
Trial Conviction   .513** 1.670 .640** 1.897 
 (.196)  (.058) 
2+ Conviction Counts   .169 1.184 .258** 1.294 
 (.026)  (.028) 
Non-US Citizen     1.279** 3.594 
 (.027) 
Age     -.004 .996 
 (.005) 
Age2 .000** 1.000  
 (.000) 
Dependents – Yes     -.175** .840 
 (.019) 
Education Level 1     - - 
Education Level 2     -.270** .764 
 (.023) 
Education Level 3     -.341** .711 
 (.025) 





Table 7.1  Logistic Regression Models for In/Out Decision, FY1993-2003 (continued) 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Variable  B / (S.E.)     Exp(B)       B / (S.E.)     Exp(B)     B / (S.E.)     Exp(B) 
FY1993     -.226** .798 
 (.040) 
FY1994     -.246** .782 
 (.041) 
FY1995     -.181** .834 
 (.041) 
FY1996     -.227** .797 
 (.040) 
FY1997     -.046 .955 
 (.039) 
FY1998     - -  
 -
FY1999     -.078* .925  
 (.039) 
FY2000     .056 1.057  
 (.039) 
FY2001     -.042 .959 
 (.040) 
FY2002     .213** 1.237 
 (.039) 
FY2003     .355** 1.425 
 (.037) 
 
Block of 94 District Courts (see Appendix B)   - - 
 
Constant -.951** .386 -2.662** .070 -.880** .415 
 (.012)  (.031)  (.140) 
 
N 95,810 95,810 95,810
Nagelkerke R2 Value  .174   .354   .436 
Model Prediction Rate 70.4%   75.4%   78.3% 





Table 7.2.  OLS Regression Models for Mean Sentence Length, FY1993-2003 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 Unstand.     Stand.   Unstand.     Stand.     Unstand.     Stand. 
Variable  B / (S.E.)     B    B / (S.E.)     B     B / (S.E.)     B 
Female -29.619** -.125 -4.985** -.021 -5.426** -.023 
 (.361)  (.186)  (.185) 
Black 36.455** .223 4.505** .028 3.786** .023 
 (.292)  (.152)  (.163) 
Hispanic -3.187** -.021 2.006** .013 1.985** .013 
 (.275)  (.158)  (.198) 
Other Race -.698 -.002 1.573** .004 2.832** .007 
 (.632)  (.323)  (.351) 
Criminal History   1.240** .029 1.116** .026 
 (.038)  (.039) 
Presumptive Sentence   .774** .783 .772** .782 
 (.001)  (.001) 
Fraud Crimes   -8.448** -.038 -7.392** -.034 
 (.286)  (.287) 
Larceny & Theft   -10.542** -.034 -9.535** -.031 
 (.329)  (.327) 
Immigration   -6.137** -.028 -6.341** -.029 
 (.304)  (.317) 
Drug Crimes   -3.369** -.023 -3.446** -.023 
 (.257)  (.258) 
Robbery & Firearms   10.797** .047 10.832** .047 
 (.291)  (.290) 
Trial Conviction   32.793** .117 32.406** .115 
 (.233)  (.232) 
2+ Conviction Counts   14.722** .084 15.550** .089 
 (.145)  (.147) 
Non-U.S. Citizen     1.430** .009 
 (.180) 
Age     .220** .031 
 (.033) 
Age2 -.003** -.034 
 (.000) 
Educ Level 1     - - 
Educ Level 2     -.390** -.002 
 (.139) 
Educ Level 3     -1.923** -.010 
 (.172) 





Table 7.2.  OLS Regression Models for Mean Sentence Length, FY1993-2003 (cont.) 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 Unstand.     Stand.   Unstand.     Stand.     Unstand.     Stand. 
Variable  B / (S.E.)     B    B / (S.E.)     B     B / (S.E.)     B 
Dependents – Yes     -1.456** -.010 
 (.121) 
FY1993     .696** .002 
 (.285) 
FY1994     -.029 .000 
 (.288) 
FY1995     -.453 -.002 
 (.290) 
FY1996     -.733** -.003 
 (.281) 
FY1997     .171 .001 
 (.274) 
FY1998     - -  
 -
FY1999     -.652** -.003 
 (.261)  
FY2000     -.010 -.000 
 (.258) 
FY2001     .337 .001 
 (.256) 
FY2002     1.329** .006 
 (.252) 
FY2003     2.601** .012 
 (.248) 
 
Block of 94 District Courts (see Appendix B)   - - 
 
Constant 55.454** - 1.856** - .589 - 
 (.208)  (.264)  (1.225) 
 
R2 Value   .069   .764   .771 





Table 7.3.  Multinomial Logistic Regression Models for Judicial Downward  
 Departure Decision, FY1993-2003 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Variable  B / (S.E.)     Exp(B)       B / (S.E.)     Exp(B)     B / (S.E.)     Exp(B) 
Female .108** 1.114 .273** 1.314 .393** 1.481 
 (.012)  (.013)  (.014) 
Black -.496** .609 -.608** .544 -.318** .728 
 (.013)  (.014)  (.015) 
Hispanic .696** 2.006 .321** 1.378 -.095** .909 
 (.010)  (.012)  (.016) 
Other Race -.019 .981 -.037 .964 -.323** .724 
 (.024)  (.024)  (.027) 
Criminal History   .038** 1.038 .041** 1.042 
 (.003)  (.003) 
Presumptive Sentence   .001** 1.001 .003** 1.003 
 (.000)  (.000) 
Fraud Crimes   -.296** .743 -.219** .803 
 (.020)  (.022) 
Larceny & Theft   -.452** .637 -.365** .694 
 (.024)  (.026) 
Immigration   .556** 1.744 .351** 1.421 
 (.020)  (.023) 
Drug Crimes   .159** 1.172 .111** 1.118  
 (.018)  (.020) 
Robbery & Firearms   .014 1.014 .164** 1.178  
 (.022)  (.024) 
Trial Conviction   -.495** .610 -.398** .672 
 (.022)  (.024) 
2+ Conviction Counts   -.302** .739 -.278** .758 
 (.013)  (.014) 
Non-U.S. Citizen     .153** 1.165 
 (.014) 
Age     -.055** .947 
 (.002) 
Age2 .001** 1.001  
 (.000) 
Educ Level 2     -.009 .991 
 (.012) 
Educ Level 3     .117** 1.124 
 (.015) 





Table 7.3.  Multinomial Logistic Regression Models for Judicial Downward  
 Departure Decision, FY1993-2003 (continued) 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Variable  B / (S.E.)     Exp(B)       B / (S.E.)     Exp(B)     B / (S.E.)     Exp(B) 
Dependents – Yes     .061** 1.063 
 (.010) 
FY1993     -.687** .503 
 (.027) 
FY1994     -.474** .622 
 (.026) 
FY1995     -.401** .670 
 (.025) 
FY1996     -.235** .790 
 (.024) 
FY1997     -.104** .901 
 (.022) 
FY1998     - -  
 -
FY1999     .136** 1.145  
 (.020) 
FY2000     .191** 1.210  
 (.020) 
FY2001     .313** 1.367 
 (.020) 
FY2002     .186** 1.204 
 (.020) 
FY2003     -.157** .855 
 (.020) 
Block of 94 District Courts (see Appendix B)   - - 
 
Constant -1.849** - -1.810** - -1.196** - 
 (.008)  (.018)  (.065) 
 
N 536,455 522,965 517,981
Model Chi-Square Value 21,356.175**  87,759.879**  157,608.091** 
Nagelkerke R2 Value  .047   .186   .315 
Model Prediction Rate 67.8%   67.6%   70.3% 
* p < .05      ** p < .01 
TABLES (continued)
Table 7.4. Gender, Race, & Ethnicity Coefficients from the Full Logistic Regression Model for In/Out Decision by Fiscal Year
Fiscal Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Variable B B B B B B B B B B B
Female -.615** -.562** -.492** -.498** -.306** -.300** -.342** -.190** -.356** -.347** -.401**
S.E. (.070) (.074) (.075) (.073) (.065) (.068) (.066) (.066) (.070) (.065) (.062)
Exp(B) .540 .570 .612 .608 .737 .741 .711 .827 .701 .707 .669
Z Score -.520 -.664 .057 -1.964 -.064 .443 -1.628 1.725 -.094 .601
Black .362** .299** .172* .184* .327** .002 .176* .292** .314** .068 .096
S.E. (.076) (.079) (.084) (.086) (.078) (.082) (.079) (.079) (.084) (.078) (.075)
Exp(B) 1.436 1.349 1.187 1.202 1.387 1.002 1.193 1.339 1.370 1.070 1.101
Z Score .575 1.101 -.100 -1.232* 2.872* -1.528 -1.038 -.191 2.146* -.259
Hispanic .517** .480** .137 .298** .544** .407** .428** .516** .365** .188* .223**
S.E. (.112) (.115) (.114) (.111) (.104) (.107) (.104) (.099) (.101) (.092) (.084)
Exp(B) 1.676 1.616 1.147 1.347 1.722 1.503 1.535 1.675 1.440 1.206 1.249
Z Score .230 2.118 -1.012 -1.617 .918 -.141 -.613 1.068 1.296 -.281
Other Race .261 -.113 -.198 -.363 -.282* -.280* -.441** -.016 -.060 -.225 -.387
S.E. (.140) (.160) (.148) (.145) (.131) (.142) (.140) (.141) (.133) (.127) (.127)
Exp(B) 1.299 .893 .821 .695 .754 .756 .643 .984 .941 .799 .679
Z Score 1.759 .390 .796 -.415 -.010 .807 -2.139* .227 .897 .902
N 9,324 8,111 7,619 7,991 9,225 8,250 8,803 8,633 7,931 8,979 10,944
R2 Value .417 .404 .414 .444 .430 .466 .464 .494 .480 .486 .551
Predict Rate 80.7 80.5 80.1 79.2 78.3 79.4 79.6 79.3 79.4 78.6 80.5
* p < .05 ** p < .01
TABLES (continued)
Table 7.5. Conviction & Offense Type Coefficients from Full Logistic Regression Model for In/Out Decision by Fiscal Year
Fiscal Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Variable B B B B B B B B B B B
Trial Cnvtn .694** .442** .858** .818** .734** .696** .491* .491* .681** .212 .408*
S.E. (.146) (.179) (.193) (.181) (.189) (.208) (.217) (.223) (.256) (.280) (.205)
Exp(B) 2.002 1.557 2.359 2.265 2.083 2.005 1.634 1.634 1.976 1.236 1.504
Z Score 1.091 -1.580 .151 .321 .135 .682 .000 -.738 1.236 -.565
Fraud .211* .265* .259* .056 .491** .489** .646** .614** .284** .529** .490**
S.E. (.099) (.112) (.107) (.108) (.098) (.102) (.095) (.102) (.099) (.094) (.094)
Exp(B) 1.235 1.304 1.296 1.057 1.634 1.631 1.908 1.848 1.328 1.697 1.633
Z Score -.361 .039 1.335 -2.983* .049 -1.062 .230 2.322* -1.795 .903
Larceny -.173 -.093 -.167 -.503** -.156 -.186 -.164 -.274** -.455** -.340** -.330**
S.E. (.111) (.123) (.119) (.123) (.110) (.116) (.115) (.117) (.117) (.002) (.108)
Exp(B) .841 .911 .846 .605 .856 .830 .849 .760 .635 .712 .719
Z Score -.483 .432 1.963 -2.103* .188 -.135 .671 1.094 -.716 -.065
Immigr. 1.020** 1.369** 1.264** .848** 1.372** 1.793** 1.521** 1.491** .996** 1.364** 1.323**
S.E. (.135) (.152) (.146) (.132) (.122) (.135) (.125) (.129) (.130) (.125) (.117)
Exp(B) 2.774 3.932 3.539 2.336 3.943 6.006 4.578 4.442 2.706 3.911 3.756
Z Score -1.717 .498 2.114* -2.915* -2.314* 1.478 .167 2.703* -2.041* .239
Drugs .217 .369** .378** .351** .157 .114 .277* .235 .219 .023 .259*
S.E. (.119) (.137) (.135) (.135) (.128) (.135) (.121) (.129) (.120) (.115) (.107)
Exp(B) 1.242 1.446 1.459 1.421 1.170 1.121 1.319 1.265 1.245 1.023 1.296
Z Score -.838 -.047 .141 1.043 .231 -.899 .237 .091 1.179 -1.502
Robbery .182 .471* .129 .094 .264 -.488 .201 -.362 -.527* .045 -.261
S.E. (.170) (.209) (.259) (.241) (.274) (.286) (.245) (.234) (.227) (.190) (.180)
Exp(B) 1.200 1.601 1.138 1.099 1.302 .614 1.223 .696 .590 1.046 .770
Z Score -1.073 1.028 .099 -.466 1.899 -1.830 1.662 .506 -1.932 1.169
* p < .05 ** p < .01
TABLES (continued)
Table 7.6. Gender, Race, & Ethnicity Coefficients from the Full OLS Regression Model for Mean Sentence Length by Fiscal
Year, FY1993 – FY2003
Fiscal Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Variable Unstnd. B Unstnd. B Unstnd. B Unstnd. B Unstnd. B Unstnd. B Unstnd. B Unstnd. B Unstnd. B Unstnd. B Unstnd.B
Female -6.760** -5.318** -6.595** -5.131** -5.026** -4.998** -5.602** -5.228** -5.647** -5.455** -4.930**
S.E. (.781) (.811) (.778) (.727) (.662) (.619) (.558) (.541) (.527) (.506) (.490)
Stnd. B -.025 -.020 -.026 -.020 -.020 -.021 -.025 -.024 -.027 -.025 -.021
Z Score -1.281 1.136 -1.375 -.107 -.031 .725 -.481 .555 -.263 -.745
Black 5.500** 4.036** 4.859** 3.433** 2.949** 3.102** 3.599** 4.296** 3.789** 4.293** 3.790**
S.E. (.630) (.664) (.673) (.640) (.587) (.570) (.520) (.502) (.482) (.448) (.428)
Stnd. B .031 .023 .028 .020 .017 .019 .022 .028 .025 .028 .024
Z Score 1.599 -.871 1.535 .557 -.187 -.644 -.964 .729 -.766 .812
Hispanic 2.605** 2.976** 2.198** 1.953* 1.693* 1.588* 2.478** 3.131** 1.464** 1.796** 1.443**
S.E. (.850) (.881) (.863) (.812) (.731) (.701) (.617) (.590) (.557) (.510) (.480)
Stnd. B .014 .016 .012 .011 .010 .010 .017 .022 .011 .013 .010
Z Score -.303 .631 .207 .238 .105 -.954 -.765 2.055* -.440 .504
Other Race 4.262** 2.977 3.220* 2.013 1.603 3.268** .426 4.944** 4.242** 3.970** 2.087*
S.E (1.589) (1.587) (1.439) (1.324) (1.191) (1.159) (1.079) (1.038) (1.032) (.970) (.916)
Stnd. B .009 .006 .008 .005 .004 .009 .001 .013 .011 .010 .005
Z Score .572 -.113 .617 .230 -1.001 1.794 -3.018* .480 .192 1.411
Constant -13.721** -3.732 4.561 .331 .221 8.286* -2.205 -.841 .474 7.880* 2.967
S.E. (4.368) (4.621) (4.653) (4.569) (4.418) (4.230) (4.024) (3.593) (4.000) (3.286) (3.458)
N 28,276 27,310 26,507 29,523 32,303 34,716 39,305 41,699 43,604 46,490 51,056
R2 Value .771 .771 .771 .771 .788 .771 .775 .764 .748 .772 .792
* p < .05 ** p < .01
TABLES (continued)
Table 7.7. Conviction & Offense Type Coefficients from the Full OLS Regression Model for Mean Sentence Length by FYr
Fiscal Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Variable Unstd. B Unstd. B Unstd. B Unstd. B Unstd. B Unstd. B Unstd. B Unstd. B Unstd. B Unstd. B Unstd. B
Trial Cnvtn. 28.943** 35.334** 33.020** 36.672** 33.684** 33.347** 33.684** 29.123** 26.632** 30.537** 28.843**
S.E. (.729) (.818) (.852) (.801) (.786) (.774) (.766) (.771) (.866) (.849) (.678)
Stnd. B .126 .139 .126 .141 .122 .129 .115 .096 .078 .083 .092
Z Score -5.833* 1.959 -3.123* 2.663* -1.508 1.540 4.187* 2.145* -3.219* 1.558
Fraud -5.997** -6.109** -5.089** -6.132** -6.283** -7.175** -7.583** -6.034** -9.064** -8.216** -10.973**
S.E. (1.189) (1.225) (1.133) (1.096) (.992) (.990) (.874) (.859) (.858) (.794) (.764)
Stnd. B -.025 -.026 -.023 -.027 -.028 -.032 -.035 -.029 -.045 -.039 -.048
Z Score .066 -.611 .662 .102 .636 .313 -1.275 2.502* -.726 2.500*
Larceny -4.805** -8.140** -6.623** -9.967** -10.807** -10.969** -12.677** -8.473** -9.927** -9.623** -9.943**
S.E. (1.258) (1.326) (1.272) (1.230) (1.110) (1.099) (1.042) (1.001) (1.031) (.960) (.909)
Stnd. B -.017 -.027 -.022 -.032 -.036 -.037 -.039 -.028 -.031 -.029 -.029
Z Score 1.825 -.826 1.890 .507 .104 1.124 -2.906* 1.013 -.217 .241
Immigr. -5.857** -7.232** -7.694** -7.589** -6.879** -7.336** -7.477** -4.547** -7.438** -6.014** -7.237**
S.E. (1.574) (1.607) (1.442) (1.315) (1.173) (1.104) (.951) (.915) (.918) (.841) (.778)
Stnd. B -.015 -.019 -.025 -.028 -.026 -.032 -.037 -.024 -.039 -.033 -.042
Z Score .611 .214 -.054 -.403 .284 .093 -2.219* 2.234* -1.145 1.069
Drugs 1.424 -.245 -2.447* -3.146** -4.251** -4.761** -5.520** -2.468** -4.185** -4.517** -5.826**
S.E. (1.069) (1.125) (1.038) (.996) (.911) (.897) (.783) (.772) (.772) (.703) (.668)
Stnd. B .009 -.001 -.015 -.020 -.027 -.032 -.038 -.018 -.031 -.033 -.042
Z Score 1.075 1.439 .486 .819 .399 .632 -2.778* 1.580 .316 1.354
Robbery 13.503** 13.409** 13.271** 15.391** 14.909** 13.996** 9.268** 11.312** 8.484** 6.486** 5.110**
S.E. (1.185) (1.233) (1.159) (1.121) (1.039) (1.014) (.914) (.884) (.869) (.791) (.739)
Stnd. B .056 .056 .056 .063 .059 .059 .038 .050 .041 .031 .025
Z Score .055 .082 -1.315 .315 .629 3.461* -1.607 2.284* 1.700 1.270
* p < .05 ** p < .01
TABLES (continued)
Table 7.8. Gender, Race, & Ethnicity Coefficients from the Full Multinomial Logistic Regression Model for the Judicial
Downward Departure Decision by Fiscal Year
Fiscal Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Variable B B B B B B B B B B B
Female .363** .489** .448** .481** .370** .359** .281** .393** .390** .421** .467**
S.E. (.060) (.058) (.058) (.052) (.049) (.046) (.041) (.040) (.039) (.040) (.041)
Exp(B) 1.437 1.631 1.565 1.618 1.448 1.432 1.324 1.481 1.477 1.524 1.595
Z Score -1.510 .500 -.424 1.554 .164 1.266 -1.955 .054 -.555 -.803
Black -.306** -.359** -.318** -.359** -.267** -.314** -.301** -.295** -.290** -.282** -.303**
S.E. (.061) (.061) (.063) (.059) (.055) (.053) (.047) (.046) (.045) (.045) (.046)
Exp(B) .736 .698 .728 .698 .766 .731 .740 .744 .748 .754 .738
Z Score .614 -.468 .475 -1.141 .615 -.184 -.091 -.078 -.126 .326
Hispanic -.282** -.221** -.149* -.145* -.038 -.020 -.089 -.074 -.013 -.115** -.136**
S.E. (.079) (.075) (.071) (.065) (.059) (.056) (.049) (.047) (.044) (.044) (.044)
Exp(B) .754 .802 .862 .865 .963 .980 .915 .929 .987 .892 .873
Z Score -.560 -.697 -.042 -1.219 -.221 .927 -.221 -.947 1.639 .337
Other Race -.474** -.356** -.294** -.045 -.438** -.470** -.360** -.215** -.370** -.283** -.278**
S.E. (.128) (.121) (.110) (.095) (.095) (.090) (.084) (.078) (.082) (.081) (.081)
Exp(B) .623 .701 .746 .956 .645 .625 .698 .807 .691 .753 .757
Z Score -.670 -.379 -1.713 2.925* .245 -.894 -1.265 1.370 -.755 -.044
N 38,161 36,317 35,232 39,215 44,209 45,860 51,230 53,651 53,531 57,149 63,426
R2 Value .314 .289 .304 .306 .300 .347 .347 .340 .343 .354 .325
Predict Rate 70.3 73.4 72.7 71.4 69.3 69.5 69.5 69.3 69.0 69.7 71.2
* p < .05 ** p < .01
TABLES (continued)
Table 7.9. Conviction & Offense Type Coefficients from the Full Multinomial Logistic Regression Model for the Judicial
Downward Departure Decision by Fiscal Year
Fiscal Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Variable B B B B B B B B B B B
Trial Cnvtn -.332** -.372** -.434** -.366** -.440** -.423** -.320** -.411** -.476** -.593** -.600**
S.E. (.077) (.084) (.089) (.079) (.080) (.077) (.072) (.074) (.083) (.092) (.080)
Exp(B) .718 .689 .648 .693 .644 .655 .726 .663 .622 .553 .549
Z Score .351 .507 -.571 .658 -.153 -.977 .881 .585 .944 .057
Fraud -.229** -.185* -.300** -.212** -.360** -.309** -.191** -.137* -.069 -.185** -.227**
S.E. (.088) (.087) (.085) (.080) (.074) (.074) (.066) (.065) (.067) (.066) (.067)
Exp(B) .795 .831 .741 .809 .698 .735 .827 .872 .934 .831 .797
Z Score -.356 .945 -.754 1.358 -.487 -1.190 -.583 -.728 1.233 .447
Larceny -.406** -.430** -.530** -.209* -.394** -.432** -.236** -.394** -.163* -.555** -.428**
S.E. (.098) (.100) (.100) (.090) (.074) (.085) (.082) (.080) (.081) (.083) (.080)
Exp(B) .666 .651 .588 .811 .698 .649 .790 .674 .850 .574 .652
Z Score .171 .707 -2.386* 1.494 .316 -1.660 1.379 -2.029* 3.380* -1.102
Immigr. -.768** -.663** -.162 .015 -.166* .250** .520** .630** .709** .535** .503**
S.E. (.143) (.131) (.109) (.091) (.081) (.079) (.070) (.068) (.068) (.067) (.065)
Exp(B) .464 .515 .850 1.015 .847 1.284 1.682 1.877 2.033 1.707 1.653
Z Score -.541 -2.940* -1.247 1.486 -3.677* -2.558* -1.127 -.821 1.823 .343
Drugs -.103 -.076 .052 .040 .066 .145* .210** .103 .275** .178** -.078
S.E. (.084) (.087) (.082) (.076) (.070) (.069) (.061) (.060) (.061) (.060) (.059)
Exp(B) .902 .927 1.053 1.041 1.068 1.156 1.233 1.108 1.316 1.195 .927
Z Score -.223 -1.071 .107 -.252 -.804 -.706 1.251 -2.010* 1.134 3.018*
Robbery .203* .006 .177 .072 -.026 .161* .224** .190** .245** .343** .045
S.E. (.096) (.097) (.094) (.091) (.085) (.083) (.075) (.072) (.073) (.069) (.069)
Exp(B) 1.225 1.006 1.193 1.021 .974 1.174 1.251 1.209 1.278 1.409 1.046
Z Score 1.444 -1.266 1.192 .377 -1.574 -.563 .327 -.536 -.976 3.054*
* p < .05 ** p < .01
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Chapter VIII.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Summary of Key Findings 
 The results of this analysis of multiple years of federal sentencing data have been 
generated from an in-depth study of three main decision-making points for federal district 
court judges at sentencing, namely the in/out imprisonment decision, the length of 
incarceration decision, and the judicial downward departure decision.  The study results 
have illuminated how the promulgation of the federal Sentencing Guidelines has 
influenced the sentencing decisions of these judges over time, while simultaneously 
limiting their discretion and making the decision process more transparent.  These results 
have, in part, confirmed important findings of earlier studies, as well as revealed the 
emergence of significant trends which should stimulate further research in the future. 
Taken as a whole, the results suggest that the Sentencing Guidelines have not 
succeeded in eliminating disparities in sentencing outcomes due to extralegal factors with 
the passage of time.  Instead, the simple, straightforward proposal of sentencing 
convicted offenders according to the characteristics of the offense rather than the 
characteristics of the offender has run into the complicated, three-dimensional actuality of 
sentencing in real life with real people.  Hence, an improved understanding of how 
federal judges have managed to balance the constraints imposed upon their sentencing 
decisions while, at the same time, trying to mete out a just and fair punishment is, 
perhaps, the most important result of this study. 
 Sentencing data compiled by the U.S. Sentencing Commission for fiscal years 
1993 through 2003 were selected for this study.  These eleven years contain sentencing 
information for nearly 600,000 offenders sentenced in U.S. federal district courts during 
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this period.  This data set was analyzed in two ways: as one whole data set and as 
separate individual fiscal year data sets in order to analyze change over time.  Owing to 
this temporal feature of the data set, the longitudinal focus of the study took center stage 
in the analysis.  Therefore, each hypothesis was examined in the context of how 
disparities arising out of the judge’s sentencing decision-making processes varied across 
the eleven fiscal years included in the study.  Whether the predictions of this study were 
supported or not supported by the findings of this study is summarized in a rather 
simplified form in Table 8.1. 
Taken as a whole, the findings from all three sentencing outcomes leads to the 
conclusion that racial inequality persists in federal sentencing outcomes.  In the aggregate 
analysis, black defendants were more likely to receive a sentence of incarceration, more 
likely to receive a longer term of incarceration, and less likely to receive a judicial 
downward departure.  For both the incarceration decision and the length-of-term 
decision, the magnitude of the coefficients declined somewhat over time when analyzed 
across the eleven years in the study period (see Table 8.2).  Meanwhile, for the judicial 
downward departure decision, the decreased likelihood of black defendants receiving a 
departure did not experience any change over time.  Thus, by fiscal year 2003, black 
defendants still were more likely to receive significantly longer sentences and less likely 
to receive a judicial downward departure.  The unwarranted disparity attributable to race 
has not gone away with the passage of time.  Similar to the findings of Kautt and Spohn 
(2002), this study finds that the Guidelines have been unable to curtail the effects of race 
on all the sentencing outcomes.  Instead, they retain a strong influence over sentencing 
outcomes, particularly in the case of judicial downward departures. 
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The influence of ethnicity was even more pronounced than the influence of race, 
thus highlighting the importance of studying the outcomes of Hispanic defendants in the 
federal court system.  Overall, Hispanic defendants were significantly more likely to 
receive a sentence of incarceration than both black and white defendants.  Likewise, the 
influence of ethnicity significantly increased the length of the term of incarceration, and 
decreased the likelihood of receiving a judicial downward departure.   While the effect of 
ethnicity on the incarceration decision declined over time, it still exerted a substantial and 
significant effect at the end of the study (see Table 8.3).  This same trend was observed in 
the length of term decision and the judicial downward departure decision.  As Hebert 
(1997) suggests, federal district court judges appear to be responding to the perceived 
dangerousness of offenders on the basis of their racial or ethnic background, while at the 
same time, acting within the constraints imposed by a highly structured determinate 
sentencing system.  Hence, any study that examines only the outcomes of black 
defendants in the context of an analysis of minority defendants would be excluding an 
important set of predictors. 
These findings concerning the influence of race on the sentencing outcomes of 
black and Hispanic defendants only offers partial support for the prediction in hypothesis 
1(a).  The probability of receiving a sentence of incarceration declined over time for both 
black and Hispanic defendants.  The odds ratio for black defendants became non-
significant during the final two fiscal years in the study; the odds ration for Hispanic 
defendants did not.  Contrary to the hypothesis, however, the odds of Hispanic defendants 
receiving a sentence of incarceration was higher than for black defendants, and they 
continued to experience higher probabilities throughout the length of the study period. 
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The prediction in hypothesis 2(a) was supported by the finding that the influence 
of race for black defendants influenced the probability of receiving a longer sentence 
length than either Hispanic or white defendants.  As predicted, these heightened 
probabilities declined over time; only the decline for black defendants was significant, 
although still very different in magnitude from the reference category.  While the 
direction of the coefficients for both black and Hispanic defendants supports the 
prediction of convergence over time, neither set of odds ratios decreased sufficiently in 
magnitude to suggest that any convergence was imminent. 
Findings concerning the influence of race and ethnicity on the judicial downward 
departure decision did not support the predictions in hypothesis 3(a).  Certainly, black 
defendants had lower odds of receiving a judicial downward departure, and these 
probabilities remained lower throughout the study period.  However, contrary to the 
prediction, there was no change over time.  For Hispanic defendants, the magnitude of 
the coefficients indicated a gradual increase in the probability of receiving a judicial 
departure in the first half of the study, but the direction of the coefficients remained 
negative and began declining again at the end of the study.  Hence, contrary to the 
prediction, Hispanic defendants did not experience any significant change over time in 
the probability of receiving a judicial downward departure. 
Female defendants fared much better than racial and ethnic minorities in the 
sentencing outcomes.  Evidence of chivalrous treatment of women in general emerged in 
all three sentencing decisions of this study.  Female defendants were less likely to be sent 
to prison than male defendants.  If they were sent to prison, the average length of their 
233
prison sentence was shorter than male defendants.  They were also more likely to receive 
judicial downward departures (see Table 8.4). 
These findings concerning the sentencing outcomes of female defendants provide 
partial support for the predictions in hypotheses 1(b) and 2(b).  The odds of a female 
defendant receiving a sentence of incarceration did change over time in the direction of 
the predicted convergence with the reference category.  However, in the final year of the 
study, the probabilities for female defendants were still substantially lower than for male 
defendants.  Likewise, the mean sentence length of female defendants changed over time 
in the direction of the predicted convergence, but, again, the differences in the magnitude 
of the coefficients for female defendants at the end of the study remained substantially 
lower than the reference category.  Finally, the findings concerning the odds of receiving 
a judicial downward departure were contrary to the prediction in hypothesis 3(b).  The 
coefficients for female defendants changed over time by diverging away from the 
reference category and increasing in magnitude so that female defendants at the end of 
the study were even more likely to receive a judicial downward departure than they were 
at the beginning of the study period in fiscal year 1993. 
Defendants who were convicted by a trial proceeding were penalized harshly in 
all three sentencing outcomes.  Being convicted at trial rather than pleading guilty 
significantly increased the likelihood of receiving a prison sentence, of receiving a 
significantly longer prison sentence, and significantly decreased the likelihood of 
receiving a judicial downward departure. The correlation between the mode of conviction 
and its effects on the sentencing outcome was constant throughout the study period.  
These findings support earlier research findings in both state and federal courts of 
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defendants who do not plead guilty being disadvantaged at the sentencing stage (Johnson, 
2005; Semisch, 2000; Smith and Damphouse, 1998; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004), as well 
as buttressing courtroom efficiency workgroup theory. 
These findings regarding defendants who are found guilty through a trial did not 
support the predictions of the direction of change over time in hypotheses 4(a), 4(b), or 
4(c).  Defendants who were found guilty through a trial process were just slightly less 
likely to receive a sentence of incarceration at the end of the study period than they were 
at the beginning of the study period, but the overall direction of the coefficients was not 
toward convergence.  In fact, during some years, the magnitude of the coefficients was 
even larger, suggesting an even greater increase in the likelihood of being sentenced to 
prison.  Similarly, the increase in mean sentence length for defendants who were found 
guilty by a trial did not converge over time.  Instead, for eight of the nine intervening 
years, the coefficients were even greater in magnitude, suggesting a fluctuating drive 
toward divergence over time. 
The directional trend of the coefficients for the judicial downward departure 
decision did change over time, but toward divergence, not convergence.  Again, this 
change is in the opposite direction to the hypothesized prediction.  The magnitude of the 
probability for receiving a judicial downward departure declined significantly over time 
so that defendants at the end of the study were much less likely to receive judicial 
downward departures than they were in the beginning of the study. 
One of the most interesting findings of the study concerned the sentencing 
outcomes of defendants who were sentenced for immigration crimes.  This particular 
offense type category exerted a more constant and definitive effect than any other 
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category of offenses.  Defendants sentenced for immigration crimes were significantly 
more likely to receive a sentence of incarceration, but the length of term of incarceration 
was significantly decreased.  Moreover, the magnitude of both of these significant effects 
increased over time.  However, the effect of this crime type category on the judicial 
downward departure decision and its trend over time was particularly fascinating.  While 
defendants sentenced for immigration offenses were less likely to receive a judicial 
downward departure during the initial years, this probability subsequently changed 
direction and significantly increased the odds of receiving a judicial downward departure 
during the latter half of the study period. 
The other interesting finding concerning the crime type category was for drug 
offenses.  Although not to the same degree of magnitude, but similar to defendants 
sentenced for immigration offenses, defendants sentenced for drug crimes were more 
likely to be incarcerated, and when incarcerated, their length of term was significantly 
lower than expected.  This decrease in the length of term of incarceration was 
significantly enlarged over time.  The effect exerted by the drug offenses category on the 
judicial downward departure decision was only significant during the latter half of the 
study period, and all but the last one of these coefficients were positive, indicating an 
increased likelihood of receiving a judicial downward departure.  Hence, judicial 
downward departures appear to be growing in importance for offenders being sentenced 
for drug offenses in the federal system.  This finding speaks to the need for further 
investigation into the trend for substantial assistance departures in this same area, since 
one type of downward departure seems to offset the other. 
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This finding also speaks to the trend of the exploding population of female drug 
offenders being sentenced in the federal courts.  In their study, Griffin and Wooldredge 
(2006) have proposed that a new focal concern has emerged surrounding female drug 
offenders with children to incarcerate women more frequently in order to protect the 
children.  In their discussion, they draw upon the findings of Spohn (1999) to emphasize 
that women convicted of drug crimes do not receive the same leniency as women 
convicted of less serious property crimes.  Therefore, they might not enjoy any benefit of 
chivalry, particularly if their involvement with a drug-addicted lifestyle is viewed by the 
judge as detrimental to the children within their care (Bush-Baskette, 2000; Chesney-
Lind and Pollack, 1995; Daly, 1987; Steffensmeier, Kramer, and Streifel, 1993; 
Wicharaya, 1995). 
These findings concerning the type of offense for which the defendant was 
sentenced do not support the prediction of hypothesis 5(a), but they do lend some support 
to the predictions of hypotheses 5(b) and 5(c).  Regarding the incarceration decision, 
none of the coefficients produced for the crime type categories experienced significant 
change over time.  The directional trend of the coefficients in the three categories of 
fraud, deceit, and counterfeiting offenses, larceny, embezzlement, theft, and money 
laundering offenses, and immigration offenses instead suggests a slight divergence, 
although the magnitude of these changes was not strong enough to reach statistical 
significance. 
All of the crime type categories experienced substantial change over time in the 
length-of-term sentencing outcome, although the category of immigration offenses did 
not reach the level of statistical significance for its amount of change.  Only the category 
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of robbery and firearms offenses changed in the direction predicted, toward convergence.  
All of the other categories diverged further away from the mean sentence length, 
increasing in magnitude and strength over time rather than decreasing over time. 
On the other hand, regarding the judicial downward departure decision, the 
category of immigration offenses was the only category to experience change over time 
in the magnitude of its coefficients.  Also, the two categories of drug offenses and 
robbery and firearms offenses changed the strength of their coefficients over time, 
although the overall magnitude was not altered.  Notably, the directional trend for the 
immigration offenses category coefficients was toward convergence the first half of the 
study, but then continued upward, increasing in magnitude, in a divergent trend during 
the latter half of the study period. 
The findings of this study showed that the geographic location of the district court 
of sentencing has proven to be a significant source of extralegal disparity for all three 
sentencing outcomes.  It is at the district court level that the sentencing decisions 
originate (Kautt, 2002).  The narrower focus on individual districts also allowed for an 
examination of variation between the district courts within each of the eleven circuits, 
uncovering effects which would have otherwise remained obscured by not delving below 
the circuit level (see, for instance, Albonetti, 1997; Kautt and Spohn, 2002; Steffensmeier 
and DeMuth, 2000).  Overall, the Guidelines have failed to create uniform sentences 
throughout the federal courts.  This finding severely undermines the ability of the 
Guidelines to achieve the goals for which they were enacted—to promote equity and 
fairness in sentencing through uniformity across geographic location.   
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Overall, these findings concerning the influence of district court location do not 
provide much support for the predictions of hypotheses 6(a), 6(b), or 6(c).  Regarding the 
incarceration decision, only 17 districts (less than a quarter) experienced change in the 
magnitude of their coefficients over time: eight were toward convergence and nine 
toward divergence.  Regarding the length-of-term decision, only ten districts experienced 
change in the magnitude of their coefficients over time, only one of which actually 
converged as predicted.  Finally, regarding the judicial downward departure decision, a 
large number of districts actually diverged in the magnitude of their coefficients over 
time, contrary to the directional change in the predicted outcome. 
Finally, the fiscal year of sentencing was found to exert a significant influence on 
all three sentencing outcomes.  Owing to the substantial number of fiscal years included 
in this study, the fiscal year of sentencing took on an especially important role in 
determining whether the year in which the defendant was sentenced exhibited a 
significant influence on the sentencing outcome.  For all three sentencing decisions, the 
coefficients produced by the fiscal year variable were significant, and they experienced 
significant changes in direction over time (see Table 8.5).  Thus, the year in which the 
defendant was sentenced determined, in part, whether the probability of being 
imprisoned, of receiving a longer prison sentence, or of receiving a judicial downward 
departure was increased or decreased in comparison to other years. 
The findings concerning the influence of year of sentencing on the three 
sentencing outcomes included in this study provide only partial support for the 
predictions in hypotheses 7(a), 7(b), and 7(c).  Regarding the decision of whether to 
incarcerate, the coefficients were headed in the direction of convergence in the beginning 
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and middle years of the study period, but they began to diverge in the opposite direction 
during the final two fiscal years.  The coefficients derived for the influence of sentencing 
year on the length-of-term decision fluctuated in magnitude so substantially from year to 
year that no real trend was discernable.  However, similar to the coefficients for the 
incarceration decision, these coefficients began to diverge quite sharply in the final two 
years.  Finally, the coefficients for the judicial downward departure decision showed a 
stable linear trend in the direction of convergence for the first half of the study.  
However, in the latter half of the study, the magnitude of the coefficients pointed in the 
direction of divergence until the final two fiscal years when they began to converge once 
again. 
 
Limitations of Research 
 This study is limited in two general aspects.  First, the study is limited by the data 
and by what types of data are contained in the data sets.  Second, the study is limited by 
the type of analysis chosen to describe and define the outcomes of interest to the study.  
Therefore, any conclusions based on the results of this data analysis should be viewed 
within the context of the analytical and contextual assumptions surrounding the predicted 
outcomes and the weight of research limitations that influence both the interpretation and 
generalizability of the study findings. 
 The data for this study were collected by the U.S. Sentencing Commission as part 
of their mandate to monitor and amend the Sentencing Guidelines.  Hence, those who 
study the data are reliant on the Commission for both the quality and quantity of the data 
contained in their official data sets.  In turn, the Commission must rely on the probation 
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officers that prepare the presentence reports and on the courts to forward relevant 
sentencing documents to their office.  Meanwhile, the researcher is removed from both 
the data collection process and the decision-making processes that decided what data to 
collect, how to code it, and which portions of it would be released into the public domain. 
 The data collected by the Commission only contains information on convicted 
offenders, i.e. those who pleaded guilty or were convicted in a trial.  It does not contain 
any information on offenders who were filtered out of the system at an earlier stage in the 
criminal justice process, defendants who are acquitted or whose cases were declined for 
prosecution, or offenders prosecuted in state and local court systems.  In general, 
sentencing data has been shown to reflect enforcement and prosecutorial policies more 
than actual crime rates (Tonry, 1997).  Federal sentencing data is likewise influenced by 
targeted enforcement efforts of federal law enforcement agencies as well as the 
declination policies that dictate which types of cases merit the prosecutorial efforts of 
attorneys from the Department of Justice. 
 Regarding the issue of methodology, a true experiment is characterized by the 
presence of a control group, against which the effects of the stimulus on the experimental 
group can be measured.  The current study lacked a control group or other matched group 
for comparison purposes.  Certainly some researchers, those who have studied sentencing 
guidelines at the county or state level in particular, have attempted to compensate for this 
requirement by comparing the sentencing outcomes of groups of offenders before and 
after the implementation of sentencing guidelines.  At the federal level, the indeterminate 
sentencing system was so different from the system established under the sentencing 
guidelines, and no comparable agency such as the Commission existed to gather 
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sentencing data from all 94 districts, it was determined that no control group was 
available for the purposes of the present research. 
This study was not a true longitudinal study.  A longitudinal study is characterized 
by testing the same group(s) repeatedly, throughout the entire study period.  In other 
words, the same subjects are analyzed over and over again over a period of time, usually 
years.  However, the subjects in this study were sentenced only once.  Thus, each subset 
of fiscal year data was composed of a different group of convicted offenders than the 
previous year.  It is the characteristics of the federal court system itself that dictates when 
a case is completed during the course of a year, it is then reported to the Commission, and 
the defendant in that case, in all likelihood, will not ever appear in that courtroom again.  
In this context, the researcher is left with no choice but to analyze different subjects each 
year if they desire to engage in a longitudinal study of this particular phenomenon. 
Large studies, by their nature, also contain limitations.  In these types of studies, 
researchers are less able to explore the reasoning process underlying individual 
sentencing decisions (Sisk et al., 1998).  Instead, researchers typically measure general 
outcomes in broadly defined types of cases, leaving the process of judicial analysis in the 
individual case unexamined.  When examining data at an aggregate level, it is possible to 
overlook influences that might have overlapped or even been submerged.  Such 
differences would only be uncovered by performing a detailed analysis of individual 
cases and poring over the reasons for the judicial decision written by the judges 
themselves.  Hence, this type of analysis can result in problems of generalizing from the 
aggregate population and applying it to the individual convicted offender.  Other 
researchers (Daly, 1994; Semisch, 2000) have performed this type of narrative analysis 
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with small subsets of data.  However, both the size of the data set as well as access to 
individual case files hindered the opportunity for such an analysis in the current study. 
The models that were developed to test the predictions in this study performed 
exceedingly well in predicting possible outcomes and in explaining the majority of the 
variance surrounding each outcome of interest.  At the same time, it must be 
acknowledged that a small portion of unexplained variance persisted in each of the 
models.  This remnant of unexplained variance indicates an inability to explain the total 
amount of variance in the models.  A large amount of unexplained variance indicates the 
potential for model misspecification.  While unexplained variance is not uncommon in 
occurrence, it should be recognized that the models are incomplete in so far as they allow 
for the possibility of some important variables being omitted.  The current study 
developed and tested numerous models to maximize the explanatory capabilities of each 
model.  Nevertheless, a small amount of unexplained variance continues to exist. 
 One reason for this unexplained variance might be accounted for by the variation 
in sentencing practices between judges.  As discussed earlier, individual-level 
characteristics of federal judges are not collected or disseminated in the Commission’s 
data sets.  This stark omission in information regarding the influence of characteristics of 
the judge such as gender, race, marital and family status, military background, religious 
affiliation, political affiliation, previous career experience as a prosecution or defense 
attorney, time on the bench, and judicial socialization made it impossible to include this 
information in the models for this analysis. 
 Another possible reason for the unexplained variance in the models might be 
accounted for by the variation in the surrounding social environment in each judicial 
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district.  The data sets did not contain information on the caseloads and courtroom 
resources of the judicial districts, or whether they were sufficiently staffed.  They did not 
provide information on the degree of urbanicity or the percentage of minorities in the 
surrounding population.  Nor was there any information regarding surrounding crime 
rates at the city, county, or state level.  Due to the lack of comprehensive information that 
could be applied equally to all judicial districts at the federal level, information regarding 
the surrounding social environment was omitted from the models.5
Notwithstanding these limitations to the present study, the models that were 
constructed were found to be overall robust and performed exceedingly well when 
examining the influences that were significant contributing factors to the sentencing 
outcome.  These findings have illuminated the issue of whether disparities in sentencing 
outcomes arising out of gender, race, and ethnic differences among defendants has 
changed over time using over a decade of sentencing data.  It has also focused on the 
residual discretion exercised by federal judges in determining appropriate sanctions, 
providing a fertile ground for further research exploration. 
 
Policy Implications 
 Since the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 2005 in United States v. Booker and 
United States v. Fanfan that the Sentencing Guidelines are no longer presumptive, but 
merely “advisory” for federal judges to use in determining appropriate sanctions, it might 
give one the impression that the findings of this study are not relevant to the current 
policy debate.  However, while these rulings dealt a serious blow to the dominating force 
once exercised by the Guidelines, they certainly are not extinct.  Nor has determinate 
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sentencing been abolished in the federal court system.  In fact, by re-writing certain 
sections of the Guidelines with regard to relevant conduct, the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission can extend the longevity and reestablish the preeminent role that the 
Guidelines once held by in the sentencing process.  
 Likewise, the most recent trends in official crime rates suggest that crime is again 
on the rise.  Such a trend will inevitably be followed by an increased concern among the 
general public about how best to address issues of crime and criminal justice in their 
neighborhoods and communities.  Therefore, the findings of the current study become 
acutely germane in deciding whether a formally structured system such as the 
presumptive Sentencing Guidelines used in the federal court system provides the most 
appropriate response to the problem of crime and criminality.  Hence, the policy 
discussion takes a two-pronged approach.  The first prong assesses the efficacy of the 
presumptive Sentencing Guidelines in the federal courts in particular.  This leads to the 
second prong of the policy discussion, which forms around the larger debate of the utility 
of structured sentencing in general. 
 One of the primary purposes of the current study was to expand upon the findings 
of previous studies done on smaller samples or restricted in some other way such as by 
time and place constraints.  By removing many of these limitations, the results are much 
more generalizable to the overall population of offenders sentenced in the federal courts.  
Thus, the ability to assess different sentencing outcomes for similarly-situated offenders 
was enhanced.  The issue then becomes determining whether the Guidelines have created 
a fairer and more just system thus far, or, at a minimum, pointed the sentencing process 
in the direction its proponents have promised.  The Guidelines cannot accomplish the 
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desired outcome if they are differentially applied, resulting in the precarious balance 
between warranted and unwarranted disparity becoming a lop-sided affair. 
 According to the rational decision-making theory presented by Gottfredson and 
Gottfredson (1994), a rational case processing system must have a clear, consistent aim.  
Sentencing reform at the federal level was predicated on the goal of equity, but 
disagreement concerning the substantive merit of equal application of the law in this area 
continues to spark debate.  Indeed, equity in sentencing is not considered within the realm 
of possibility for those who view unequal status and access to opportunities as obstacles 
inherent within the existing social structure (Chesney-Lind, 1997; Simpson, 1989).  As 
noted by Kempf-Leonard and Sample (2001, p. 136), the “Guidelines may suffer a 
problem experienced with other such policy tools, that standardized instruments can 
institutionalize reliance upon inappropriate criteria and thereby equate cases based on 
statutory classifications that are substantively quite different.”  The findings of the 
current study suggest that the Guidelines have not achieved greater equity by reducing 
unwarranted disparities in sentencing when comparing outcomes in fiscal year 1993 to 
fiscal year 2003. 
 This begs the question then, what do we want the federal sentencing Guidelines to 
accomplish?  And, more specifically, can the Guidelines meet the needs of the federal 
courts in achieving equity in processing?  Thus far, no cause and effect relationship has 
been shown to exist between structured sentencing and crime rates (Tonry, 1995).  
Neither has any direct relationship been established with general deterrence.  Instead, the 
focus of the Guideline’s approach appear to be more about incapacitating the offender by 
means of incarceration in a federal prison based on calculations of offense severity and 
246
criminal history scores.  If the aim of the Guidelines is to rationalize the sentencing 
process, this can be accomplished much more effectively through the use of policy that is 
dynamic and that works cooperatively with judicial discretion. 
 Structured sentencing, in general, has demonstrated that the need exists for a 
certain amount of constraint to anchor the sentencing process.  Just as the higher courts 
review the decisions of lower courts to determine whether their rulings are aligned with 
the Constitution, structured sentencing can provide markers to guide decision makers 
toward the end goal of equitable sentencing while allowing for the use of discretion.  The 
underlying concept of sentencing guidelines is that they provide guidance without 
usurping the authority to make the final sentencing decision.  A rigid, inflexible system is 
no better than an indeterminate system with almost no guidance whatsoever.  In 
summary, structured sentencing that takes into account the need for balancing discretion 
with guidance that is malleable can achieve equitable and just outcomes.   
 
Future Research Directions 
 There are a number of paths for future research studies to take in the area of 
sentencing within the federal court system.  Indeed, research surrounding the use of the 
federal sentencing guidelines should be considered anything but complete.  While the 
current study provides a broader view of sentencing over time than has heretofore been 
presented, many questions remain about the feasibility of sentencing guidelines.  In fact, 
the most recent Commission data sets have hardly begun to be culled and analyzed yet by 
the research community.  Hence, a brief discussion of potential research veins is outlined 
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in the following paragraphs in order to stimulate further research and prioritize such 
endeavors while being removed from any political agendas or budget constraints. 
 First, there are a number of ways to continue building upon the foundation 
established by the current study.  This study used fiscal years to track changes in 
sentencing over time because the Guidelines are normally amended on an annual basis.  
A new Guidelines Manual is published by the Commission each year.  For the most part, 
changes in sentencing practice occur on an annual basis, although emergency 
amendments have been added at irregular intervals.  Hence, the time frame for this study 
was not chosen arbitrarily.  However, this assumption about the data does not guarantee 
that sentencing trends necessarily stopped or started within this time period.  One way to 
gather more in-depth data on changes over time would be to reduce the time between 
measurements to quarters.  This smaller time frame might capture more diversity, if such 
changes were occurring more rapidly than on an annual basis. 
 Another way to build on the current study would be to conduct a more detailed 
analysis of the effects of geographic court location on the sentencing outcome.  This 
study found that such differences exist, but did not determine whether the location of 
sentencing was more or less significant across the different types of outcomes.  Thus, 
future studies should compare the importance of geographic location of the sentencing 
court across outcomes.  There is a large amount of research that can be conducted to 
determine to a more exact extent the effects that each individual district court exercises 
over the sentencing process. 
 Likewise, a more detailed study of the influence of each particular type of crime 
would be beneficial.  This study reduced the type of offense for which the defendant was 
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sentenced to six major categories in order to reduce the degrees of freedom in the model 
and to make the model as parsimonious as possible.   Future studies can delineate exactly 
which types of offenses exercise the most influence over which types of sentencing 
outcomes. 
 The current study should also stimulate interest in the use of more advanced 
modeling techniques to affirm these findings.  For example, hierarchical modeling can 
permit the researcher to test for nesting effects in the model.  Future research can also 
explore more interaction effects between all of the independent variables rather than 
focus exclusively on the interaction between gender and race and ethnicity.  There are 
many other interactions to explore, such as between citizenship, age, education, and the 
number of counts of conviction.  One can also delve further into the significant effect of 
family status and the presence of dependent children on the sentencing outcome since this 
variable exerted significant influence on all three decision-making points in this study. 
 The second direction that future research can take is to explore aspects of 
sentencing under the federal sentencing guidelines that were completely excluded from 
this study.  This study focuses only on whether or not the defendant received a sentence 
of incarceration, but there is a great deal that can be learned from the study of defendants 
who were sentenced to intermediate sanctions such as community confinement, home 
detention, and other types of intermittent confinement.  It is just as important to 
understand the characteristics that influence whether a defendant is sentence to prison as 
to understand which characteristics influence whether a defendant receives an 
intermediate sentence of confinement, or even probation rather than prison.  In this data 
set, 25,622 (five percent) of the defendants, who were located in Zones C or D, who 
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received zero months in prison.  In other words, they received sentences involving 
intermediate sanctions and/or downward departures so that they did not go to prison.  
This group of defendants certainly merits further study. 
 The lines between race and ethnicity are not always clear.  Other researchers have 
made a point of separating out the effects by white Hispanics and black Hispanics 
(Mustard, 2001; Chanhatasilpa, 2000).  In his study, Mustard (2001) found that black 
Hispanics differed from white Hispanics and other Hispanics in that they had higher 
offense levels, were less likely to be U.S. citizens, had smaller annual incomes, and 
received longer average prison terms.  In this study, the majority (95.5 percent) of 
Hispanics were identified in the white racial category.  Another 4.1 percent of the study 
group was identified as black Hispanics, and 0.4 percent was identified as other 
Hispanics.  Based on the differences suggested in other studies, future analyses should 
take into account the potential for differences in sentencing outcomes arising out of the 
distinct racial categories within the Hispanic ethnicity category. 
 There is also a great deal of research that can be done to better understand the 
departure decision when sentences do not fall within the range prescribed by the 
sentencing guidelines.  This study focused solely on the judicial downward departure 
decision, but it is no less important to understand the factors that influence the decision to 
grant a substantial assistance departure or an upward departure.  As Mustard (2001) 
emphasized in his research, it is as important to study the magnitude of the departure as it 
is to study its occurrence (see also Steffensmeier and DeMuth, 2000; Griswold, 1987; 
Kramer and Ulmer, 1996 for emphasis on analyzing the size of the departure).  Moreover, 
it would be very interesting to follow those defendants who received departures and see 
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whether their future recidivism rates are different than those offenders who did not 
receive departures and were sentencing within the guideline’s range. 
 Finally, this research excluded some variables because they were not available 
during much of the time period covered in this study.  However, future research should 
focus on uncovering the amount of influence that these excluded variables have in the 
sentencing process.  Studies that utilize more recent data sets can examine the impact of 
such variables as marital status and type of defense counsel that were not analyzed in this 
study.  Uncovering the effects of these variables can increase a model’s ability to 
decipher the various influences involved in the sentencing decision. 
 
Conclusion 
 The findings from this study should emphasize the importance of conducting 
research on the outcomes of defendants sentenced under the Guidelines that is not limited 
to one offense type, or to a few judicial circuits, or to just a few years of data.  They have 
also demonstrated how federal district court judges continue to exercise a substantial 
amount of discretion in deciding whether to incarcerate, what the length of incarceration 
should be, and whether to grant a judicial downward departure.  Indeed, the variation in 
sentencing attributable to judges in the federal courts is still considerable (LaCasse & 
Payne, 1999).  Hence, these findings raise the question of whether the Commission’s 
success in limiting judicial discretion by means of structured sentencing have resulted in 
higher rates of incarceration for women and minorities, or, whether it was the federal 
judges that, through their staunch adherence to the Guidelines, have pointed out the 
injustices created by them?  Overall, sentencing under the Guidelines is a very complex 
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process, combined with the involvement of various courtroom actors, each of whom 
represents different groups with different agendas who are aiming for different outcomes.  
While this study focuses on judicial decision-making behavior, research on all other 
relevant courtroom actors will provide a more comprehensive understanding of the 
outcomes we are trying to predict. 
 If the measure of success for the SRA in general, and the Sentencing Guidelines 
in particular, has been to achieve uniformity in sentencing outcomes based on the 
characteristics of the offense rather than on the characteristics of the offender, this goal 
has not been achieved by fiscal year 2003, the final year of this study, although some 
strides have been made in certain areas.  Of the three sentencing outcomes analyzed in 
this study, the judicial downward departure outcome has experienced the most change 
over time.  In the end, federal judges are more comfortable departing away from the 
prescribed guidelines ranges, indicating that at least some of the persistent disparity in 
sentences may be both necessary and warranted. 
 
TABLE 8.1. Summary of Findings of “Support” or “No Support” from Testing of Hypotheses







1. The influence of extra-legal factors on the Imprisonment (In/Out) Decision






2. The influence of extra-legal factors on the Length-of-Term Decision




Y (blk) / N (Hsp)
YES
3. The influence of extra-legal factors on the Judicial Downward Departure Decision






4. The Type of Disposition (Plea vs. Trial Conviction) will influence the sentencing outcome.
A. Pleading guilty will influence the In/Out Decision
B. Pleading guilty will influence the Length-of-Term Decision







5. The Offense Type (6 categories) will influence the sentencing outcome.
A. The Offense Type category will influence the In/Out Decision
B. The Offense Type category will influence the Length-of-Term Decision





YES (4) / NO (1)
YES (1) / NO (4)
6. The District Court will influence the sentencing outcome.
A. The District Court Location will influence the In/Out Decision
B. The District Court Location will influence the Length-of-Term Decision







7. The Fiscal Year of Sentencing will influence the sentencing outcome.
A. The Fiscal Year of Sentencing will influence the In/Out Decision
B. The Fiscal Year of Sentencing will influence the Length-of-Term Decision





















FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03
In/Out Prison Length of Term Jud Departure
* NOTE: The coefficients for sentence length were reduced by a factor of 10 to fit within the same 
scale as the other two coefficients. 
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1.  When the individual fiscal year data sets were combined and cleaned, 77 cases were 
discovered with the same identifying file number as contained in the previous fiscal 
year’s data set.  After examining the data, it was concluded that these are the same cases, 
with each file containing separate court documents, but received by the Commission at 
different times.  It is unknown whether the Commission is aware of this overlap in their 
data sets, given that they keep each fiscal year separately.  Thus, the current study will 
treat these duplicate cases as distinct in order to be in line with official Commission 
publications.  The numbers of duplicate cases are: four in FY 1994, nine in FY 1996, two 
in FY 1997, two in FY 1998, 14 in FY 1999, eight in FY 2000, nine in FY 2001, 13 in 
FY 2002, and 16 in FY 2003. 
 
2.  The Federal Judicial District Courts are commonly abbreviated in two or three letters.  
The first two characters identify the state using the state’s postal abbreviation.  If there is 
more than one district court within a state, a third character is used to describe it.  These 
letters are C = Central, E = East, M = Middle, N = North, S = South, or W = West. 
 
3.  Recent studies analyzing departures from the Guidelines have excluded cases in Zone 
A of the sentencing table, reasoning that the penalty ranges already allow for zero months 
of incarceration without the need for a departure.  Whether the cases in Zone A actually 
received a judicial downward departure, or if they are instead the result of reporting, 
coding, or data entry errors is unknown.  As a precaution, a supplemental multinomial 
regression procedure, which excluded cases that were located in Zone A, was performed 
to check the estimates for the judicial downward departure outcome.  The multinomial 
logistic regression for judicial downward departures for defendants located in Zones B, 
C, and D did not result in radically different estimates, lending credence to the robustness 
of the findings of the original regression that included all four zones. 
 
4.  Allison (1999) has pointed out that comparisons of logit coefficients across groups are 
potentially confounded by differences in residual variation.  In essence, the difference in 
two coefficients may be an artifact of differences in the unobserved heterogeneity in the 
models.  These differences in residual variation can then lead to invalid conclusions.  As 
a solution, he suggests a test for interactions between particular predictors and dummy 
(indicator) variables representing the groups.  Allison’s heteroskedastic logit model, with 
a single dichotomous variable in the variance equation, is a special case of the larger class 
of models that are variously known as location scale models and heterogeneous choice 
models.  Allison’s paper was written in 1999.  The specialized routines that Allison wrote 
are no longer necessary because modern statistical software packages include routines for 
estimating heterogeneous choice models.  According to Williams (2006), Allison has 
provided a valuable service by alerting researchers to an important problem that has gone 
unnoticed by many.  However, thanks, in part, to additional research that Allison’s paper 
has inspired, we now know that his original proposed solution can sometimes have 
serious problems, and, counter to his advice, should not be applied on a routine basis.  
The best solution in this study was to estimate models both with and without controls for 
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heteroskedasticity, and consider whether model mis-specification could be the cause of 
any seemingly-major differences in conclusions (see also Hoetker, 2003). 
 
5.  A part of the unexplained variance in the models may be attributable to historical and 
political events that might have affected the hypothesized convergence.  For example, a 
Democratic administration was in the White House from 1992 to 2000, so federal judicial 
nominations and Supreme Court nominations originated from the Democratic Party.  
However, after the 2000 elections, a Republican administration was in the White House.  
There have also been important swings in the majority party of the U.S. Congress.  At the 
same time, pertinent case law such as Koon v. United States (1996) has continued to 
accumulate.  Important changes such as these might well have influenced Commission 
priorities and impacted sentencing outcomes in a myriad number of ways.  These are just 
some of the contextual factors, in addition to district-specific or circuit-specific traditions 
and legal cultures, which may affect the discretion exercised by the courtroom actors in a 





SENTENCING TABLE  
(in months of imprisonment)  
Criminal History Category (Criminal History Points)   
Offense I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
Level (0 or 1)   (2 or 3)   (4,5,6)   (7,8,9)   (10,11,12)   
(13 or 
more) 
1 0-6  0-6  0-6  0-6  0-6   0-6 
2 0-6  0-6  0-6  0-6   0-6  1-7 
3 0-6  0-6  0-6   0-6  2-8  3-9 
4 0-6  0-6   0-6  2-8  4-10   6-12 
5 0-6   0-6  1-7  4-10   6-12  9-15 Zone
A 6 0-6  1-7  2-8  6-12  9-15   12-18 
7 0-6  2-8  4-10  8-14   12-18  15-21 
8 0-6  4-10   6-12  10-16   15-21  18-24 
9 4-10   6-12  8-14   12-18  18-24  21-27 
Zone
B
10 6-12  8-14   10-16   15-21  21-27  24-30 
11 8-14   10-16  12-18  18-24  24-30  27-33 Zone
C 12 10-16   12-18  15-21  21-27  27-33  30-37 
13 12-18  15-21  18-24  24-30  30-37  33-41 
14 15-21  18-24  21-27  27-33  33-41  37-46 
15 18-24  21-27  24-30  30-37  37-46  41-51 
16 21-27  24-30  27-33  33-41  41-51  46-57 
17 24-30  27-33  30-37  37-46  46-57  51-63 
18 27-33  30-37  33-41  41-51  51-63  57-71 
19 30-37  33-41  37-46  46-57  57-71  63-78 
20 33-41  37-46  41-51  51-63  63-78  70-87 
21 37-46  41-51  46-57  57-71  70-87  77-96 
22 41-51  46-57  51-63  63-78  77-96  84-105 
23 46-57  51-63  57-71  70-87  84-105  92-115 
24 51-63  57-71  63-78  77-96  92-115  100-125 
25 57-71  63-78  70-87  84-105  100-125  110-137 
26 63-78  70-87  78-97  92-115  110-137  120-150 Zone
D 27 70-87  78-97  87-108  100-125  120-150  130-162 
28 78-97  87-108  97-121  110-137  130-162  140-175 
29 87-108  97-121  108-135  121-151  140-175  151-188 
30 97-121  108-135  121-151  135-168  151-188  168-210 
31 108-135  121-151  135-168  151-188  168-210  188-235 
32 121-151  135-168  151-188  168-210  188-235  210-262 
33 135-168  151-188  168-210  188-235  210-262  235-293 
34 151-188  168-210  188-235  210-262  235-293  262-327 
35 168-210  188-235  210-262  235-293  262-327  292-365 
36 188-235  210-262  235-293  262-327  292-365  324-405 
37 210-262  235-293  262-327  292-365  324-405  360-life 
38 235-293  262-327  292-365  324-405  360-life  360-life 
39 262-327  292-365  324-405  360-life  360-life  360-life 
40 292-365  324-405  360-life  360-life  360-life  360-life 
41 324-405  360-life  360-life  360-life  360-life  360-life 
42 360-life  360-life  360-life  360-life  360-life  360-life 
≥43 life  life  Life  life  Life  life 
SOURCE: Inside back cover of the U.S. Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual (November, 2001). 
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The Federal Courts 
U.S. Courts of Appeals and U.S. District Courts 
 
Court of Appeals District Courts Authorized Judgeships Location 
Federal Court United States 12 Washington, D.C. 
 
District of District of Columbia 12 Washington, D.C. 
Columbia Circuit 
 
First Circuit Maine 6 Boston, MA 
 Massachusetts 
 New Hampshire 
 Rhode Island 
 Puerto Rico 
 
Second Circuit Connecticut 13 New York, NY 
 New York (4) 
 Vermont 
 
Third Circuit Delaware 14 Philadelphia, PA 
 New Jersey 
 Pennsylvania (3) 
 Virgin Islands 
 
Fourth Circuit Maryland 15 Richmond, VA 
 North Carolina (3) 
 South Carolina 
 Virginia (2) 
 West Virginia (2) 
 
Fifth Circuit Louisiana (3) 17 New Orleans, LA 
 Mississippi (2) 
 Texas (4) 
 
Sixth Circuit Kentucky (2) 16 Cincinnati, OH 
 Michigan (2) 
 Ohio (2) 
 Tennessee (3) 
 
Seventh Circuit Illinois (3) 11 Chicago, IL 
 Indiana (2) 
 Wisconsin (2) 
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The Federal Courts 
U.S. Courts of Appeals and U.S. District Courts 
(continued) 
 
Court of Appeals District Courts Authorized Judgeships Location 
Eighth Circuit Arkansas (2) 11 St. Louis, MO 
 Iowa (2) 
 Minnesota 
 Missouri (2) 
 Nebraska 
 North Dakota 
 South Dakota 
 
Ninth Circuit Alaska 28 San Francisco, CA 
 Arizona 






 Washington (2) 
 Guam 
 N. Mariana Islands 
 
Tenth Circuit Colorado 12 Denver, CO 
 Kansas  
 New Mexico 




Eleventh Circuit Alabama (3) 12 Atlanta, GA 
 Florida (3) 
 Georgia (3) 
 






Table 1.  District Court Coefficients Derived from the Full Logistic Regression  
 Model for In/Out Decision 
Full Model          Full Model           Full Model  
 FY1993 – FY2003  FY1993  FY2003 
Variable  B /(S.E.)     Exp(B)        B /(S.E.)     Exp(B)     B /(S.E.)  Exp(B)/ Z 
Maine¹ - - - - - -
Massachusetts -1.606** .201 -2.172** .114 -2.253** .105 
 (.149)  (.543)  (.473) .113 
New Hampshire -1.106** .331 -1.476* .229 -1.922** .146 
 (.195)  (.607)  (.510) .563 
Puerto Rico -1.508** .221 -1.357** .257 -1.800** .165 
 (.135)  (.440)  (.449) .705 
Rhode Island -.197 .821 -.146 .865 -1.175 .309 
 (.243)  (.738)  (.827) .929 
Connecticut -1.794** .166 -1.571** .208 -3.115** .044 
 (.174)  (.504)  (.540) 2.089* 
New York East -1.479** .228 -1.601** .202 -1.387** .250 
 (.125)  (.415)  (.386) -.377 
New York North -.883** .413 -1.320** .267 -.984* .374 
 (.130)  (.446)  (.430) -.541 
New York South -1.979** .138 -2.140** .118 -1.987** .137 
 (.119)  (.395)  (.375) -.282 
New York West -1.760** .172 -2.223** .108 -2.169** .114 
 (.137)  (.443)  (.448) -.086 
Vermont -1.410** .244 -3.295** .037 -1.467* .231 
 (.201)  (1.125)  (.682) -1.389 
Delaware -1.714** .180 -.055 .946 -3.320** .036 
 (.197)  (.691)  (.665) 3.404* 
New Jersey -1.924** .146 -1.793** .167 -2.494** .083 
 (.129)  (.411)  (.405) 1.216 
Pennsylvania East -1.561** .210 -1.987** .137 -1.730** .177 
 (.131)  (.421)  (.415) -.435 
Pennsylvania Middle -.740** .477 -1.195* .303 -.967* .380 
 (.140)  (.506)  (.475) -.328 
Pennsylvania West -1.528** .217 -1.786** .168 -2.096** .123 
 (.148)  (.464)  (.483) .464 
Virgin Islands -.195 .823 .039 1.039 .012 1.012 
 (.151)  (.435)  (.571) .037 
Maryland -1.738** .176 -2.299** .100 -.795 .452 
 (.161)  (.476)  (.487) -2.207* 
No. Carolina East -1.726** .178 -2.089** .124 -2.142** .117 
 (.141)  (.506)  (.469) .076 
No. Carolina Middle -1.128** .324 -1.521** .219 -.464 .629 
 (.154)  (.526)  (.580) -1.351 
No. Carolina West -1.239** .290 -2.155** .116 -1.456** .233 
 (.140)  (.473)  (.478) -1.039 
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Table 1.  District Court Coefficients Derived from the Full Logistic Regression  
 Model for In/Out Decision (continued) 
Full Model          Full Model           Full Model  
 FY1993 – FY2003  FY1993  FY2003 
Variable  B /(S.E.)     Exp(B)        B /(S.E.)     Exp(B)     B /(S.E.)  Exp(B)/ Z 
South Carolina -1.513** .220 -1.723** .178 -1.766** .171 
 (.121)  (.391)  (.381) .078 
Virginia East -.821** .440 -1.163** .313 -1.078** .340 
 (.117)  (.388)  (.364) -.159 
Virginia West -1.010** .364 -1.440** .237 -1.631** .196 
 (.142)  (.498)  (.435) .290 
West Virginia North -.717** .488 -.047 .954 -.967 .380 
 (.183)  (.540)  (.637) 1.101 
West Virginia South -1.022** .360 -1.001* .367 -.260 .771 
 (.155)  (.444)  (.477) -1.138 
Louisiana East -1.434** .238 -.933* .393 -2.142** .117 
 (.135)  (.407)  (.451) 1.991* 
Louisiana Middle -1.004** .366 -.286 .751 -1.644** .193 
 (.170)  (.684)  (.495) 1.609 
Louisiana West -.742** .476 -.331 .718 -.860* .423 
 (.135)  (.428)  (.419) .884 
Mississippi North -.903** .405 -.992 .371 -2.158** .116 
 (.167)  (.518)  (.616) 1.449 
Mississippi South -.934** .393 -.935* .393 -.608 .544 
 (.145)  (.472)  (.419) -.518 
Texas East -.998** .369 -1.436** .238 -.638 .528 
 (.139)  (.441)  (.437) -1.285 
Texas North -.742** .476 -.894* .409 -.633 .531 
 (.120)  (.397)  (.381) -.475 
Texas South -.847** .429 -1.141** .319 -.540 .583 
 (.115)  (.387)  (.367) -1.129 
Texas West -1.708** .181 -.471 .624 -1.531** .216 
 (.114)  (.397)  (.361) 1.976* 
Kentucky East -.552** .576 -1.054* .349 -.930* .395 
 (.130)  (.436)  (.436) -.201  
Kentucky West -2.032** .131 -2.043** .130 -2.608** .074 
 (.132)  (.426)  (.419) .945 
Michigan East -.796** .451 -.900* .407 -1.595** .203 
 (.122)  (.394)  (.412) 1.218 
Michigan West -.276* .759 -.190 .827 -.180 .835 
 (.138)  (.456)  (.458) -.015 
Ohio North -.870** .419 -2.661** .070 -.880* .415 
 (.119)  (.435)  (.375) -3.098* 
Ohio South -1.071** .343 -.856* .425 -1.646** .193 
 (.131)  (.412)  (.430) 1.326 
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Table 1.  District Court Coefficients Derived from the Full Logistic Regression  
 Model for In/Out Decision (continued) 
Full Model          Full Model           Full Model  
 FY1993 – FY2003  FY1993  FY2003 
Variable  B /(S.E.)     Exp(B)        B /(S.E.)     Exp(B)     B /(S.E.)  Exp(B)/ Z 
Tennessee East -.712** .491 -.239 .787 -.901* .406 
 (.142)  (.431)  (.439) 1.075 
Tennessee Middle -1.011** .364 -.663 .515 -1.506** .222 
 (.160)  (.526)  (.598) 1.058 
Tennessee West -1.285** .277 -1.727** .178 -1.131** .323 
 (.142)  (.446)  (.433) -.958 
Illinois Central -.385** .681 -.417 .659 .161 1.174 
 (.157)  (.505)  (.477) -.832 
Illinois North -1.465** .231 -1.662** .190 -1.317** .268 
 (.127)  (.402)  (.388) -.617 
Illinois South -1.336** .263 -2.752** .064 -1.336* .263 
 (.189)  (.668)  (.563) -1.621 
Indiana North -1.851** .157 -2.954** .052 -1.482** .227 
 (.167)  (.564)  (.481) -1.986 
Indiana South -1.429** .240 -.278 .758 -1.551* .212 
 (.191)  (.562)  (.780) -1.324 
Wisconsin East -2.136** .118 -3.142** .043 -1.470** .230 
 (.178)  (.615)  (.545) -2.034* 
Wisconsin West .952** 2.592 1.376** 3.961 -.008 1.008 
 (.177)  (.509)  (.626) 1.697 
Arkansas East -.704** .495 -.693 .500 -1.608** .200 
 (.141)  (.462)  (.460) 1.405 
Arkansas West -.878** .416 -1.735** .180 -.215 .807 
 (.158)  (.464)  (.522) -2.147* 
Iowa North -.567** .567 -2.142** .117 .271 1.312 
 (.170)  (.806)  (.584) -2.424* 
Iowa South -.983** .374 -.463 .629 -1.570** .208 
 (.189)  (.646)  (.499) 1.356 
Minnesota -1.146** .318 -.736 .479 -1.215** .297 
 (.153)  (.454)  (.473) .731 
Missouri East -.821** .440 -.587 .556 -1.016** .362 
 (.137)  (.457)  (.420) .691 
Missouri West -1.265** .282 -1.642** .194 -1.223** .294 
 (.150)  (.463)  (.458) -.643 
Nebraska -1.032** .356 -1.056* .348 -1.164* .312 
 (.159)  (.460)  (.508) .158 
North Dakota -.946** .388 -1.854** .157 -.884 .413 
 (.146)  (.492)  (.467) -1.430 
South Dakota -.175 .839 -.067 .935 -.974* .378 
 (.132)  (.449)  (.449) 1.428 
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Table 1.  District Court Coefficients Derived from the Full Logistic Regression  
 Model for In/Out Decision (continued) 
Full Model          Full Model           Full Model  
 FY1993 – FY2003  FY1993  FY2003 
Variable  B /(S.E.)     Exp(B)        B /(S.E.)     Exp(B)     B /(S.E.)  Exp(B)/ Z 
Alaska -1.561** .210 -.963 .382 -1.236* .290 
 (.176)  (.534)  (.559) .354 
Arizona -.507** .602 -1.636** .195 -.080 .923 
 (.116)  (.397)  (.361) -2.901* 
California Central -1.224** .294 -.642 .526 -1.943** .143 
 (.120)  (.406)  (.370) 2.369* 
California East -1.407** .245 -1.485** .226 -1.527** .217 
 (.130)  (.427)  (.411) .070 
California North -2.412** .090 -2.557** .078 -2.125** .119 
 (.140)  (.588)  (.429) -.593 
California South -.456** .634 -.835* .434 -.428 .652 
 (.122)  (.411)  (.438) -.678 
Guam -.366* .694 -3.236** .039 .190 1.210 
 (.153)  (.649)  (.558) -4.001* 
Hawaii -1.153** .316 -.596 .551 -1.425** .240 
 (.144)  (.485)  (.466) 1.223 
Idaho -.845** .430 -.602 .548 -2.138** .118 
 (.187)  (.747)  (.584) 1.621 
Montana -1.064** .345 -1.033* .356 -.505 .604 
 (.147)  (.462)  (.447) -.821 
Nevada -1.459** .232 -1.637** .194 -1.499** .223 
 (.135)  (.425)  (.408) -.234 
No. Mariana Islands -1.205* .300 17.894 .000 -2.111 .121 
 (.572)  (40,192.970)  (1.621) -.000 
Oregon -1.554 .211 -1.880** .153 -2.664** .070 
 (.157)  (.509)  (.536) 1.061 
Washington East -.686** .504 -.543 .581 -.811 .444 
 (.157)  (.488)  (.504) .382 
Washington West -.857** .424 -1.866** .155 -.796* .451 
 (.130)  (.442)  (.414) -1.767 
Colorado -1.129** .323 -1.376** .253 -.707 .493 
 (.135)  (.437)  (.423) -1.100 
Kansas -1.164** .312 -.860* .423 -2.077** .125 
 (.141)  (.447)  (.459) 1.900 
New Mexico -.523** .593 1.402** .246 -.779* .459 
 (.121)  (.422)  (.377) -1.100 
Oklahoma East -2.311** .099 .009 1.009 -3.125** .044 
 (.287)  (.852)  (.981) 2.411* 
Oklahoma North -1.394** .248 -2.181** .113 -1.152* .316 
 (.164)  (.579)  (.576) -1.259 
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Table 1.  District Court Coefficients Derived from the Full Logistic Regression  
 Model for In/Out Decision (continued) 
Full Model          Full Model           Full Model  
 FY1993 – FY2003  FY1993  FY2003 
Variable  B /(S.E.)     Exp(B)        B /(S.E.)     Exp(B)     B /(S.E.)  Exp(B)/ Z 
Oklahoma West -.492** .611 .369 1.447 -1.109* .330 
 (.150)  (.431)  (.510) 2.214* 
Utah -1.482** .227 -1.387** .250 -2.217** .109 
 (.137)  (.455)  (.415) 1.348 
Wyoming -.587** .556 -2.433** .088 .801 2.228 
 (.184)  (.639)  (.727) -3.341* 
Alabama Middle -1.376** .253 -1.065* .345 -2.680** .069 
 (.160)  (.460)  (.733) 1.865 
Alabama North -1.368** .255 -1.912** .148 -1.124** .325 
 (.136)  (.464)  (.423) -1.255 
Alabama South -.910** .402 -1.388** .250 -1.256** .285 
 (.147)  (.430)  (.471) -.206 
Florida Middle -.865** .421 -1.403** .246 -1.457** .233 
 (.118)  (.402)  (.375) .098 
Florida North -.625** .535 -.276 .759 -1.789** .167 
 (.151)  (.479)  (.503) 2.180* 
Florida South -.971** .379 -1.106** .331 -1.160** .313  
 (.118)  (.395)  (.367) .101 
Georgia Middle -1.103** .332 -1.691** .184 -1.309** .270 
 (.134)  (.496)  (.412) -.592 
Georgia North -1.468** .230 -2.095** .123 -2.068** .126 
 (.136)  (.454)  (.469) -.041 
Georgia South -.874** .417 -.713 .490 -1.623** .197 
 (.148)  (.509)  (.487) 1.291 
Dist. of Columbia -1.788** .167 -1.732** .177 -1.923** .146  
 (.135)  (.434)  (.459) .303 
 
N 95,810 9,324 10,944
Nagelkerke R2 Value  .436   .417   .551 
Model Prediction Rate 78.3%   80.7%   80.5% 
1 = Reference Category, the District Court that was held constant in the model. 
* p < .05      ** p < .01 
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Table 2.  District Court Coefficients Derived from the Full OLS Regression Model  
 for Mean Sentence Length 
Full Model       Full Model           Full Model  
 FY1993 – FY2003          FY1993   FY2003 
 Unstand.     Stand.   Unstand.     Stand.     Unstand.     Stand. 
Variable  B / (S.E.)     B    B / (S.E.)     B     B / (S.E.) B/ Z Test   
Maine -.451 .000 -2.238 -.002 5.000 .004 
 (1.405)  (5.083)  (4.186) -1.099 
Massachusetts -10.262** -.013 -7.420 -.008 -5.004 -.006 
 (1.193)  (4.444)  (3.493) -.427 
New Hampshire -4.928** -.004 3.929 .003 -6.673 -.005 
 (1.481)  (5.544)  (4.161) 1.529 
Puerto Rico 9.884** .014 10.405** .013 15.450** .026 
 (1.166)  (4.240)  (3.326) -.936 
Rhode Island¹ - - - - - -
- - - -
Connecticut -6.479** -.006 6.130 .006 -7.379* -.008 
 (1.301)  (4.721)  (3.621) 2.270* 
New York East -11.193** -.024 -3.804 -.008 -7.076* -.016 
 (1.095)  (3.769)  (3.214) .660 
New York North -9.620** -.010 -.064 .000 -4.371 -.004 
 (1.257)  (4.491)  (3.666) .743 
New York South -10.184** -.022 .735 .001 -3.923 -.009 
 (1.095)  (3.846)  (3.212) .930 
New York West -4.625** -.005 1.249 .001 -2.179 -.002 
 (1.238)  (4.497)  (3.591) .596 
Vermont -7.737** -.005 5.218 .004 -7.324 -.005 
 (1.518)  (5.149)  (4.193) 1.889 
Delaware -3.466* -.002 3.525 .002 -7.576 -.005  
 (1.672)  (5.986)  (4.498) 1.483 
New Jersey -2.430* -.004 2.801 .004 -2.560 -.004 
 (1.147)  (4.162)  (3.351) 1.003 
Pennsylvania East -16.252** -.028 -27.092** -.055 -14.017** -.023 
 (1.122)  (3.793)  (3.309) -2.598* 
Pennsylvania Middle -5.204** -.006 3.218 .003 -3.591 -.004 
 (1.236)  (4.406)  (3.636) 1.192 
Pennsylvania West -.479 -.000 -.617 -.001 5.502 .006 
 (1.280)  (4.418)  (3.652) -1.067 
Virgin Islands -.174 -.000 5.826 .005 6.196 .003 
 (1.595)  (5.001)  (5.101) -.052 
Maryland -1.486 -.002 .953 .001 1.920 .003 
 (1.182)  (4.386)  (3.418) -.174 
No. Carolina East 4.887** .007 17.552** .023 -2.290 -.003 
 (1.175)  (4.150)  (3.413) 3.693* 
No. Carolina Middle 6.961** .009 4.096 .005 10.051** .011 
 (1.200)  (4.183)  (3.551) -1.085 
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Table 2.  District Court Coefficients Derived from the Full OLS Regression Model  
 for Mean Sentence Length (continued) 
Full Model       Full Model           Full Model  
 FY1993 – FY2003          FY1993   FY2003 
 Unstand.     Stand.   Unstand.     Stand.     Unstand.     Stand. 
Variable  B / (S.E.)     B    B / (S.E.)     B     B / (S.E.) B/ Z Test   
No. Carolina West -7.899** -.012 -2.376 -.004 2.501 .004 
 (1.159)  (3.994)  (3.401) -.930 
South Carolina 4.137** .007 2.401 .004 6.478* .011 
 (1.129)  (3.914)  (3.302) -.796 
Virginia East 10.427** .020 12.041** .021 12.512** .027 
 (1.108)  (3.891)  (3.224) -.093 
Virginia West -3.021** -.004 -5.632 -.006 1.203 .002 
 (1.206)  (4.386)  (3.432) -1.227 
West Virginia North 6.687** .006 5.191 .005 5.590 .006 
 (1.342)  (4.546)  (3.703) -.068 
West Virginia South 6.330** .007 8.583* .011 9.166** .010 
 (1.262)  (4.183)  (3.643) -.105 
Louisiana East 1.124 .001 3.058 .004 3.350 .004 
 (1.206)  (4.173)  (3.493) -.054 
Louisiana Middle .527 .000 3.389 .002 -4.064 -.002 
 (1.625)  (6.065)  (4.702) .973 
Louisiana West 3.263** .003 13.499** .013 5.864 .006 
 (1.281)  (4.614)  (3.666) 1.296 
Mississippi North -3.107* -.002 .583 .000 -1.505 -.001 
 (1.421)  (5.079)  (4.151) .318 
Mississippi South .374 .000 6.876 .007 5.881 .007 
 (1.266)  (4.392)  (3.533) .177 
Texas East 3.987** .006 10.187** .013 4.412 .007 
 (1.157)  (4.190)  (3.370) 1.074 
Texas North 4.903** .010 13.301** .026 8.270** .016 
 (1.103)  (3.800)  (3.256) 1.005 
Texas South .620 .002 3.816 .009 1.046 .004 
 (1.061)  (3.714)  (3.128) .571 
Texas West .104 .000 5.050 .012 1.552 .006 
 (1.060)  (3.704)  (3.128) .721 
Kentucky East -.486 -.001 4.569 .005 1.479 .002 
 (1.207)  (4.369)  (3.519) .551 
Kentucky West .565 .001 -.825 -.001 -2.816 -.003 
 (1.339)  (5.060)  (3.795) .315 
Michigan East -2.604* -.004 5.417 .011 .050 .000 
 (1.127)  (3.812)  (3.381) 1.053 
Michigan West -.080 .000 11.991** .011 3.313 .004 
 (1.235)  (4.689)  (3.479) 1.486 
Ohio North -2.194* -.003 6.749 .010 -2.808 -.004 
 (1.146)  (4.023)  (3.331) 1.830 
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Table 2.  District Court Coefficients Derived from the Full OLS Regression Model  
 for Mean Sentence Length (continued) 
Full Model       Full Model           Full Model  
 FY1993 – FY2003          FY1993   FY2003 
 Unstand.     Stand.   Unstand.     Stand.     Unstand.     Stand. 
Variable  B / (S.E.)     B    B / (S.E.)     B     B / (S.E.) B/ Z Test   
Ohio South -3.097** -.004 .437 .001 -4.903 -.006 
 (1.207)  (4.063)  (3.510) .995 
Tennessee East 6.270** .008 4.513 .006 14.327** .020 
 (1.187)  (4.196)  (3.390) -1.819 
Tennessee Middle -1.074 -.001 3.651 .003 .020 .000 
 (1.338)  (4.865)  (3.760) .590 
Tennessee West -1.132 -.001 1.132 .001 -2.695 -.003 
 (1.207)  (4.166)  (3.475) .705 
Illinois Central 5.265** .006 7.486 .008 15.289** .018 
 (1.256)  (4.447)  (3.549) -1.371 
Illinois North -.171 .000 6.627 .009 1.324 .003 
 (1.138)  (4.023)  (3.245) .956 
Illinois South 11.146** .013 9.954* .011 6.609 .007 
 (1.225)  (4.353)  (3.595) .592 
Indiana North -2.262 -.002 2.821 .002 -6.350 -.007 
 (1.279)  (4.998)  (3.581) 1.491 
Indiana South 7.612** .007 14.312** .014 9.157 .009 
 (1.308)  (4.559)  (3.696) .874 
Wisconsin East 3.063* .003 15.022** .017 7.065 .007 
 (1.284)  (4.322)  (3.703) 1.398 
Wisconsin West 13.064** .010 15.211** .012 15.899** .013 
 (1.455)  (4.953)  (3.986) -.108 
Arkansas East 2.775* .003 2.669 .002 4.365 .004 
 (1.297)  (4.752)  (3.954) -.274 
Arkansas West 2.455 .002 7.532 .005 -.712 -.001 
 (1.493)  (5.321)  (4.087) 1.229 
Iowa North .063 .000 -1.019 -.001 4.350 .005 
 (1.290)  (5.243)  (3.488) -.853 
Iowa South 6.011** .006 16.324** .012 7.495 .009 
 (1.263)  (5.288)  (3.524) 1.389 
Minnesota -5.039** -.006 3.572 .004 -3.085 -.004 
 (1.199)  (4.220)  (3.501) 1.214 
Missouri East .858 .001 8.926 .010 .466 .001 
 (1.163)  (4.301)  (3.340) 1.554 
Missouri West -6.172** -.008 4.885 .007 -4.256 -.006 
 (1.174)  (4.108)  (3.366) 1.721 
Nebraska 2.105 .003 -5.839 -.006 12.247** .019 
 (1.205)  (4.620)  (3.344) -3.171* 
North Dakota -4.150** -.003 2.044 .001 -2.679 -.002 
 (1.510)  (5.838)  (4.156) .659 
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Table 2.  District Court Coefficients Derived from the Full OLS Regression Model  
 for Mean Sentence Length (continued) 
Full Model       Full Model           Full Model  
 FY1993 – FY2003          FY1993   FY2003 
 Unstand.     Stand.   Unstand.     Stand.     Unstand.     Stand. 
Variable  B / (S.E.)     B    B / (S.E.)     B     B / (S.E.) B/ Z Test   
South Dakota 2.622* .003 7.934 .006 3.466 .003 
 (1.307)  (5.040)  (3.784) .709 
Alaska .984 .001 .651 .000 3.200 .002 
 (1.530)  (6.113)  (4.351) -.340 
Arizona -8.202** -.023 -4.364 -.009 -4.604 -.017 
 (1.072)  (3.783)  (3.137) -.049 
California Central -2.891** -.005 4.225 .006 -6.473* -.013 
 (1.113)  (4.023)  (3.244) 2.070 
California East -2.919** -.004 9.289* .013 -7.763* -.012 
 (1.178)  (4.083)  (3.337) 3.234* 
California North -7.233** -.010 8.403 .007 -6.348 -.008 
 (1.179)  (4.837)  (3.460) 2.480* 
California South -9.369** -.025 -6.990 -.017 -7.469* -.018 
 (1.074)  (3.719)  (3.197) .098 
Guam 1.696 .001 7.239 .003 -3.277 -.002  
 (1.702)  (7.458)  (5.423) 1.140 
Hawaii -6.329** -.006 -2.384 -.002 -6.632 -.007 
 (1.293)  (5.097)  (3.707) .674 
Idaho -4.291** -.003 12.621 .006 -2.769 -.003 
 (1.510)  (6.744)  (3.804) 1.988 
Montana 2.873* .003 3.837 .003 7.733* .008 
 (1.314)  (5.160)  (3.636) -.617 
Nevada -1.031 -.001 3.865 .005 -1.115 -.002 
 (1.175)  (4.164)  (3.375) .929 
No. Mariana Islands -12.505** -.003 -22.123 -.004 -8.253 -.002 
 (3.166)  (16.360)  (8.327) -.756 
Oregon -3.063** -.003 4.295 .006 -6.137 -.007 
 (1.244)  (4.124)  (3.530) 1.922 
Washington East -5.011** -.005 1.185 .001 .286 .000 
 (1.298)  (4.985)  (3.565) .147 
Washington West -8.742** -.011 -3.476 -.004 -7.424* -.010 
 (1.188)  (4.246)  (3.447) .722 
Colorado -4.380** -.005 6.113 .007 -5.795 -.007 
 (1.205)  (4.222)  (3.465) 2.180*  
Kansas 1.557 .002 10.694* .011 .397 .001 
 (1.214)  (4.421)  (3.434) 1.839 
New Mexico -3.015** -.006 2.053 .003 -1.362 -.003 
 (1.102)  (3.977)  (3.188) .670 
Oklahoma East 6.293 .003 10.748 .005 8.279 .004 
 (1.890)  (7.394)  (5.445) .269 
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Table 2.  District Court Coefficients Derived from the Full OLS Regression Model  
 for Mean Sentence Length (continued) 
Full Model       Full Model           Full Model  
 FY1993 – FY2003          FY1993   FY2003 
 Unstand.     Stand.   Unstand.     Stand.     Unstand.     Stand. 
Variable  B / (S.E.)     B    B / (S.E.)     B     B / (S.E.) B/ Z Test   
Oklahoma North 3.387* .003 -1.845 -.001 9.432* .007 
 (1.439)  (5.185)  (4.135) -1.700 
Oklahoma West 1.252 .001 6.256 .007 3.607 .003 
 (1.315)  (4.331)  (4.179) .440 
Utah -.312 .000 2.813 .003 -2.942 -.005 
 (1.194)  (4.522)  (3.334) 1.024 
Wyoming 5.323** .004 -2.970 -.002 6.788 .006 
 (1.447)  (5.434)  (3.862) -1.464 
Alabama Middle 2.667 .002 9.992* .009 -1.274 -.001 
 (1.399)  (4.842)  (4.210) 1.756 
Alabama North -4.100** -.005 -2.834 -.003 2.609 .003 
 (1.222)  (4.605)  (3.483) -.943 
Alabama South -5.294** -.006 -1.586 -.002 4.824 .005 
 (1.230)  (4.130)  (3.668) -1.161 
Florida Middle 2.107* .005 9.659 .022 2.052 .004 
 (1.089)  (3.736)  (3.217) 1.543 
Florida North 4.504** .006 -7.778* -.010 7.404 .008 
 (1.202)  (4.115)  (3.583) -2.782* 
Florida South 4.474** .012 7.963* .021 4.972 .013 
 (1.073)  (3.682)  (3.810) .615 
Georgia Middle 3.678** .004 5.036 .005 7.772 .008 
 (1.259)  (4.544)  (3.655) -.469 
Georgia North .655 .001 9.313* .015 4.034 .006 
 (1.133)  (3.938)  (3.338) 1.023 
Georgia South 4.392** .004 7.566 .008 2.595 .003 
 (1.280)  (4.538)  (3.722) .847 
Dist. of Columbia -9.364** -.011 -1.720 -.002 -13.130** -.015 
 (1.226)  (4.238)  (3.570) 2.059* 
 
Constant .589 - -13.721** - 2.967 - 
 (1.225)  (4.368)  (3.458) 
 
R2 Value   .771   .772   .792 
1 = Reference Category, the District Court that was held constant in the model. 
* p < .05      ** p < .01 
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Table 3.  District Court Coefficients Derived from the Full Multinomial Logistic  
 Regression Model for the Judicial Downward Departure Decision 
Full Model          Full Model           Full Model  
 FY1993 – FY2003  FY1993  FY2003 
Variable  B /(S.E.)     Exp(B)        B /(S.E.)     Exp(B)     B /(S.E.)  Exp(B)/ Z 
Maine -1.137** .321 .185 1.204 -1.797** .166 
 (.131)  (.398)  (.524) 3.013* 
Massachusetts .607** 1.834 1.033** 2.808 .444** 1.559 
 (.058)  (.272)  (.169) 1.835 
New Hampshire -.296** .744 .026 1.026 -.346 .707 
 (.116)  (.502)  (.312) .630 
Puerto Rico -1.034** .355 -.418 .658 -1.570** .208 
 (.074)  (.379)  (.234) 2.588* 
Rhode Island -.439** .645 -.524 .592 -.732* .481 
 (.109)  (.545)  (.358) .319 
Connecticut 1.385** 3.995 1.987** 7.297 1.367** 3.924 
 (.059)  (.239)  (.165) 2.135* 
New York East 1.189** 3.284 1.244** 3.469 1.074** 2.927 
 (.047)  (.215)  (.136) .668 
New York North .401** 1.493 .202 1.224 .202 1.224 
 (.066)  (.332)  (.200) -.001 
New York South .072 1.075 1.010** 2.745 -.458** .632 
 (.050)  (.220)  (.153) 5.480* 
New York West .000 1.000 .859** 2.361 .103 1.109 
 (.067)  (.267)  (.197) 2.277* 
Vermont .795** 2.215 .851** 2.341 .353 1.423 
 (.080)  (.329)  (.253) 1.202 
Delaware -.463** .630 -.271 .763 .316 1.371 
 (.133)  (.623)  (.264) -.867 
New Jersey -.366** .693 .108 1.114 -.306 .736 
 (.061)  (.284)  (.175) 1.242 
Pennsylvania East1 - - - - - -
- - - -
Pennsylvania Middle -.196** .822 .442 1.556 -.896** .408 
 (.077)  (.305)  (.288) 3.188* 
Pennsylvania West -.142 .868 .677* 1.969 -.932** .394 
 (.076)  (.285)  (.254) 4.217* 
Virgin Islands -1.053** .349 -1.866 .155 -.570 .565 
 (.155)  (1.023)  (.419) -1.172 
Maryland .275** 1.317 .808** 2.244 -.095 .909 
 (.062)  (.273)  (.192) 2.707* 
No. Carolina East -.856** .425 -.388 .678 -.462 .630 
 (.079)  (.344)  (.202) .185 
No. Carolina Middle -1.566** .209 -.530 .589 -2.101** .122 
 (.109)  (.377)  (.402) 2.851* 
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Table 3.  District Court Coefficients Derived from the Full Multinomial Logistic  
 Regression Model for the Judicial Downward Departure Decision (cont.) 
Full Model          Full Model           Full Model  
 FY1993 – FY2003  FY1993  FY2003 
Variable  B /(S.E.)     Exp(B)        B /(S.E.)     Exp(B)     B /(S.E.)  Exp(B)/ Z 
No. Carolina West -.712** .491 -.022 .978 -1.152** .316  
 (.079)  (.316)  (.257) 2.771* 
South Carolina -1.512** .220 -.605* .546 -1.854** .157 
 (.081)  (.288)  (.249) 3.282* 
Virginia East -1.487** .226 -.525 .592 -1.549** .212 
 (.072)  (.282)  (.193) 3.004* 
Virginia West -.956** .384 .476 1.610 -1.206** .299 
 (.088)  (.297)  (.248) 4.341* 
West Virginia North -1.571** .208 -.966 .381 -2.097** .123 
 (.137)  (.543)  (.432) 1.631 
West Virginia South -1.235** .291 .019 1.019 -2.481** .084 
 (.103)  (.295)  (.469) 4.515* 
Louisiana East -.628** .534 -.095 .909 -.947** .388 
 (.076)  (.306)  (.241) 2.188* 
Louisiana Middle -.753** .471 .606 1.834 -1.488** .226 
 (.142)  (.475)  (.602) 2.733* 
Louisiana West -1.080** .340 -.147 .863 -1.701** .182 
 (.103)  (.366)  (.361) 3.022* 
Mississippi North -.070 .933 1.082** 2.951 -.619 .539 
 (.099)  (.326)  (.355) 3.525* 
Mississippi South -1.007** .365 .206 1.228 -1.366** .255 
 (.099)  (.319)  (.285) 3.678* 
Texas East -.807** .446 .492* 1.636 -1.186** .305 
 (.070)  (.258)  (.221) 4.939* 
Texas North -.810** .445 -.274 .760 -1.253** .286 
 (.060)  (.262)  (.187) 3.046* 
Texas South .031 .970 -.289 .749 .329** 1.389 
 (.046)  (.250)  (.131) -2.186* 
Texas West .017 1.017 -.377 .686 -.498** .608 
 (.046)  (.250)  (.135) .424 
Kentucky East -1.478** .228 -.618 .539 -1.579** .206 
 (.103)  (.392)  (.332) 1.873 
Kentucky West -.923** .397 .420 1.522 -.776** .460 
 (.090)  (.287)  (.247) 3.158* 
Michigan East -.296** .744 .055 1.057 -.482** .618 
 (.060)  (.250)  (.192) 1.707 
Michigan West -.641** .527 -.563 .570 -.661** .516 
 (.084)  (.432)  (.229) .201 
Ohio North -.160** .852 .505* 1.657 -.218 .804 
 (.059)  (.245)  (.172) 2.416* 
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Table 3.  District Court Coefficients Derived from the Full Multinomial Logistic  
 Regression Model for the Judicial Downward Departure Decision (cont.) 
Full Model          Full Model           Full Model  
 FY1993 – FY2003  FY1993  FY2003 
Variable  B /(S.E.)     Exp(B)        B /(S.E.)     Exp(B)     B /(S.E.)  Exp(B)/ Z 
Ohio South -.196** .822 -.006 .994 -.505* .604 
 (.073)  (.306)  (.217) 1.330 
Tennessee East -1.278** .279 -.497 .609 -1.659** .190 
 (.095)  (.354)  (.284) 2.562* 
Tennessee Middle -.666** .514 .337 1.401 -1.102** .332 
 (.104)  (.370)  (.336) 2.881* 
Tennessee West -.754** .471 .284 1.328 -1.265** .282 
 (.085)  (.285)  (.272) 3.938* 
Illinois Central -.767** .464 -1.800** .165 -1.141** .320 
 (.096)  (.737)  (.280) -.836 
Illinois North -.392** .676 -.582* .559 -.797** .451 
 (.061)  (.304)  (.175) .616 
Illinois South -1.445** .236 -1.322** .267 -1.219** .296 
 (.107)  (.540)  (.294) -.168 
Indiana North -.929** .395 -.048 .954 -1.502** .223 
 (.099)  (.355)  (.332) 2.990* 
Indiana South -.537** .584 .324 1.383 -.597* .551 
 (.097)  (.349)  (.267) 2.095* 
Wisconsin East -.761** .467 .002 1.002 -.683** .505 
 (.092)  (.323)  (.248) 1.681* 
Wisconsin West -1.665** .189 -1.023 .359 -3.471** .031 
 (.173)  (.617)  (1.011) 2.067* 
Arkansas East -1.191** .304 -.228 .796 -1.429** .239 
 (.107)  (.393)  (.363) 2.244* 
Arkansas West -1.347** .260 -.179 .836 -1.789** .167 
 (.148)  (.412)  (.473) 2.567* 
Iowa North -.566** .568 .442 1.555 -1.901** .149 
 (.090)  (.400)  (.346) 4.430* 
Iowa South -.074 .929 -.189 .828 -.635** .530 
 (.075)  (.465)  (.223) .866 
Minnesota .334** 1.397 .453 1.573 .109 1.115 
 (.063)  (.284)  (.189) 1.010 
Missouri East -.711** .491 .012 1.012 -.893** .409 
 (.073)  (.317)  (.204) 2.400* 
Missouri West -.830** .436 -.101 .904 -1.028** .358 
 (.078)  (.306)  (.215) 2.477* 
Nebraska .067 1.069 .601* 1.823 .326 1.386 
 (.064)  (.303)  (.157) .805 
North Dakota .181* 1.198 .898** 2.455 -.171 .842 
 (.088)  (.368)  (.263) 2.363* 
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Table 3.  District Court Coefficients Derived from the Full Multinomial Logistic  
 Regression Model for the Judicial Downward Departure Decision (cont.) 
Full Model          Full Model           Full Model  
 FY1993 – FY2003  FY1993  FY2003 
Variable  B /(S.E.)     Exp(B)        B /(S.E.)     Exp(B)     B /(S.E.)  Exp(B)/ Z 
South Dakota -.288** .750 -.056 .946 -.410 .664 
 (.078)  (.417)  (.236) .738 
Alaska .209** 1.233 .521 1.683 -.679* .507 
 (.086)  (.420)  (.354) 2.183* 
Arizona 2.116** 8.296 2.535** 12.611 1.769** 5.865 
 (.045)  (.208)  (.130) 3.126* 
California Central -.258** .773 .422 1.525 -.732** .481 
 (.058)  (.261)  (.173) 3.689* 
California East -.466** .628 -.045 .956 -.996** .369 
 (.059)  (.280)  (.191) 2.802* 
California North .509** 1.663 .560 1.750 .468** 1.596 
 (.055)  (.322)  (.164) .255 
California South 1.724** 5.609 1.377** 3.961 1.607** 4.986 
 (.045)  (.216)  (.136) -.902 
Guam -1.719** .179 -.420 .657 -2.409* .090 
 (.222)  (.751)  (1.019) 1.572 
Hawaii -.259** .772 -.025 .975 -.568* .567 
 (.083)  (.502)  (.274) .949 
Idaho .204* 1.227 .654 1.923 .576** 1.779 
 (.094)  (.478)  (.216) .148 
Montana .017 1.017 .571 1.769 -1.158** .314 
 (.075)  (.344)  (.287) 3.856* 
Nevada -.102 .903 .103 1.109 -.317** .728 
 (.061)  (.279)  (.173) 1.281 
No. Mariana Islands -2.637** .072 -13.860 .000 -16.835 .000  
 (1.007)  (3,300.553)  (2,899.179) .001 
Oregon .440** 1.553 .649** 1.913 .484 1.623 
 (.059)  (.250)  (.174) .540 
Washington East .879** 2.408 .866** 2.379 .595** 1.812 
 (.061)  (.315)  (.174) .756 
Washington West .611** 1.842 .652** 1.920 .681** 1.976 
 (.057)  (.264)  (.165) -.092 
Colorado .024 1.024 .502 1.652 -.457* .633 
 (.065)  (.278)  (.204) 2.786* 
Kansas -.480** .619 .268 1.307 -1.108** .330 
 (.073)  (.304)  (.229) 3.618* 
New Mexico .752** 2.122 1.182** 3.261 .711** 2.036 
 (.048)  (.230)  (.136) 1.762 
Oklahoma East .241* 1.273 -.458 .633 .290 1.336 
 (.110)  (.755)  (.320) -.911 
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Table 3.  District Court Coefficients Derived from the Full Multinomial Logistic  
 Regression Model for the Judicial Downward Departure Decision (cont.) 
Full Model          Full Model           Full Model  
 FY1993 – FY2003  FY1993  FY2003 
Variable  B /(S.E.)     Exp(B)        B /(S.E.)     Exp(B)     B /(S.E.)  Exp(B)/ Z 
Oklahoma North -.641** .527 .496 1.643 -2.642** .071 
 (.106)  (.342)  (.724) 3.919* 
Oklahoma West -1.144** .319 -.214 .808 -2.378** .093 
 (.111)  (.337)  (.597) 3.157* 
Utah -.123* .884 .847** 2.332 -.533** .587 
 (.063)  (.277)  (.174) 4.221* 
Wyoming -.313** .731 .190 1.210 -.660* .517  
 (.100)  (.400)  (.280) 1.741 
Alabama Middle -.696** .499 -.808 .446 -.833* .435 
 (.116)  (.494)  (.388) .040 
Alabama North -1.118** .327 -.674 .509 -1.557** .211 
 (.098)  (.458)  (.308) 1.599 
Alabama South -.953** .386 -1.170** .310 -.757** .469 
 (.101)  (.456)  (.270) -.781 
Florida Middle -.565** .568 -.264 .768 -.682** .505 
 (.055)  (.249)  (.163) 1.404 
Florida North -1.197** .302 -.346 .708 -1.604** .201 
 (.099)  (.346)  (.363) 2.511* 
Florida South -1.041** .353 -.683** .505 -1.369** .254  
 (.054)  (.249)  (.169) 2.281* 
Georgia Middle -1.029** .357 -.016 .984 -1.488** .226  
 (.096)  (.324)  (.332) 3.170* 
Georgia North -.096 .909 .385 1.470 -.662** .516 
 (.058)  (.250)  (.190) 3.333* 
Georgia South -.783** .457 .201 1.222 -1.142** .319 
 (.098)  (.349)  (.323) 2.824* 
Dist. of Columbia -.089 .915 .685** 1.984 -.244 .783 
 (.068)  (.260)  (.208) 2.787* 
 
N 517,981 38,161 63,426
Nagelkerke R2 Value  .315   .307   .325 
Model Prediction Rate 70.3%   76.6%   71.2% 
1 = Reference Category, the District Court that was held constant in the model. 
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Table 1.  Defendant’s Gender 
Variable  
Description      N  Percent 
Male 487,446 (85.1%) 
Female 83,728 (14.6%) 
Missing 1,366 (0.2%) 
TOTAL 572,540 (100.0%) 
Table 2.  Year of Sentencing by Defendant’s Gender 
Variable       Males      Females       TOTAL 
Description   N  Percent    N Percent   N  Percent 
1993 35,614  (84.6%) 6,460 (15.4%) 42,074  (100.0%) 
1994 33,818  (84.6%) 6,148 (15.4%) 39,966  (100.0%) 
1995 32,745  (85.1%) 5,742 (14.9%) 38,487  (100.0%) 
1996 35,893  (84.6%) 6,540 (15.4%) 42,433  (100.0%) 
1997 41,478  (85.0%) 7,304 (15.0%) 48,782  (100.0%) 
1998 43,054  (84.9%) 7,646 (15.1%) 50,700  (100.0%) 
1999 46,946  (84.6%) 8,563 (15.4%) 55,509  (100.0%) 
2000 51,067  (85.7%) 8,555 (14.3%) 59,622  (100.0%)  
2001 51,197  (85.5%) 8,658 (14.5%) 59,855  (100.0%) 
2002 55,077  (86.0%) 8,962 (14.0%) 64,039  (100.0%) 
2003 60,557 (86.9%) 9,150 (13.1%) 69,707 (100.0%) 
TOTAL* 487,446 (85.3%) 83,728 (14.7%) 571,174  (100.0%) 
* There were 1,366 cases in the dataset where the Gender variable was missing. 
 
Table 3.  Defendant’s Racial and Ethnic Category 
Variable Description     N  Percent 
White 189,538 (33.1%) 
Black 148,304 (25.9%) 
Hispanic 201,905 (35.3%) 
Other * 22,119 (3.9%) 
Missing 10,674 (1.9%) 
TOTAL 572,540 (100.0%) 





Table 4.  Defendant’s Racial and Ethnic Category by Gender 
Variable     Male    Female 
Description      N  Percent   N         Percent 
White 156,808 (32.7%) 32,705 (40.0%) 
Black 123,129 (25.7%) 25,168 (30.8%) 
Hispanic 181,900 (37.9%) 19,800 (24.2%) 
Other 17,952 (3.7%) 4,131 (5.0%) 
TOTAL* 479,789 (100.0%) 81,804 (100.0%) 
* There were 10,947 cases in the dataset where the Race, Ethnicity and/or Gender variables were missing. 
The “Other” category includes Asians, American Indians, Pacific Islanders, & Alaska Natives. 
 
Table 5.  Defendant’s Racial and Ethnic Category by Gender Combined 
Variable Description     N  Percent 
White Male 156,808 (27.4%) 
Black Male 123,129 (21.5%) 
Hispanic Male 181,900 (31.8%) 
Other Male 17,952 (3.1%) 
White Female 32,705 (5.7%) 
Black Female 25,168 (4.4%) 
Hispanic Female 19,800 (3.5%) 
Other Female 4,131 (0.7%) 
Missing 10,947 (1.9%) 
TOTAL* 572,540 (100.0%) 
* There were 10,947 cases in the dataset where the Race, Ethnicity and/or Gender variables were missing. 
The “Other” category includes Asians, American Indians, Pacific Islanders, & Alaska Natives. 
 
Table 6.  Defendant’s Age Range Categories 
Variable Description     N  Percent 
Less Than 21 28,087 (4.9%) 
21 through 25 102,930 (18.0%) 
26 through 30 111,881 (19.5%) 
31 though 35 96,227 (16.8%) 
36 through 40 77,353 (13.5%) 
41 through 50 94,900 (16.6%) 
More Than 50 50,619 (8.8%) 
Missing 10,543 (1.8%) 




Table 7.  Defendant’s Age Range Categories by Gender 
Variable     Male    Female 
Description        N  Percent    N         Percent 
Less Than 21 24,005 (5.0%) 4,008 (4.8%) 
21 through 25 88,189 (18.4%) 14,569 (17.6%) 
26 through 30 96,438 (20.2%) 15,264 (18.4%) 
31 though 35 82,137 (17.2%) 13,933 (16.8%) 
36 through 40 64,776 (13.5%) 12,478 (15.1%) 
41 through 50 79,305 (16.6%) 15,481 (18.7%) 
More Than 50 43,501 (9.1%) 7,052 (8.5%) 
TOTAL* 478,351 (100.0%) 82,785 (100.0%) 
* There were 11,404 cases in the dataset where the Age Range and/or Gender variables were missing. 
 
Table 8.  Defendant’s Age Range Categories by Racial and Ethnic Category 
Variable       White      Black      Hispanic 
Description  N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Less Than 21 6,244 (3.3%) 8,462 (5.7%) 11,119 (5.7%) 
21 through 25 22,433 (11.9%) 34,984 (23.6%) 39,840 (20.5%) 
26 through 30 26,196 (13.9%) 35,615 (24.1%) 44,694 (22.9%) 
31 though 35 28,463 (15.1%) 25,725 (17.4%) 37,281 (19.1%) 
36 through 40 28,706 (15.2%) 17,827 (12.0%) 26,783 (13.8%) 
41 through 50 45,111 (23.9%) 18,524 (12.5%) 25,979 (13.3%) 
More Than 50 31,898 (16.9%) 6,822 (4.6%) 9,077 (4.7%) 
TOTAL* 189,051 (100.0%) 147,959 (100.0%) 194,773 (100.0%) 
* There were 22,002 cases in the “Other” category and 18,755 cases were missing these variables. 
 
Table 9.  Defendant’s Citizenship Status 
Variable Description     N  Percent 
U.S. Citizen 382,734 (66.8%) 
Non-U.S. Citizen 170,097 (29.7%) 
Missing 19,709 (3.4%) 




Table 10.  Defendant’s Citizenship Status by Gender 
Variable     Male    Female 
Description   N  Percent N         Percent 
U.S. Citizen 315,706 (66.9%) 66,994 (83.3%) 
Non-U.S. Citizen 156,510 (33.1%) 13,431 (16.7%) 
TOTAL* 472,216 (100.0%) 80,425 (100.0%) 
* There were 19,899 cases in the dataset where the Citizenship and/or Gender variables were missing. 
 
Table 11.  Defendant’s Citizenship Status by Racial and Ethnic Category 
Variable       White      Black      Hispanic 
Description  N Percent N Percent N Percent 
U.S. Citizen 177,958 (95.0%) 133,890 (91.3%) 55,043 (28.1%) 
Non-U.S. Citizen 9,392 (5.0%) 12,757 (8.7%) 140,599 (71.9%) 
TOTAL* 187,350 (100.0%) 146,647 (100.0%) 195,642 (100.0%) 
* There were 21,668 cases in the “Other” race category and 21,233 cases were missing these variables. 
 
Table 12.  Defendant’s Citizenship Status by Age Category 
Variable          U.S. Citizen      Non-U.S. Citizen 
Description       N  Percent    N         Percent 
Less Than 21 19,259 (5.0%) 7,299 (4.4%) 
21 through 25 69,286 (18.1%) 30,240 (18.4%) 
26 through 30 70,792 (18.5%) 38,261 (23.3%) 
31 though 35 59,801 (15.7%) 34,052 (20.7%) 
36 through 40 50,879 (13.3%) 24,643 (15.0%) 
41 through 50 69,759 (18.3%) 22,987 (14.0%) 
More Than 50 42,306 (11.1%) 7,065 (4.3%) 
TOTAL* 382,082 (100.0%) 164,547 (100.0%) 





Table 13.  Defendant’s Educational Attainment Category 
Variable Description     N  Percent 
Less Than H.S. Graduate 230,134 (40.2%) 
High School Graduate 163,757 (28.6%) 
Some College 98,659 (17.2%) 
College Graduate 36,692 (6.4%) 
Missing 43,298 (7.6%) 
TOTAL 572,540 (100.0%) 
Table 14.  Defendant’s Educational Attainment by Gender 
Variable     Male    Female 
Description   N  Percent N         Percent 
Less Than H.S. Graduate 203,868 (45.3%) 26,250 (33.2%) 
High School Graduate 136,006 (30.2%) 27,743 (35.1%) 
Some College 78,373 (17.4%) 20,277 (25.6%) 
College Graduate 31,857 (7.1%) 4,831 (6.1%) 
TOTAL* 450,104 (100.0%) 79,101 (100.0%) 
* There were 43,335 cases in the dataset where the Education and/or Gender variables were missing. 
 
Table 15.  Defendant’s Educational Attainment by Racial and Ethnic Category 
Variable       White      Black      Hispanic 
Description  N Percent N Percent N Percent 
< H.S. Grad. 46,915 (25.2%) 56,689 (38.8%) 118,579 (67.9%) 
H.S. Grad. 70,828 (38.0%) 51,953 (35.5%) 34,053 (19.5%) 
Some College 45,415 (24.4%) 31,101 (21.3%) 17,436 (10.0%) 
College Grad. 23,114 (12.4%) 6,404 (4.4%) 4,634 (2.7%) 
TOTAL* 186,272 (100.0%) 146,147 (100.0%) 174,702 (100.0%) 




Table 16.  Defendant’s Educational Attainment by Age Category 
Variable          < H.S. Grad.       H.S. Grad           Some College     College Grad. 
Description          N       Percent     N  Percent          N       Percent        N    Percent 
Less Than 21 17,013 (7.4%) 6,563 (4.0%) 2,084 (2.1%) 36 (0.1%) 
21 through 25 50,778 (22.1%) 29,085 (17.8%) 14,923 (15.2%) 1,053 (2.9%)  
26 through 30 48,809 (21.3%) 33,535 (20.5%) 18,712 (19.0%) 3,339 (9.1%) 
31 though 35 38,803 (16.9%) 29,163 (17.8%) 17,155 (17.4%) 4,990 (13.6%) 
36 through 40 28,708 (12.5%) 23,609 (14.4%) 14,879 (15.1%) 5,806 (15.8%) 
41 through 50 30,292 (13.2%) 27,771 (17.0%) 20,603 (20.9%) 11,869 (32.4%) 
More Than 50 15,224 (6.6%) 13,793 (8.4%) 10,140 (10.3%) 9,538 (26.0%) 
TOTAL* 229,627 (100.0%) 163,519(100.0%) 98,496(100.0%) 36,631(100.0%) 
* There were 44,267 cases in the dataset where the Education and/or Age variables were missing. 
 
Table 17.  Number of Dependents Whom the Defendant Supports 
Variable Description     N  Percent 
No Dependents 203,121 (35.5%) 
1 to 3 Dependents 258,828 (45.2%) 
4 to 6 Dependents 60,281 (10.5%) 
7 to 9 Dependents 5,477 (1.0%) 
10 to 20 Dependents 997 (0.2%) 
21 to 96 Dependents 171 (0.03%) 
Some Dependents 135 (0.02%) 
Missing 43,530 (7.6%) 
TOTAL 572,540 (100.0%) 
Table 18.  Number of Dependents Whom the Defendant Supports by Gender 
Variable     Male    Female 
Description       N  Percent     N         Percent 
No Dependents 173,921 (38.6%) 29,172 (37.1%) 
1 to 3 Dependents 216,470 (48.1%) 42,340 (53.8%) 
4 to 6 Dependents 53,695 (11.9%) 6,582 (8.4%) 
7 to 9 Dependents 5,046 (1.1%) 428 (0.5%) 
10 to 20 Dependents 882 (0.2%) 115 (0.1%) 
21 to 96 Dependents 128 (0.0%) 43 (0.1%) 
TOTAL* 450,142 (100.0%) 78,680 (100.0%) 




Table 19.  Number of Dependents Whom the Defendant Supports by Racial and 
 Ethnic Category 
Variable       White      Black      Hispanic 
Description  N Percent N Percent N Percent 
No Depen. 84,929 (46.1%) 51,167 (35.2%) 57,387 (32.4%) 
1 to 3 Depen. 85,734 (46.6%) 75,309 (51.8%) 87,944 (49.6%) 
4 to 6 Depen. 12,491 (6.8%) 16,409 (11.3%) 28,875 (16.3%) 
7 to 9 Depen. 682 (0.4%) 1,973 (1.4%) 2,539 (1.4%) 
10 to 20 Depen. 157 (0.1%) 434 (0.3%) 352 (0.2%) 
21 to 96 Depen. 58 (0.0%) 61 (0.0%) 42 (0.0%) 
TOTAL* 184,051 (100.0%) 145,353 (100.0%) 177,139 (100.0%) 
* There were 21,314 cases in the “Other” race category and 44,683 cases were missing these variables. 
 
Table 20.  Defendant’s Crime Type Category 
Variable Description     N  Percent 
Fraud, Deceit, & Counterfeiting Offenses 10,155 (17.7%) 
Larceny, Embezzlement, Theft, & Money Laund. 48,430 (8.5%) 
Immigration Offenses 84,762 (14.8%) 
Drug Offenses 234,366 (40.9%) 
Robbery & Firearms Offenses 57,130 (10.0%) 
Other Offenses 43,862 (7.7%) 
Missing 2,435 (0.4%) 
TOTAL 572,540 (100.0%) 
Table 21.  Defendant’s Crime Type Category by Gender 
Variable                     Male                       Female 
Description             N Percent     N         Percent 
Fraud, Deceit, & Counterfeiting 74,117 (15.3%) 27,319 (32.7%) 
Larceny, Embezzl., Theft, M.L.  35,873 (7.4%) 12,479 (14.9%) 
Immigration Offenses 79,690 (16.4%) 4,843 (5.8%) 
Drug Offenses  204,070  (42.0%) 30,190 (36.2%) 
Robbery & Firearms Offenses 54,417 (11.2%) 2,698 (3.2%) 
Other Offenses 37,796 (7.8%) 5,952 (7.1%) 
TOTAL * 485,963 (100.0%) 83,481 (100.0%) 




Table 22.  Defendant’s Crime Type Category by Race and Ethnicity 
Variable        White      Black      Hispanic 
Description   N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Fraud, Deceit, Counter. 54,803 (29.0%) 27,683 (18.7%) 12,196 (6.1%) 
Larc., Emb., Theft, M.L. 23,124 (12.2%) 13,300 (9.0%) 7,538 (3.7%) 
Immigration Offenses 3,811 (2.0%) 2,956 (2.0%) 75,257 (37.4%) 
Drug Offenses 62,531 (33.0%) 71,233 (48.1%) 94,119 (46.7%) 
Robbery & Firearms 23,151 (12.2%) 25,823 (17.4%) 6,096 (3.0%) 
Other Offenses 21,805 (11.5%) 7,182 (4.8%) 6,200 (3.1%) 
TOTAL * 189,225 (100.0%) 148,177 (100.0%) 201,406 (100.0%) 
* There were 22,073 cases in the “Other” race category and 11,659 cases were missing these variables. 
 
Table 23.  Defendant’s Crime Type Category by Citizenship 
Variable               U.S. Citizen                Non-U.S. Citizen 
Description            N Percent     N         Percent 
Fraud, Deceit, & Counterfeiting 84,810 (22.2%) 13,865 (8.2%) 
Larceny, Embezzl., Theft, & M.L.  39,546 (10.3%) 6,106 (3.6%) 
Immigration Offenses 6,907 (1.8%) 74,790 (44.0%) 
Drug Offenses  162,295  (42.4%) 67,386 (39.7%) 
Robbery & Firearms Offenses 53,359 (14.0%) 3,123 (1.8%) 
Other Offenses 35,430 (9.3%) 4,594 (2.7%) 
TOTAL * 382,347 (100.0%) 169,864 (100.0%) 





Table 24.  Defendant’s Final Offense Level 
Variable Description     N  Percent 
Level 1 125 (0.02%) 
Level 2 6,551 (1.1%) 
Level 3 2,193 (0.4%) 
Level 4 16,451 (2.9%) 
Level 5 3,575 (0.6%) 
Level 6 25,336 (4.4%) 
Level 7 12,585 (2.2%) 
Level 8 18,358 (3.2%) 
Level 9 13,666 (2.4%) 
Level 10 34,268 (6.0%) 
Level 11 12,598 (2.2%) 
Level 12 23,001 (4.0%) 
Level 13 36,121 (6.3%) 
Level 14 9,933 (1.7%) 
Level 15 21,284 (3.7%) 
Level 16 8,292 (1.4%) 
Level 17 21,503 (3.8%) 
Level 18 7,780 (1.4%) 
Level 19 18,852 (3.3%) 
Level 20 7,235 (1.3%) 
Level 21 52,772 (9.2%) 
Level 22 7,307 (1.3%) 
Level 23 27,109 (4.7%) 
Level 24 7,599 (1.3%) 
Level 25 19,509 (3.4%) 
Level 26 7,191 (1.3%) 
Level 27 16,851 (2.9%) 
Level 28 5,353 (0.9%) 
Level 29 21,439 (3.7%) 
Level 30 6,284 (1.1%) 
Level 31 17,897 (3.1%) 
Level 32 5,969 (1.0%) 
Level 33 9,598 (1.7%) 
Level 34 8,113 (1.4%) 
Level 35 6,588 (1.2%) 
Level 36 3,253 (0.6%) 
Level 37 3,776 (0.7%) 
Level 38 2,985 (0.5%) 
Level 39 1,542 (0.3%) 
Level 40 2,169 (0.4%) 




Table 24.  Defendant’s Final Offense Level (continued) 
Variable Description     N  Percent 
Level 42 1,118 (0.2%) 
Level 43 1,886 (0.3%) 
Level 44 181 (0.0%) 
Level 45 122 (0.0%) 
Level 46 127 (0.0%) 
Level 47 53 (0.0%) 
Level 48 48 (0.0%) 
Level 49 20 (0.0%) 
Level 50 15 (0.0%) 
Level 51 9 (0.0%) 
Level 52 10 (0.0%) 
Level 53 5 (0.0%) 
Missing 35,042 (6.1%) 
TOTAL 572,540 (100.0%) 
Table 25.  Defendant’s Sentencing Zone  
Variable Description     N  Percent 
Zone A 66,133 (11.6%) 
Zone B 46,934 (8.2%) 
Zone C 35,262 (6.2%) 
Zone D 393,417 (68.7%) 
Missing 30,794 (5.4%) 




Table 26.  Defendant’s Sentencing Zone by Gender 
Variable     Male    Female 
Description       N  Percent     N         Percent 
Zone A 46,803 (10.2%) 18,496 (23.2%) 
Zone B 35,446 (7.7%) 11,449 (14.4%) 
Zone C 27,522 (6.0%) 7,716 (9.7%) 
Zone D 351,328 (76.2%) 41,929 (52.7%) 
TOTAL* 461,099 (100.0%) 79,590 (100.0%) 
* There were 31,851 cases in the dataset where the Zone and/or Gender variables were missing. 
 
Table 27.  Defendant’s Sentencing Zone by Race and Ethnicity 
Variable       White      Black      Hispanic 
Description  N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Zone A 25,099 (13.8%) 14,094 (9.9%) 18,827 (9.9%) 
Zone B 19,409 (10.7%) 10,914 (7.7%) 13,629 (7.2%) 
Zone C 14,867 (8.2%) 7,384 (5.2%) 10,989 (5.8%) 
Zone D 122,562 (67.4%) 110,031 (77.3%) 145,855 (77.0%) 
TOTAL* 181,937 (100.0%) 142,423 (100.0%) 189,300 (100.0%) 
* There were 20,992 cases in the “Other” race category and 37,888 cases were missing these variables. 
 
Table 28.  Defendant’s Sentencing Zone by Citizenship 
Variable             U.S. Citizen      Non-U.S. Citizen 
Description       N  Percent     N         Percent 
Zone A 40,735 (11.0%) 18,109 (11.4%) 
Zone B  33,266 (9.0%) 12,366 (7.8%) 
Zone C  24,734 (6.7%) 9,762 (6.2%) 
Zone D  269,961 (73.2%) 118,395 (74.6%) 
TOTAL* 368,696 (100.0%) 158,632 (100.0%) 





Table 29.  Defendant’s Sentencing Zone by In/Out Prison Decision 
Variable     No Prison   Prison 
Description       N  Percent     N         Percent 
Zone A 45,205 (68.9%) 20,442 (31.1%) 
Zone B 23,576 (50.5%) 23,134 (49.5%) 
Zone C 7,172 (20.4%) 27,954 (79.6%) 
Zone D 18,450 (4.7%) 373,435 (95.3%) 
TOTAL* 94,403 (17.5%) 444,965 (82.5%) 
* There were 33,172 cases in the dataset where the Zone and/or In/Out Decision variables were missing. 
 
Table 30.  Defendant’s Sentencing Zone by Departure Status 
 No         Upward       Downward         Sub. Assist. 
Variable  Departure       Departure  Departure     Departure 
Description          N       Percent     N  Percent          N       Percent        N    Percent 
Zone A 58,985 (97.0%) 388 (0.6%) 493 (0.8%) 935 (1.5%) 
Zone B 37,784 (82.6%) 315 (0.7%) 3,677 (8.0%) 3,971 (8.7%)  
Zone C 22,467 (65.5%) 215 (0.6%) 6,510 (19.0%) 5,121 (14.9%) 
Zone D 232,754 (60.8%) 3,420 (0.9%) 60,411 (15.8%) 86,443 (22.6%) 
TOTAL* 351,990 (67.2%) 4,338 (0.8%) 71,091 (13.6%) 96,470 (18.4%) 
* There were 48,651 cases where the Sentencing Zone and/or Departure Status variables were missing. 
 
Table 31.  Defendant’s Final Offense Level Score 
 Standard          Range 
N Mean Median Deviation  Min. Max. 
537,498 18.39 18.00 9.236 1 53 
* There were 35,042 cases in the dataset where the Final Offense Level (FOL) score variable was missing. 
 
Table 32.  Defendant’s Final Offense Level Score by Gender 
 Standard     Range 
N Mean Median Deviation Min. Max. 
Male 457,885 19.06 19.00 9.214 1 53 
Female 79,175 14.55 12.00 8.373 1 50  
* There were 35,042 cases in the dataset where the Final Offense Level (FOL) score variable was missing 





Table 33.  Defendant’s Final Offense Level Score by Race and Ethnicity 
 Standard     Range 
N Mean Median Deviation Min. Max. 
White 181,590 16.77 15.00 8.613 1 51 
Black 142,143 20.85 21.00 10.203 1 53 
Hispanic 187,507 18.47 19.00 8.542 1 53 
Other 20,959 16.37 14.00 9.177 1 52  
* There were 35,042 cases in the dataset where the Final Offense Level (FOL) score variable was missing 
and 5,299 cases where the Race and Ethnicity variable was missing. 
 
Table 34.  Defendant’s Final Offense Level Score by Gender and Race and Ethnicity  
 Variables Combined 
 Standard     Range 
N Mean Median Deviation Min. Max. 
White Male  150,122 17.37 16.00 8.643 1 51 
White Female 31,453 13.93 12.00 7.870 1 46 
Black Male 118,124 22.16 23.00 9.952 1 53 
Black Female 24,013 14.42 11.00 8.901 1 50 
Hispanic Male 168,665 18.69 21.00 8.547 1 53 
Hispanic Female 18,718 16.54 15.00 8.245 1 46 
Other Male 17,008 17.31 15.00 9.263 1 52 
Other Female 3,926 12.34 10.00 7.541 1 42  
* There were 35,042 cases in the dataset where the Final Offense Level (FOL) score variable was missing 
and 5,469 cases where the Gender or Race and Ethnicity variables were missing.  The “Other” race 
category includes Asians, American Indians, Pacific Islanders, & Alaska Natives. 
 
Table 35.  Defendant’s Final Offense Level Score by Citizenship 
 Standard     Range 
N Mean Median Deviation Min. Max. 
U.S. Cit. 368,101 18.78 18.00 9.463 1 53 
Non-Cit. 157,196 17.91 19.00 8.453 1 52  
* There were 35,042 cases in the dataset where the Final Offense Level (FOL) score variable was missing 





Table 36.  Defendant’s Final Criminal History Category 
Variable Description     N  Percent 
Category I 291,230 (50.9%) 
Category II 59,396 (10.4%) 
Category III 74,018 (12.9%) 
Category IV 41,923 (7.3%) 
Category V 24,961 (4.4%) 
Category VI 49,432 (8.6%) 
Missing 31,580 (5.5%) 
TOTAL 572,540 (100.0%) 
Table 37.  Defendant’s Final Criminal History Category by Gender 
Variable     Male    Female 
Description       N  Percent     N         Percent 
Category I 229,998 (49.9%) 60,915 (76.8%) 
Category II 52,416 (11.4%) 6,948 (8.8%) 
Category III 67,801 (14.7%) 6,188 (7.8%) 
Category IV 39,723 (8.6%) 2,179 (2.7%) 
Category V 23,788 (5.2%) 1,157 (1.5%) 
Category VI 47,481 (10.3%) 1,927 (2.4%) 
TOTAL* 461,207 (100.0%) 79,314 (100.0%) 
* There were 32,019 cases in the dataset where the Criminal History and/or Gender variables were missing. 
 
Table 38.  Defendant’s Final Criminal History Category by Race and Ethnicity 
Variable       White      Black      Hispanic 
Description  N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Category I 111,519 (61.2%) 58,619 (41.1%) 102,464 (53.9%) 
Category II 20,109 (11.0%) 17,048 (12.0%) 19,694 (10.4%) 
Category III 21,065 (11.6%) 24,034 (16.9%) 26,408 (13.9%) 
Category IV 10,211 (5.6%) 14,546 (10.2%) 16,050 (8.4%) 
Category V 5,949 (3.3%) 8,460 (5.9%) 9,981 (5.3%) 
Category VI 13,245 (7.3%) 19,877 (13.9%) 15,384 (8.1%) 
TOTAL* 182,098 (100.0%) 142,584 (100.0%) 189,981 (100.0%) 





Table 39.  Defendant’s Final Criminal History Category by Citizenship Status 
Variable     U.S. Citizen      Non-U.S. Citizen 
Description       N  Percent     N         Percent 
Category I 194,609 (52.7%) 88,173 (55.2%) 
Category II 43,041 (11.7%) 15,392 (9.6%) 
Category III 51,687 (14.0%) 21,168 (13.3%) 
Category IV 27,636 (7.5%) 13,684 (8.6%) 
Category V 16,019 (4.3%) 8,585 (5.4%) 
Category VI 36,167 (9.8%) 12,640 (7.9%) 
TOTAL* 369,159 (100.0%) 159,642 (100.0%) 
* There were 43,739 cases in the dataset where the Criminal History and/or Citizenship status variables 
were missing. 
 
Table 40.  Circuit Court Where the Defendant was Sentenced 
Variable Description     N  Percent 
D.C. Circuit 4,761 (0.8%) 
First Circuit 15,868 (2.8%) 
Second Circuit 46,914 (8.2%) 
Third Circuit 27,243 (4.8%) 
Fourth Circuit 54,853 (9.6%) 
Fifth Circuit 98,925 (17.3%) 
Sixth Circuit 44,996 (7.9%) 
Seventh Circuit 24,934 (4.4%) 
Eighth Circuit 34,042 (5.9%) 
Ninth Circuit 122,887 (21.5%) 
Tenth Circuit 33,128 (5.8%) 
Eleventh Circuit 63,989 (11.2%) 




Table 41.  Circuit Court Where the Defendant was Sentenced by Gender 
Variable     Male    Female 
Description       N  Percent     N         Percent 
D.C. Circuit 3,864 (0.8%) 890 (1.1%) 
First Circuit 13,910 (2.9%) 1,938 (2.3%) 
Second Circuit 39,980 (8.2%) 6,796 (8.1%) 
Third Circuit 23,214 (4.8%) 3,980 (4.8%) 
Fourth Circuit 45,863 (9.4%) 8,765 (10.5%) 
Fifth Circuit 84,981 (17.4%) 13,792 (16.5%) 
Sixth Circuit 36,686 (7.5%) 8,237 (9.8%) 
Seventh Circuit 20,837 (4.3%) 4,068 (4.9%) 
Eighth Circuit 28,829 (5.9%) 5,183 (6.2%) 
Ninth Circuit 107,059 (22.0%) 15,376 (18.4%) 
Tenth Circuit 28,474 (5.8%) 4,586 (5.5%) 
Eleventh Circuit 53,749 (11.0%) 10,117 (12.1%) 
TOTAL* 487,446 (100.0%) 83,728 (100.0%) 
* There were 1,366 cases in the dataset where the Circuit Court and/or Gender variables were missing. 
 
Table 42.  Circuit Court Where the Defendant was Sentenced by Race and Ethnicity 
Variable       White      Black      Hispanic 
Description  N Percent N Percent N Percent 
D.C. Circuit 562 (0.3%) 3,636 (2.5%) 421 (0.2%) 
First Circuit 5,995 (3.2%) 1,583 (1.1%) 7,698 (3.8%) 
Second Circuit 16,540 (8.7%) 12,410 (8.4%) 14,531 (7.2%) 
Third Circuit 11,252 (5.9%) 9,490 (6.4%) 5,406 (2.7%) 
Fourth Circuit 19,010 (10.0%) 28,330 (19.1%) 3,980 (2.0%) 
Fifth Circuit 20,412 (10.8%) 18,631 (12.6%) 57,695 (28.6%) 
Sixth Circuit 21,922 (11.6%) 17,786 (12.0%) 4,106 (2.0%) 
Seventh Circuit 10,686 (5.6%) 9,855 (6.6%) 3,455 (1.7%) 
Eighth Circuit 16,440 (8.7%) 8,827 (6.0%) 5,676 (2.8%) 
Ninth Circuit 32,928 (17.4%) 9,910 (6.7%) 67,776 (33.6%) 
Tenth Circuit 12,039 (6.4%) 4,105 (2.8%) 14,747 (7.3%) 
Eleventh Circuit 21,752 (11.5%) 23,741 (16.0%) 16,414 (8.1%) 
TOTAL* 189,538 (100.0%) 148,304 (100.0%) 201,905 (100.0%) 





Table 43.  Circuit Court Where the Defendant was Sentenced by Citizenship 
Variable             U.S. Citizen      Non-U.S. Citizen 
Description       N  Percent     N         Percent 
D.C. Circuit 4,134 (1.1%) 570 (0.3%) 
First Circuit 11,372 (3.0%) 3,692 (2.2%) 
Second Circuit 28,856 (7.5%) 16,595 (9.8%) 
Third Circuit 21,440 (5.6%) 5,006 (2.9%) 
Fourth Circuit 46,723 (12.2%) 5,012 (2.9%) 
Fifth Circuit 55,861 (14.6%) 39,233 (23.1%) 
Sixth Circuit 40,403 (10.6%) 3,358 (2.0%) 
Seventh Circuit 21,576 (5.6%) 2,868 (1.7%) 
Eighth Circuit 28,818 (7.5%) 4,735 (2.8%) 
Ninth Circuit 56,709 (14.8%) 61,148 (35.9%) 
Tenth Circuit 21,094 (5.5%) 11,373 (6.7%) 
Eleventh Circuit 45,748 (12.0%) 16,507 (9.7%) 
TOTAL* 382,734 (100.0%) 170,097 (100.0%) 
* There were 19,709 cases in the dataset where the Circuit Court and/or Citizenship variables were missing. 
 
Table 44.  Defendant’s Number of Counts of Conviction 
 Standard  Range 
N Mean Median Deviation Minimum Maximum 
570,812 1.55 1.00 2.884 1 495 
* There were 1,728 cases in the dataset where the Counts of Conviction variable was missing. 
 
Table 45.  Defendant’s Number of Counts of Conviction by Gender 
 Standard     Range 
N Mean Median Deviation Min. Max. 
Male 486,574 1.57 1.00 2.930 1 495 
Female 83,569 1.46 1.00 2.606 1 222  






Table 46.  Defendant’s Number of Counts of Conviction by Race and Ethnicity 
 Standard     Range 
N Mean Median Deviation Min. Max. 
White 189,480 1.80 1.00 4.063 1 495 
Black 148,263 1.62 1.00 2.367 1 158 
Hispanic 201,637 1.26 1.00 1.680 1 225 
Other 22,107 1.60 1.00 2.640 1 101  
* There were 11,053 cases in the dataset where the Counts of Conviction and/or Race and Ethnicity 
variables were missing. 
 
Table 47.  Defendant’s Number of Counts of Conviction by Gender and Race and  
 Ethnicity Variables Combined 
 Standard     Range 
N Mean Median Deviation Min. Max. 
White Male 156,757 1.86 1.00 4.245 1 495 
White Female 32,699 1.55 1.00 3.032 1 93 
Black Male 123,096 1.65 1.00 2.410 1 158 
Black Female 25,161 1.46 1.00 2.133 1 93 
Hispanic Male 181,677 1.26 1.00 1.563 1 225 
Hispanic Female 19,766 1.31 1.00 2.516 1 222 
Other Male 17,944 1.61 1.00 2.697 1 101 
Other Female 4,130 1.53 1.00 2.385 1 51 
* There were 11,310 cases in the dataset where the Counts of Conviction or the Gender variable or the 
Race and Ethnicity variable were missing.  The “Other” race category includes Asians, American Indians, 
Pacific Islanders, & Alaska Natives. 
Table 48.  Defendant’s Number of Counts of Conviction by Citizenship Status 
 Standard     Range 
N Mean Median Deviation Min. Max. 
U.S. Citizen 382,692 1.68 1.00 3.259 1 495 
Non-Citizen 170,073 1.27 1.00 1.862 1 266 






Table 49.  Defendant’s Disposition  
Variable Description     N  Percent 
Guilty Plea 534,728 (93.4%) 
Nolo Contendere 455 (0.1%) 
Jury Trial 33,790 (5.9%) 
Trial by Judge or Bench Trial 594 (0.1%) 
Both Guilty Plea & Trial (>1 count) 612 (0.1%) 
Missing 2,361 (0.4%) 
TOTAL 572,540 (100.0%) 
Table 50.  Defendant’s Disposition by Gender 
Variable     Male    Female 
Description       N  Percent     N         Percent 
Plea 454,612 (93.6%) 79,906 (95.8%) 
Trial 30,868 (6.4%) 3,503 (4.2%) 
TOTAL* 485,480 (100.0%) 83,409 (100.0%) 
* There were 3,651 cases in the dataset where the Disposition and/or Gender variables were missing. 
 
Table 51.  Defendant’s Disposition by Race and Ethnicity 
Variable       White      Black      Hispanic 
Description  N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Plea 177,339 (93.8%) 134,549 (91.0%) 193,759 (96.3%) 
Trial 11,681 (6.2%) 13,336 (9.0%) 7,530 (3.7%) 
TOTAL* 189,020 (100.0%) 147,885 (100.0%) 201,289 (100.0%) 
* There were 22,056 cases in the “Other” race category and 12,290 cases were missing these variables. 
 
Table 52.  Defendant’s Disposition by Citizenship Status 
Variable     U.S. Citizen     Non-U.S. Citizen 
Description       N  Percent     N         Percent 
Plea 354,811 (92.9%) 163,077 (96.1%) 
Trial 26,983 (7.1%) 6,688 (3.9%) 
TOTAL* 381,794 (100.0%) 169,765 (100.0%) 





Table 53.  Defendant’s Departure Status 
Variable Description     N  Percent 
No Departure 363,549 (63.5%) 
Upward Departure 4,384 (0.8%) 
Downward Departure 71,459 (12.5%) 
Substantial Assistance Departure 97,063 (17.0%) 
Missing 36,085 (6.3%) 
TOTAL 572,540 (100.0%) 
Table 54.  Defendant’s Departure Status by Gender 
Variable     Male    Female 
Description       N  Percent     N         Percent 
No Departure 310,469 (67.9%) 52,741 (67.0%) 
Upward Departure 4,071 (0.9%) 312 (0.4%) 
Downward Departure 61,283 (13.4%) 10,131 (12.9%) 
Sub. Assist. Departure 81,509 (17.8%) 15,507 (19.7%) 
TOTAL* 457,332 (100.0%) 78,691 (100.0%) 
* There were 36,517 cases in the dataset where the Departure and/or Gender variables were missing. 
 
Table 55.  Defendant’s Departure Status by Race and Ethnicity 
Variable       White      Black      Hispanic 
Description  N Percent N Percent N Percent 
No Departure 119,773 (66.3%) 100,408 (71.0%) 124,355 (66.1%) 
Upward Depart 1,839 (1.0%) 1,177 (0.8%) 947 (0.5%) 
Down Depart 19,222 (10.6%) 9,813 (6.9%) 39,697 (21.1%) 
Sub. Assist.  39,710 (22.0%) 30,021 (21.2%) 23,225 (12.3%) 
TOTAL* 180,544 (100.0%) 141,419 (100.0%) 188,224 (100.0%) 
* There were 20,772 cases in the “Other” race category and 41,581 cases were missing these variables. 
 
Table 56.  Defendant’s Departure Status by Citizenship Status 
Variable     U.S. Citizen     Non-U.S. Citizen 
Description       N  Percent     N         Percent 
No Departure 247,740 (67.7%) 106,376 (67.2%) 
Upward Departure 3,482 (1.0%) 851 (0.5%) 
Downward Departure 35,496 (9.7%) 34,483 (21.8%) 
Sub. Assist. Departure 79,001 (21.6%) 16,648 (10.5%) 
TOTAL* 365,719 (100.0%) 158,358 (100.0%) 




Table 57.  Defendant’s Departure Status by Gender and Race and Ethnicity  
 Variables Combined 
 Judicial Downward       Substan. Assist. 
Variable    No Departure                Departure    Departure 
Description  N Percent N Percent N Percent 
White Male 99,205 (27.6%) 15,410 (21.7%) 32,937 (34.2%) 
White Female 20,556 (5.7%) 3,812 (5.4%) 6,771 (7.0%) 
Black Male 83,323 (23.2%) 7,796 (11.0%) 25,297 (26.3%) 
Black Female 17,080 (4.8%) 2,017 (2.8%) 4,724 (4.9%) 
Hispanic Male 112,907 (31.4%) 35,906 (50.6%) 19,891 (20.7%) 
Hispanic Female 11,358 (3.2%) 3,769 (5.3%) 3,328 (3.5%) 
Other Male 11,862 (3.3%) 1,867 (2.6%) 2,770 (2.9%) 
Other Female 2,822 (0.8%) 452 (0.6%) 579 (0.6%)  
TOTAL * 359,113 (100.0%) 71,029 (100.0%) 96,297 (100.0%) 
* There were 41,742 cases where the Departure variable, Gender variable, or Race and Ethnicity variable 
information was missing.  There were also 4,359 cases that were given upward departures, but are not 
included in this table.  The “Other” race category includes Asians, American Indians, Pacific Islanders, & 
Alaska Natives. 
 
Table 58.  Circuit Court Where the Defendant was Sentenced by Departure 
 Judicial Downward       Substan. Assist. 
Variable    No Departure                Departure    Departure 
Description  N Percent N Percent N Percent 
D.C. Circuit 3,328 (72.4%) 410 (8.9%) 825 (18.0%) 
First Circuit 11,073 (72.7%) 1,450 (9.5%) 2,550 (16.7%) 
Second Circuit 25,972 (60.7%) 7,779 (18.2%) 8,747 (20.4%) 
Third Circuit 15,991 (60.2%) 1,928 (7.3%) 8,451 (31.8%) 
Fourth Circuit 36,942 (74.4%) 2,098 (4.2%) 10,188 (20.5%) 
Fifth Circuit 70,000 (72.6%) 11,219 (11.6%) 14,374 (14.9%) 
Sixth Circuit 30,302 (69.5%) 2,571 (5.9%) 10,416 (23.9%) 
Seventh Circuit 17,798 (74.1%) 1,333 (5.5%) 4,650 (19.4%) 
Eighth Circuit 23,116 (69.1%) 2,847 (8.5%) 7,177 (21.5%) 
Ninth Circuit 62,811 (58.4%) 31,367 (29.2%) 12,517 (11.6%) 
Tenth Circuit 22,331 (71.2%) 5,051 (16.1%) 3,770 (12.0%) 
Eleventh Circuit 43,885 (71.7%) 3,406 (5.6%) 13,398 (21.9%) 
TOTAL* 363,549 (67.8%) 71,459 (13.3%) 97,063 (18.1%) 
* There were 36,085 cases where the Departure variable or Circuit Court variable was missing.  There were 





Table 59.  Defendant’s Receipt of Prison Sentence (In/Out Status) 
Variable Description     N  Percent 
Non-Prison Sentence 62,531 (60.9%) 
Prison Sentence 40,139 (39.1%) 
TOTAL * 102,670 (100.0%) 
* There were 469,870 defendants who were either not sentenced within range, or located in Zones C or D, 
or missing this information. 
 
Table 60.  Defendant’s Receipt of Prison Sentence (In/Out Status) by Fiscal Year 
Variable       Non-Prison Sentence      Prison Sentence 
Description       N  Percent     N         Percent 
FY 1993 6,768 (71.8%) 2,653 (28.2%) 
FY 1994 5,915 (71.7%) 2,332 (28.3%) 
FY 1995 5,405 (69.6%) 2,358 (30.4%) 
FY 1996 5,392 (66.4%) 2,727 (33.6%) 
FY 1997 5,805 (61.9%) 3,574 (38.1%) 
FY 1998 5,171 (60.6%) 3,367 (39.4%) 
FY 1999 5,565 (61.5%) 3,490 (38.5%) 
FY 2000 5,596 (54.4%) 4,685 (45.6%) 
FY 2001 5,263 (56.9%) 3,985 (43.1%) 
FY 2002 5,389 (53.9%) 4,601 (46.1%) 
FY 2003 6,262 (49.6%) 6,367 (50.4%) 
* There were 469,870 defendants who were either not sentenced within range, or located in Zones C or D, 
or missing this information. 
 
Table 61.  Defendant’s Receipt of Prison Sentence (In/Out Status) by Gender 
Variable     Male    Female 
Description       N  Percent     N         Percent 
Non-Prison Sentence 41,316 (55.3%) 20,542 (75.6%) 
Prison Sentence 33,348 (44.7%) 6,619 (24.4%) 
TOTAL * 74,664 (100.0%) 27,161 (100.0%) 
* There were 845 cases in the dataset where the Gender variable was missing.  The other 469,870 





Table 62.  Defendant’s Receipt of Prison Sentence (In/Out Status) by Racial and  
 Ethnic Category 
Variable       White      Black      Hispanic 
Description  N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Non-Prison 30,012 (75.2%) 15,886 (68.7%) 9,596 (32.6%) 
Prison Sentence 9,879 (24.8%) 7,228 (31.3%) 19,824 (67.4%) 
TOTAL* 39,891 (100.0%) 23,114 (100.0%) 29,420 (100.0%) 
* There were 5,844 cases in the “Other” race category and 4,401 cases were missing these variables.  The 
other 469,870 defendants were not sentenced within range, or located in Zones C or D, or missing this 
information. 
 
Table 63.  Defendant’s Receipt of Prison Sentence (In/Out Status) by Gender and 
 Race and Ethnicity Variables Combined 
Variable       Non-Prison Sentence    Prison Sentence 
Description       N  Percent     N         Percent 
White Male 21,384 (74.1%) 7,482 (25.9%) 
White Female 8,622 (78.3%) 2,393 (21.7%) 
Black Male 8,808 (62.9%) 5,203 (37.1%) 
Black Female 7,074 (77.8%) 2,023 (22.2%) 
Hispanic Male 6,862 (27.4%) 18,168 (72.6%) 
Hispanic Female 2,724 (63.2%) 1,583 (36.8%) 
Other Male 2,567 (64.1%) 1,435 (35.9%) 
Other Female 1,427 (78.4%) 394 (21.6%)  
TOTAL * 59,468 (60.6%) 38,681 (39.4%)  
* There were 4,521 cases in the dataset where the Prison or Gender or Race and Ethnicity variables were 
missing.  The other 469,870 defendants were not sentenced within range, or located in Zones C or D or 
missing this information.  The “Other” race category includes Asians, American Indians, Pacific Islanders, 
& Alaska Natives. 
 
Table 64.  Defendant’s Receipt of Prison Sentence (In/Out Status) by Citizenship 
Variable             U.S. Citizen      Non-U.S. Citizen 
Description       N  Percent     N         Percent 
Non-Prison Sentence 49,603 (74.3%) 7,950 (28.5%) 
Prison Sentence 17,148 (25.7%) 19,957 (71.5%) 
TOTAL * 66,751 (100.0%) 27,907 (100.0%) 
* There were 8,012 cases in the dataset where the Prison and/or Citizenship variables were missing.  The 
other 469,870 defendants were not sentenced within range, or located in Zones C or D, or missing this 
information. 
 
Table 65. Defendant’s Receipt of Prison Sentence (In/Out Status) by Gender and Fiscal Year
Males Females
Variable Non-Prison Sentence Prison Sentence Non-Prison Sentence Prison Sentence
Description N Percent N Percent N Percent N Percent
FY 1993 4,557 (67.7%) 2,178 (32.3%) 2,192 (82.2%) 475 (17.8%)
FY 1994 3,930 (67.0%) 1,933 (33.0%) 1,981 (83.2%) 399 (16.8%)
FY 1995 3,750 (65.9%) 1,939 (34.1%) 1,647 (79.8%) 416 (20.2%)
FY 1996 3,596 (61.3%) 2,275 (38.7%) 1,794 (79.9%) 452 (20.1%)
FY 1997 4,012 (57.8%) 2,929 (42.2%) 1,777 (73.6%) 636 (26.4%)
FY 1998 3,400 (55.6%) 2,716 (44.4%) 1,764 (73.2%) 645 (26.8%)
FY 1999 3,583 (56.0%) 2,820 (44.0%) 1,981 (74.9%) 663 (25.1%)
FY 2000 3,673 (48.7%) 3,875 (51.3%) 1,837 (70.9%) 753 (29.1%)
FY 2001 3,482 (50.6%) 3,399 (49.4%) 1,747 (74.9%) 586 (25.1%)
FY 2002 3,435 (47.2%) 3,835 (52.8%) 1,838 (71.8%) 723 (28.2%)
FY 2003 3,898 (41.7%) 5,449 (58.3%) 1,984 (69.5%) 871 (30.5%)
Table 66. Defendant’s Receipt of Prison Sentence (In/Out Status) by Race/Ethnicity and Fiscal Year
White Black Hispanic
Variable Non-Prison Prison Non-Prison Prison Non-Prison Prison
Description N Percent N Percent N Percent N Percent N Percent N Percent
FY 1993 3,749 (78.4%) 1,034 (21.6%) 1,794 (71.6%) 712 (28.4%) 697 (48.4%) 743 (51.6%)
FY 1994 3,160 (78.1%) 884 (21.9%) 1,641 (72.9%) 609 (27.1%) 636 (47.0%) 716 (53.0%)
FY 1995 2,810 (77.1%) 836 (22.9%) 1,393 (70.6%) 580 (29.4%) 724 (48.4%) 772 (51.6%)
FY 1996 2,658 (77.1%) 788 (22.9%) 1,290 (70.5%) 539 (29.5%) 928 (42.8%) 1,241 (57.2%)
FY 1997 2,618 (74.8%) 880 (25.2%) 1,435 (67.2%) 700 (32.8%) 1,136 (40.0%) 1,706 (60.0%)
FY 1998 2,409 (73.8%) 856 (26.2%) 1,383 (70.3%) 584 (29.7%) 898 (34.8%) 1,679 (65.2%)
FY 1999 2,531 (75.9%) 803 (24.1%) 1,565 (69.2%) 695 (30.8%) 953 (35.8%) 1,711 (64.2%)
FY 2000 2,629 (74.3%) 907 (25.7%) 1,379 (64.4%) 761 (35.6%) 968 (26.5%) 2,685 (73.5%)
FY 2001 2,312 (75.1%) 768 (24.9%) 1,275 (67.4%) 618 (32.6%) 864 (27.9%) 2,236 (72.1%)
FY 2002 2,482 (71.0%) 1,014 (29.0%) 1,306 (66.4%) 660 (33.6%) 819 (25.2%) 2,437 (74.8%)




Table 67.  Defendant’s Sentence Length (in months) 
 Standard          Range 
N Mean Median Deviation  Min. Max. 
452,438 59.35 34.00 73.200 1 470 
* There were 120,102 cases in the dataset where the Sentence Length variable was missing. 
 
Table 68.  Defendant’s Sentence Length by Gender 
Variable      Standard     Range 
Description N      Mean Median Deviation Min. Max. 
Male 404,385 62.20 37.00 75.264 1 470 
Female 47,729 35.41 21.00 46.114 1 470  
* There were 120,426 cases in the dataset where the Sentence Length and/or Gender variables were 
missing. 
 
Table 69.  Defendant’s Sentence Length by Race and Ethnicity 
Variable      Standard     Range 
Description N      Mean Median Deviation Min. Max. 
White 133,560 51.51 30.00 64.500 1 470 
Black 121,814 88.23 60.00 93.264 1 470 
Hispanic 178,333 46.30 29.00 56.804 1 470 
Other 15,444 51.06 27.00 68.091 1 470  






Table 70.  Defendant’s Sentence Length by Gender and Race and Ethnicity  
 Variables Combined 
Variable       Standard     Range 
Description  N      Mean Median Deviation Min. Max. 
White Male  115,944 54.43 31.00 66.819 1 470 
White Female 17,606 32.30 18.00 41.597 1 470 
Black Male 107,829 94.28 60.00 95.398 1 470 
Black Female 13,982 41.58 24.00 56.005 1 470 
Hispanic Male 164,382 47.34 30.00 57.879 1 470 
Hispanic Female 13,810 34.23 24.00 40.256 1 470 
Other Male 13,467 54.37 30.00 70.718 1 470 
Other Female 1,969 28.46 16.00 39.469 1 470  
* There were 123,551 cases in the dataset where the Sentence Length and/or Race and Ethnicity variables 
were missing.  The “Other” category includes Asians, American Indians, Pacific Islanders, & Alaska 
Natives. 
 
Table 71.  Defendant’s Sentence Length by Citizenship 
Variable      Standard     Range 
Description N      Mean Median Deviation Min. Max. 
U.S. Cit. 292,365 68.41 40.00 80.470 1 470 
Non-Cit. 151,371 42.80 24.00 52.773 1 470  
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